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INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution explicitly provides congressional
authority for laws governing creations of the mind in the Constitutional provision that Congress "shall have Power To ... promote

the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."' Divided into copyright laws

for the "Authors ... to their respective Writings,"2 and patent laws
for the "Inventors ... to their... Discoveries," Congress accorded

definable rights to these expressions of creativity as the property
of the intellect, hence intellectual property.' As with all property
rights, however, the same government which grants these rights in
intellectual property may similarly redeem or revoke such rights for
the public welfare. Although discussion of the United States's
power to usurp property for the public welfare commonly involves
real property, this eminent domain power 4 extends to personal

I U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2 See Lionel M. Lavenue, Note, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l
Copyrightabilityfor the User Interface of Computer Software in the United States and the
InternationalRealm, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 289 (1992) (describing development of
copyright law from 1909 Act to 1976 Act, with emphasis on copyrightability of computer
programs in United States).
' Hegel first utilized the term "intellectual property" to encompass the broad expanse of
intangibles which a person conjures with the mind in contrast to the tangible forms of
property created by the hands. See GEORG HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
§ 43 (H.B. Nisbet trans. 1991) (discussing externalization of spirit through knowledge,
sciences, and talents to become things); see also Mary B. Percifull, Note, Digital Sampling:
Creative or Just Plain "CHEEZ-OID?"42 CASE W. RES. 1263, 1293 (1992) (considering
Hegelian theory ofintellectual property). Intellectual property law encompasses five primary
means to protect the products of the intellect, specifically patent law, copyright law,
trademark law, trade secret law, and mask work protection.
4 Eminent domain characterizes the inherent power of federal and state governments to
take private property for public use without the owner's consent. P. SACKMAN, NICHOL'S THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1985). By delegated authority, however,
counties, municipalities, and even private parties may exercise the power as well. JACQUES
B. GELUN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1, at 1 (1982).
While the term "eminent domain" originated with the works of Hugo Grotius, its modern
meaning traces to the King's prerogative. 5A GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2575, at 59 (1978). By this privilege, the King
maintained the right to acquire property in order to perform governmental functions. Id. at
58.
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property as well, including intellectual property.5
The eminent domain power, as defined in the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, forbids the expropriation (or "taking") by the
United States of "private property... for public use, without just
compensation."7 Thus, in all eminent domain proceedings, the
Government must consider the three issues: (1) "private property";
(2) "public use"; and (3) "just compensation."
First, private
property encompasses any property not held by a governmental
entity,' with neither the Constitution nor the eminent domain
power immunizing certain types of property from government
expropriation.' ° Second, the eminent domain power applies only
to use by the general public." Finally, the justness of compensa-

' The rationale of patent and other intellectual property rights rests in promoting the
public good and the general welfare. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61, 95-96 (1986). The rationale of eminent domain rests in the same
source. Id. Eminent domain may apply as to intellectual property as a statutorily created
form of personal property. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (defining patent as possessing
"attributes of personal property").
6 The King's prerogative predated any limitations.
William B. Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553-54 (1972). The King faced the first
limitation to the prerogative in 1215 A.D. with the signing of the Magna Carta. See MAGNA
CARTA, ch. XXIX ("no Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his Freehold
... but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land"). Similarly, the doctrine
of eminent domain predated any limitations. Stoebuck, supra, at 553. The Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution contains the first limits on the power of
eminent domain. Id. Despite the presence of the Fifth Amendment, almost one hundred
years passed before the United States Supreme Court first addressed limitations to the
power of eminent domain. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367, 371-72 (1876).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2576, at 71.
' For an overview of the various views of "private property," see Frank I. Michelman,
Property,Utility,and Fairness,Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "JustCompensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1967).
'0 THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2578, at 111. The rights and private ownership in all
property, both real and personal, tangible and intangible, remain subject to the power of the
sovereign through eminent domain. Id. at 112.
" Id. § 2577 at 81. "The existence of the power of eminent domain and the exercise
thereof are justified on the theory that the rights of individuals must yield to the public good,
and that the welfare of the state is paramount to that of the individual citizen." Id. § 2575
at 61. "The rule most generally adhered to is that the general public must have the right
to a definite and fixed use of the property appropriated, not as a mere matter of favor or by
permission of the owner, but as a matter of right." Id. § 2577 at 89. However, the line
separating private and public use have gradually blurred. MYRES S. McDoUGAL & DAVID
HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING, & DEVELOPMENT 900-02 (1948).
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tion for the taking generally requires judicial determination.12
While the federal government needs no statutory authority to take
private property, Congress has nonetheless provided for explicit
statutory taking authority in areas outside of normal condemnation
proceedings
in eminent domain, 13 including intellectual proper14
ty.

Despite the inclusion of intellectual property under takings law
jurisprudence, a historical distinction exists between the means of
compensation for the government expropriation of real and personal
property, particularly intellectual property."5 When the federal
government converts real property, the Fifth Amendment requires
only just compensation. In retrospect, when the government
converted intellectual property prior to 1910,16 conversion of
intellectual property 17 under the Fifth Amendment mandate faced

12THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 2582, at 196. In the taking of real property, the generalized

standard requires basing compensation on the damage suffered by the owner and not the
benefit derived by the Government.
1. GEORGE A. PINDAR, AMERICAN REAL ESTATE LAW § 2-4, at 32 (1976).
14
ROBERT KRATORIL & RAYMoND J. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW § 6.06(a), at 57 (9th ed.
1988).
"Jack M. Beerman, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism &
State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277,301 (1988). Ironically, although the majority
of American case law involves the taking of real property, precursors to the Fifth
Amendment considered only chattels and not real property. Leslie Bender, The Takings
Clause: Principles or Politics?,34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 752 (1985).
16
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992); United States
v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196, 218 (1882). Most commonly, a taking of property in violation
of the Fifth Amendment occurs "where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced
additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by having any artificial structure placed
on it, so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning
of the Constitution." Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872).
However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a variety of other types of
takings. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 311 (1987) (land use regulations "temporary" taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (nuisance laws as taking); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 119 (1978) (zoning laws as taking).
" As noted earlier, intellectual property includes patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade
secrets, and mask work rights. See supra note 3. The realm of Government transactions
involving intellectual property, however, includes a sixth area, "technical data rights."
Captain Donna C. Maizel, Trade Secrets and Technical DataRights in Government Contracts,
114 MIL. L. REv. 225, 225 (1986). "technical Data rights' encompass the rights ofthe owner
of certain data to the technical merit of reports, drawings, blueprints or any similar technical
data or information." Id. at 236. Since 1955, the Department of Defense has provided
regulatory protection for this type of data. Id.
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an encyclopedic series of common law tenancies and judicial
decrees. In 1910, however, Congress provided a statutory means
of redress for the unauthorized and uncompensated Government
use of patents in § 1498 of Title 28 of the United States Code."8
Focusing on this takings remedy for "patent infringement by the
Government," this Article examines the statutory remedy for patent
owners in the United States Court of Federal Claims when the
United States or contractors of the United States utilize a patent
without the consent of the owner. 9
Part I studies the history behind the introduction of a statutory
right of redress for patent infringement by the United States. Part
I first considers the evolution of venues for such claims, including:
(1) the congressional forum, where congressional committees hear
and decide disputes proffered by private bills or congressional
reference; (2) the quasi-judicial forum, where administrative
agencies dedicate decisional bodies to resolve disputes of fact and
issue recommendations of law to Congress; and (3) judicial fora,
which initially made recommendations to Congress but later gained
authority to make final rulings on fact and law. After describing
the various venues, Part I follows the development of the law for
claims of patent infringement against the United States, from its
genesis in congressional reference cases, through development of a
common law theory based on implied-in-fact contract, to development of a statutory basis for the assertion of patent infringement
against the United States culminating in the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1498.
Part II dissects 28 U.S.C. § 1498 into its component parts,
analyzing the role and effect of each element in the statutory
design and its application in case law. This Part also attempts to
ascertain the scope of jurisdiction, and thus the scope of protection
for a patentee.
Part III focuses upon the odd feature of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
whereby the statute actually enables the Government to engage in
patent infringement by contract. It explains how 28 U.S.C.
18

28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988).

As evident from its title, this Article considers not merely the use of patents by the
United States per se but also the use of patents by contractors of the United States. These
.contractors" represent individuals and businesses who enter into contracts with the United
States Government for the delivery of goods or performance of services.
'
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§ 1498(a) appears to induce patent infringement by authorizing
compensation to a patentee for any use or manufacture by or for
the United States without authorization and consent of the
patentee pursuant to a government contract. The Part also
delineates the other statutory sources of patent infringement
against the United States, from agency specific statutory schemes
to government wide specialized patent policies. It also contains the
implementing regulations for 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and portrays a
flow chart diagram and a hypothetical situation applying the
diagram. This hypothetical examines whether the regulatory
provisions apply to a particular Government contract, and if so,
what clauses apply.
Part IV examines the administrative problems of anticipated
patent infringement in bid protests and the issues relating to
patent infringement during contract performance. It then analyzes
the case law under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, distinguishing the cases by
the type of proceeding (summary judgment or trial), the type of
patent (utility, design, or plant), and the type of government
contract (supply or service, construction, or research and development). Part IV finally scrutinizes the characterization of an
assertion of patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an
action in eminent domain.
Part V reviews the rationale for a right of patent infringement
against the United States and critiques the two reasons for the
continuance of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). It then considers recommendations to change the statute, including the recent suggestions of the
Department of Defense Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law, particularly the recommendation of
direct suits for patent infringement against government contractors. This Article criticizes the recommendations based not only on
the adverse result upon small business, but also the effect upon
federal procurement in general with regard to fairness, competition,
cost, delay, and best technology. Finally, Part V turns to the
practicalities of suing the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a), employing a database of all reported suits depicting the
number of statutory patent infringement suits initiated against the
United States, the types of proceedings for the resolution of such
suits, and the win/loss ratios for these suits in the Court of Federal
Claims and Claims Court.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1995

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

398

[Vol. 2:389

This Article concludes by focusing on the unique nature of patent
infringement against the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 by examining the property right in a patent, the statutory
authorization of a compulsory license, and the function of the
eminent domain theory behind the statutory framework. Although
recommending a statutory amendment allowing the recovery of
attorneys' fees, the Article argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 has served
the United States, government contractors, and even patentees
well, and that any proposal to change the current statutory
framework should contemplate the long, successful history of the
statute.
I. TLHE GENESIS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT AGAINST
THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to Article I, Section 8, the United States Congress
passed the first patent act one year after the adoption of the United
States Constitution. ° In the same year, Samuel Hopkins of
Pittsford, Vermont received the first United States patent for a
process of making potash from wood ashes.2 1 Under the original
Act of 1790, patent applicants merely submitted patents to three
Government officials for review and consent.2 2 As this system
became increasingly burdensome, the Patent Act of 179323
transformed the United States patent system into a simple
registration process, similar to the copyright process today.2 4
Under the Patent Act of 1836, 25 as well as the Patent Act of
1870, 2' the current system of formal requirements and examina-

20 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790). See ROBERT P. MERGES,

PATENT
21 LAW AND POLICY 1-10 (1992) (presenting historical overview of American patent law).
Henry Paynter, The First U.S. Patent, AM. HERITAGE OF INVENTION AND TECH., Fall

1990, at 18.

WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 76-77 (1890). The Act authorized the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General, or any two, to grant a
patent for a term of fourteen years. I& at 77-79.
"' Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-21 (1793).
2

4 BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAw 126-

43 (1967).
2 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117-19 (1836) (repealed 1870).

" Patent Act of 1870, ch. 2301, 16 Stat. 198-201 (1870) (repealed 1952).
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tion procedures developed27 and carried forward into the Patent
Act of 1952. 28
A. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE VENUE

From the outset, the federal government has avoided liability for
its use of a patent by relying on sovereign immunity. Present in
England as far back as the thirteenth century,29 sovereign immunity originally immunized the King from suit by the English
citizenry in the courts of the King.' Although antithetical to the
concept of democratic government,3 ' sovereign immunity in the
United States traces its origins to the sovereign status of the King
of England. 2
The capacity to sue the United States Government finds its

27 P. J. Federico, TransitionalProblems of the New PatentAct, 35 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. Soc'y 325, 326 (1953).
2Patent
Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1-376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For an overview of the 1952 Act, see generally The Patent
Act of 1952, 34 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOCy 525, 548 (1952).
"As generally understood, sovereign immunity embodies the American tradition for
English monarchical convention that "the King can do no wrong." The tenant behind the
English theory maintained that, as the King created the courts and as the courts acted
subject to the King, the King could not be subject to the courts. W.S. Holdsworth, The
History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141, 143 (1922).
30 ROBERT D. WATKINS, THE STATE AS A PARTY LITIGANT 7 (1927). On occasion, however,
the King would grant a waiver of this immunity, typically pursuant to a "Petition of Right."

10 WILLIAM S. HoLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 13-17 (1926). In 1305, the King
designed the 'King in Parliament' to address these petitions, although the King continued
to entertain certain Petitions of Right himself. 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 197 (1923).
3"See NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATroRNEYS GENERAL, COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT LIABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS
OFFICIALS 1 (1979) [hereinafter SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY] ("This absolutist, monarchial notion
.. appears antithetical to the basic concept of democratic government... [because it] bars
the people, at whose pleasure and for whose benefit the government exists, from suing their
representatives when they have been wronged by them"); but see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1963) ("The
immunity of the sovereign from suit (sovereign immunity) and his capacity to violate or not
violate the law (the King can do no wrong') are distinct and independent concepts, for the
grant of consent is based precisely on the proposition that the King has acted contrary to
law").
3 Jaffe, supra note 31, at 1.
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genesis in the Declaration of Independence.3 3 Citing the King's
refusal to heed colonists' "petitions for redress," Jefferson berated
the King for failing to waive his immunity in his own courts.3 4
Thus, ironically, the desire to escape sovereign immunity comprises
a fundamental premise of the founding of this Nation.35
Despite Jefferson's protestations in the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation contained no provision for the

right of redress against the United States.36 Upon adopting the
Constitution in 1789, the Founding Fathers again failed to provide
a right to petition the Government.3 7 In the Bill of Rights,
however, the Founding Fathers remedied this oversight with an
explicit provision for the right to "petition the Government for a
redress of grievances" in the First Amendment.'
Although
indefinite, this mandate includes the right of petition of Congress
directly for grievances against the Government.3 9
1. The CongressionalForum. Following the Revolutionary War,
the Congress of the Articles of Confederation faced a plethora of
claims against the Government, particularly relating to the War of
Independence.4" Unable to adjudicate the claims, the Congress
established a quasi-judicial system for redress in the three-man
"Board of Treasury."4 ' Although temporary, the quasi-judicial

31Id.

"Jefferson wrote: "In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for relief in
the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated irjury."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 30 (U.S. 1776). Ironically, Jefferson became the
first administrator of the United States patent system. Outline of the History of the United
States Patent Office, J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'y, July 1936, at 64.
3Holdsworth, supra note 29, at 143.
' Cf. William R. Hartl, Note, Sovereign Immunity: An Outdated Doctrine FacesDemise
in a Changing JudicialArena, 69 N. DAK L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1993) (discussing sovereign
immunity in early America). Hartl records the first United States case in which a court
applied sovereign immunity. Id. In Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357 (1788), a

claimant sought compensation for 227 barrels of flour lost in the Revolutionary War. Id. at
357-58. The Supreme Court denied the claim based on sovereign immunity. Id. at 362-63.
" Walter Gellhorn & C. Newton Schenek, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government,
47 COLUM. L. REV. 722, 722 (1947).
U.S. CONST., amend. I.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 842 (1971).
40 2 WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A HISTORY 2 (1978).
'

39

41Id. at 3 (quoting William M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims,
20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 389 (1968)). From 1776 to 1784, the Congress would normally have
delegated the administrative responsibilities for such claims to the Superintendent of
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board actually was the first body to decide claims against the
Government under the Articles of Confederation.42 More importantly, the board operated
under the first explicit waiver of
43
immunity.
sovereign
Following the ratification of the Constitution and the establishment of the United States, claims for redress fared no better under
the new system of government. 44 Under a "private bill" system,4'
claimants against the Government submitted claims to their
Legislator or Senator for presentation to the full Congress.46
Thus, Congress acted as the administrative tribunal for the
resolution of private claims. 47 As under the Articles of Confederation, Congress found these private proceedings before the entire
Congress created not only delay but also impropriety." Accordingly, Congress adopted a procedure similar to that under the
Articles of Confederation, relegating such claims to the newly

Finance, Robert Morris. Unable to trust Morris, however, the Congress awaited his
departure and then established the "Board of Treasury after he left office in 1784." William
M. Wiecek, The Origin of the United States Court of Claims, 20 ADMIN. L. REV. 387, 389
(1968).
4 COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 2-3.

' Id. In the absence of any constitutional procedures for the "petition of redress," the
Congress of the Articles of Confederation initially waived sovereign immunity for such claims
by private relief bills. Brian R. Levey, Tortious Government Conduct and the Government
Contract: Tort, Breach of Contract, or Both?, 42 CATH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992).
" Harold J. Krent, ReconceptualizingSovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1544
(1992); see generally Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims againstthe United States:
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625
(1985) (discussing Congress's various means for addressing sovereign immunity).
' Shimomura, supra note 44, at 644. A private bill comprises a bill which a legislator
presents to Congress for the benefit of a private party. Michael Rust, Comment, Expansion
of the Feres Doctrine, 32 EMORY L.J. 237, 238 n.5 (1983); see generally Note, PrivateBills in
Congress, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1684 (1966) (explaining role of private bills in legislature).
46 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Claims Court at the Crossroads,40 CATH. L. REv. 517, 520
(1991).
47 COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 4.
48 Id. In 1832, John Quincy Adams complained

that private bills expended "half of the
time" of Congress. Alexander Holtzoff, Tort ClaimsAgainst the United States, 25 A.B.A. J.
828 (1939) (quoting diary of John Quincy Adams, February 23, 1832). When Senator Richard
Broadhead submitted the Court of Claims Act of 1855, he stated that private bills expended
one-third of the time of the Senate. 30 CONG. GLOBE 33 Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1854). Congress
enacted the Court of Claims Act in part to prevent "frauds upon the Treasury of the United
States." Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 81, § 1, 10 Stat. 170 (1853) (repealed 1855). For a
discussion of the claims system by private bill, see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,
25 n.9 (1953).
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created Treasury Department.4 9
2. The Quasi-Judicial Forum. Other than by private bill,
alternative procedures of prosecuting petitions of redress against
the United States continued as under the Articles of Confederation,
with the Comptroller of the Treasury instead of the Articles' Board
of Treasury handling the administrative responsibilities.'
Until
the early 1800's, except for the direct petition of Congress by
private bill, such claims constituted the sole route of redress
against the Government.5 1 However, unlike a finding of Congress
under a private bill, the conclusions of the Department of Treasury
remained subject to congressional approval. Thus, the Comptroller
of the Treasury served only a quasi-judicial role.52 Because of the
Comptroller's lackluster history, by the 1840's, Congress began to
demand a separate means to resolve private claims against the
United States.' In response to the delays caused by congressional resolution of private claims and congressional supervision for
the Department of Treasury decisions, Congress eventually
considered a permanent judicial body to hear and adjudicate claims
against the United States. 54
3. The JudicialFora. On December 6, 1854, Senator Broadhead
of Pennsylvania introduced a bill calling for the establishment of an
administrative commission for the resolution of claims against the
United States, a "Commission for the Examination of and Adjust-

49 COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 4.

60 Id.
51Id. at 4-7.
"2 Wiecek, supra note 41, at 389-90. Submission of a claim to the Department of Treasury
began upon receipt of a "public account" by Congress, after which the auditor of Congress
would certify the balance and submit the account to the Comptroller of the Treasury for
proceedings. Id. at 389. Although the exact procedures remain unknown, the Comptroller
recommended a course of action to Congress after some form of fact-finding. Id.
James Madison attempted to make the decisions of the Comptroller final, with appeals to
the United States Supreme Court, but Congress rejected the proposal. Id. at 390.
Apparently, Congress considered such a proposal a violation of Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution. Id. at 389-90.
5' Id. at 394-95. By 1855, Congress had considered nine different bills to change the dual
private bill/Department of Treasury claim system. Id. at 395.
4Id. at 12-13.
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ment of Private Claims."' Fourteen days later, he and two other
Senators introduced a substitute bill calling for the establishment
of a judicial body for the resolution of such claims."6 This bill,
entitled "An Act to Establish a Court for the Investigation of
Claims against the United States, 517 later became known as the
Court of Claims Act of 1855.58 On February 24, 1855, President
Franklin Pierce signed the bill.5" The Court of Claims Act created
the first permanent judicial body to adjudicate claims against the
United States-the United States Court of Claims., °
a. Venue for Trial.
i. United States Court of Claims. Under the statement of
purpose for the original Court of Claims Act of 1855, the Court of
Claims maintained only limited jurisdiction.6
The Court of
Claims Act granted jurisdiction over any claim founded upon (1)
any law of Congress; (2) any regulation of the Executive Department; or (3) any contract with the United States Government,
express or implied.62 Subsequently, Congress extended general
jurisdiction over certain classes of cases and over particularly
difficult matters by passage of "special jurisdiction statutes."'
In 1887, Congress enacted the jurisdictional cornerstone of the
55 30 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1854). As a member of the Senate Committee
on Claims, Senator Broadhead remained well aware of the problems facing the dual claim
procedures, especially relating to congressional reference claims. COWEN ET AL., supra note
40, at 13.
" COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 13.
57Id. at 14.
5 Id.
59 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
60 COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 15. The original Court of Claims comprised a scant
three judges, and the decisions remained subject to the review of Congress. Id.
61
J.C. DEVEREUX, THE COURT OF CLAMS, ITS ORIGINS AND PROGRESS, DEVEREUX COURT
OF CLAIMS REPORTS--APPENDIX 16-17 n.* (1856). As an indication of the limited nature of
the new court's jurisdiction, the Court of Claims began with only three judges, John James
Gilchrist, Isaac N. Blackford, and George P. Scarburgh. COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 19.
a Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855). The original statement ofjurisdiction
recited jurisdiction over "all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the
government of the United States .... and also all claims which may be referred to said court
by either house of Congress." Id. § 1. Notably, even from the inception, the Court of Claims
had no jurisdiction over tort claims. Gibbons v. United States, 8 U.S. (Wall.) 269,275 (1868).
Apparently, Congress limited jurisdiction as to not grant too much authority to the new
court.
63 COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 25.
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Court of Claims, the Tucker Act.6" The Tucker Act empowered the
Court of Claims to adjudicate almost any money claim against the
United States" other than those "sounding in tort.'
Under the
original Court of Claims Act, as well as under the Tucker Act,
however, the Court of Claims did not possess equity jurisdiction.67
Nonetheless, the court maintained authority to adjudicate impliedin-fact contracts, a sort of equitable remedy." Yet despite this
broad new jurisdiction, Congress continued to expand the court's
jurisdiction by special statutes encompassing such diverse areas as
Indian claims, congressional reference, and other highly specific
areas. In spite of this expanding jurisdiction, and the Tucker Act's
extension of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction beyond simple
contracts to any claim "founded upon the Constitution," the
Supreme Court ruled that the Tucker Act did not extend jurisdic-

"Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887). Named for Representative Randolph Tucker of Virginia,
who sponsored the bill, the Tucker Act resulted from Representative Tucker's efforts to
mitigate the large number of private claims made to Congress. COWEN ET AL., supra note
40, at 39. The Act thus represented the second evolution of the original Court of Claims Act
of 1855. Id. at 39-40.
'6 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976). Pursuant to sovereign immunity, the
Tucker Act only waived Government immunity to those matters specifically enumerated in
the statute. Id. at 399. Nevertheless, the Court of Claims exercised wide authority,
extending jurisdiction to almost all money claims. Id. at 400-01.
's The term "not sounding in tort* means more than simply non-tort claims. Clapp v.
United States, 117 F. Supp. 576, 581, 127 Ct. Cl. 505 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834
(1954). In Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, F. Supp. 682, 129 Ct. Cl. 53, 122 (1954),
for example, the Court of Claims recognized:
When Congress, having expressly given this court jurisdiction of claims
"founded upon any express or implied contract with the United States,"
in the very next clause gave the court jurisdiction over claims "for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort," it
must have supposed that there are non-contractual claims which do not
sound in tort.
122 F. Supp. at 683-84. This interpretation serves as the source of theory that the Court of
Claims maintains jurisdiction over essentially all money claims against the United States,
except those "sounding in tort." Cf. Simanonok v. Simanonok, 918 F.2d 947, 954 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (holding that "Claims Court lacks jurisdiction over claims sounding only in tort")
(emphasis added).
61 United States v. Jones, 131 U.S. 1 (1889).
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1047, 1059-60, 228 Ct. Cl. 146,
164 (1981). For a further discussion of implied-in-fact contracts, see infra notes 98-115 and
accompanying text.
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tion over the tort of patent infringement.6 9
ii. United States Claims Court. Pursuant to the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA),7 ° Congress reorganized

the structure of the Court of Claims, splitting the court into the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) and the United States Claims Court (Claims Court).7 '
The existing judges of the Court of Claims, along with the judges

of the abolished United States Court of Customs and Patent72

Appeals (CCPA), became the first judges of the Federal Circuit.
The trial commissioners of the Court of Claims became the first
judges of the Claims Court. 73 The FCIA empowered the Article I
judges of the Claims Court with the same jurisdiction as the
original Court of Claims,7 4 while the Act empowered the Federal
Circuit with full appellate review of the Claims Court's deci-

" Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894). In Schillinger, a claimant sought
jurisdiction over a patent infringement claim under the Tucker Act. Id. at 167. The
claimant recited the taking clause of the Fifth Amendment as a claim "founded upon the
Constitution." Id. Reciting the same reasons as those cited in United States v. Palmer, 128
U.S. 262 (1888), the Supreme Court denied the claim as that of a tort and not of a
.constitutional claim." Id. at 168. For a discussion of the Palmercase, see infra notes 106107 and accompanying text. Ironically, despite the introduction of a statutory right of patent
infringement against the United States per 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the rule ofSchillingerv. United
States remains valid today.
70
Pub. L. No. 97-164, ch. 7, § 105(a), 96 Stat. 27, 28 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1988)).
7
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the AdministrativeLawmaking System, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1112 n.2 (1990).
' Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal CourtsImprovement Act: A Practioner's
Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 392 (1984).
73 Id.
These judges required nomination and confirmation pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution and, primarily because of the continued ability to issue declaratory judgments
pursuant to congressional reference cases, initially only served fifteen year appointments.
28 U.S.C. § 171 (1988). In 1987, however, Congress authorized any judge not selected for
reappointment to take "senior judge" status for an indefinite term. 5 U.S.C. § 8331 (Supp.
IV 1993). In effect, the judges of the Claims Court (now the Court of Federal Claims) enjoy
a de facto life appointment.
"' The Honorable Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM.
U. L. REV. 1003, 1011 n.35 (1991). Although scholars have questioned the constitutionality
of the Claims Court and the Court of Federal Claims, both Article I courts, the Court of
Claims largely existed without question of its constitutionality. Id. Some scholars on the
Claims Court and the Court of Federal Claims, however, have expressed much trepidation
over the constitutionality of any court created under Article I of the Constitution. See
generally Joan E. Baker, Is the United States Claims Court Constitutional?,32 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 55 (1983) (discussing constitutional concerns resulting from creation of Claims Court).
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sions.7" The decisions of the Court of Claims, as well as of the
CCPA, remain binding precedent for the Claims Court as well as
the Federal Circuit.7"
iii. United States Court of Federal Claims. In conformity
with the Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural
Improvement Act (CFCTPIA) of 1992,"7 Congress renamed the
Claims Court the Court of Federal Claims and made several
refinements to the court's jurisdiction." The Act did not change
the jurisdiction of the new Court of Federal 79Claims over patent
infringement suits against the United States.
b. Venue for Appeal.
i. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Court of
Federal Claims.' Unlike the Court of Federal Claims, an Article
I court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) is an Article III court. Just as the Court of Federal Claims
follows precedents of the Court of Claims, unless a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit controls, the
75 41 U.S.C. § 609 (1988).
" South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). Due to
the nature ofappellate review by the United States circuit courts, several panels have sought
to diverge from the precedent of the Court of Claims or the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Rich, J., dissenting) (decrying panel's rejection of CCPA precedent, "(I]t is mutiny.
It is heresy. It is illegal.").
7 Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4516 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp.
V 1993)).
78 Hannon v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 142, 143 n.1 (1993). One impetus for the new
legislation was that many people frequently confused the United States Claims Court with
the Small Claims Court. Interview with David Lampen, Clerk, Court of Federal Claims, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1, 1992).
" Further, pursuant to General Order 33, the Court of Federal Claims adopted the same
Rules as applied by the Claims Court. MA. Morteuson Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 82,
89 n.5 (1993).
' See Sward & Page, supra note 72, at 392. Under the original appointment, the CAFC
had twelve judges, five from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and seven from the
Court of Claims. Thomas H. Case & Scott R. Miller, Note, An Appraisal of the Court of
Appeals for the FederalCircuit,57 S. CAL. L. REV. 301, 304 (1984). The judges of the Court
of Claims and CCPA became the first Circuit Judges of the Federal Circuit. The Honorable
S. Jay Plager, The United StatesCourt ofAppeals, The FederalCircuit,and the Non-Regional
Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 863
(1990).
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Federal Circuit follows precedents of the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals."1
ii. United States Supreme Court. Under the Act of March 3,
1863,82 later refined by the Act of March 17, 1866,m the United
States Supreme Court gained statutory authority to review the
decisions of the Court of Claims.' Until Congress changed the
structure of the Court of Claims in 1982, the Supreme Court
reviewed approximately 1795 decisions of the court,85 almost
fourteen cases a year. After Congress reorganized the Court of
Claims in 1982, however, the Supreme Court dramatically decreased the number of cases for which it granted certiorari. From
1982 to 1992, the Supreme Court has reviewed only seventeen
cases of the Federal Circuit,' and only nine cases have involved
decisions of the Claims Court, 7 less than a single case each year.
Of these nine cases, none involved patent infringement claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. In this regard, the Supreme Court
apparently has decided to grant great deference to the appellate
81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also Harold C. Petrowitz, Federal Court

Reform: The FederalCourts Improvement Act of 1982-And Beyond, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 543,
543 (1983).
82 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 5, 12 Stat. 765, 766, repealed by Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch.
19, 17 Stat. 9.
83 Act of Mar. 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 21-25.
Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, US File (April 1, 1994). Notably, of these 1795 cases,
only 116 regarded patent rights. Only eight regarded patent infringement specifically:
Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943); United States v. EsnaultPelterie, 303 U.S. 26 (1938); United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201 (1936);
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Colgate v. United States, 280 U.S. 43
(1929); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v.
United States, 275 U.S. 331 (1928); United States v. Societe Anonyme Des Anciens
Etablissements Cail, 224 U.S. 309 (1912).
" See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992); Cardinal Chem. Co. v.
Morton Intl Inc., 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992); United States v. Hill, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
' Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992); United States v. Thompson/Center
Arms Co., 502 U.S. 807 (1991); Montedoro Whitney Corp. v. Marsh McBirney, Inc., 498 U.S.
1061 (1991); United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132 (1989); United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 493 U.S. 889
(1989); Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 493 U.S. 806 (1989); Van Drasek v.
Webb, 481 U.S. 738 (1987); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239 (1987);
O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986); United States v. American Bar Endowment,
477 U.S. 105 (1986); United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834 (1986);
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809 (1986); United States v. City of Fulton, 475
U.S. 657 (1986); Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985).
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decisions of the Federal Circuit.
B. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW

As a court with jurisdiction primarily over money claims, but
expressly without jurisdiction over tort claims, the Court of Claims
traditionally had no jurisdiction over patent infringement claims
against the United States. Because the absence of a means to
redress patent infringement against the United States resulted in
substantial inequities to patentees, claimants and courts contrived
routes for remedy. Prior to the adoption of a statutory right to
bring a patent infringement claim against the United States,
practice and procedure relegated patentees to direct resolution by
congressional reference and indirect judicial resolution by impliedin-fact contract.
1. PatentInfringement Against the United States by Reference of
Congress. As noted earlier, the first claims of patent infringement
arose by private bill in Congress.' Claimants gained access to
this forum by simply requesting that a legislator submit a claim to
the full Congress. 9 When inventors submitted more and more
such private claims, Congress began to relegate many judicial
functions to the Court of Claims. 9 These congressional reference
cases found particular favor in cases of patent infringement against
the United States."
Through congressional reference, patentees initially gained
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims by two means, either by

' Fallon, supra note 46, at 520. The role of private bills for patent infringement tracks
the similar path of private bills for tort claims. John Astley, United States v. Johnson: Feres
Doctrine Gets New Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 191 (1988). As the
number of private bills began to grow, Congress developed other legal remedies to ease the
burden of such direct petitions on the Congress. See generally Walter Gellhorn & Louis
Lauer, CongressionalSettlement of Tort ClaimsAgainst the United States, 55 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 1-4 (1955) (describing congressional maneuvers to reduce use of private bills to settle tort
claims).
89 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 (1953). See generally 1 LESTER S. JAYSON,
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JuDIcIAL REMEDIES § 51, at 2-3

(1982) (discussing burden of private bills on Congress).
9o COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 53-57.
91

Id.
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asserting a claim of congressional reference under the Bowman
Act9 2 or under section 14 of the Tucker Act.93 In Forehand v.
United States," the inventor of a pistol cartridge gained a
congressional reference under the Bowman Act for a finding of fact
on patent infringement to the Court of Claims by the Senate
Committee on Claims. 95 Similarly, in Richardson v. United
States," the inventor of certain ordnance projectiles gained a
congressional reference under the Tucker Act for a reconsideration
of a previous finding of fact by the Court of Claims, even though
the court had already adjudicated the same issue. 97 As these two
cases demonstrate, claimants frequently used the congressional
reference as a means of last resort for pressing meritless claims.
Eventually Congress became overburdened by the requests for
claims by congressional reference and a means of direct action
before the Court of Claims developed based on common law.
2. Patent Infringement Against the United States Under the
Common Law. In Pitcher v. United States,9 8 the Court of Claims
rejected a patent infringement claim based on a theory of impliedin-fact contract. 9 Upon review of the claim, the Court of Claims
refused jurisdiction, finding no right to recover against the United
States under contract law principles."° Some thirty years later,
however, the Court of Claims reconsidered this position in McKeever v. United States.'
In McKeever, the Court of Claims first recognized an implied-infact contract theory for a patent infringement claim."0 2 As in

Ch. 116, § 1, 22 Stat. 485 (1883) (repealed).
"3Ch. 359, § 13, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988)).

"23 Ct. Cl. 477 (1888).
"Id. at 477-82. Finding that the inventor's claim was really for patent infringement, a
tort, the Court of Claims found no jurisdiction over that claim, and denied the claimant any
right to compensation under contract principles. Id

96 81 Ct. Cl. 948, 27 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 255 (1935).
97 81 Ct. Cl. at 949.

"1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863).
"Id. at 8.
'00 Id. at 9.
'0' 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878).
1"5 In McKeever, the Secretary of War had empaneled a board to select arms and
ordnance. Id. at 422. Inventors appeared before the board and offered their products for
sale. Id. McKeever had submitted two specimen "patent cartridge boxes" which the board
recommended to the Secretary of War. Id. at 422-23. The Secretary approved the
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Pitcher,the inventor in McKeever claimed entitlement to compensation on a theory of implied-in-fact contract, while the Government
argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the tort of patent
infringement. 0 3 Unlike the Pitcher court, however, the court in
McKeever expressly rejected the Government's position:
When a vendible article, such as ordinarily is the
subject of bargain and sale, is offered by a producer
to a consumer, though with no price specified, and is
accepted and used by the latter, it is not to be
supposed, on the one hand, that the offer was intended as a gift inter vivos, nor implied, on the other,
that the taking was with a tortious intent.' °4
Despite this finding, the viability of an implied-in-fact contract
remained
rationale for jurisdiction over patent infringement10claims
5
in doubt pending a ruling of the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Palmer,"° the United States Supreme Court
first mentioned the possibility of a common law cause of action
based on implied-in-fact contract.0 7 Later, in United States v.
Berdan Fire-Arms Manufacturing Co.," the Supreme Court
expressly affirmed this common-law right." 9 In Berdan FireArms, an inventor had submitted an invention for improvements to
When the government
firearms to the War Department. 10
subsequently used the invention without compensating the

recommendation, and the Ordnance Department began production without notification to
McKeever. Id. When he discovered the use, McKeever sued for patent infringement in the
Court
1 8 of Claims.
" McKeever, 14 Ct. Cl. at 422.
104 Id. The claimant argued there was no inconsistency with Pitcherv. United States. Id.
at 416.
10 Louis H. Le Mieux, Patent Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, 41 J. PAT. [&

TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 112, 117 (1959).
'06
128 U.S. 262 (1888).
'07

Id.

at 270-72.

In Palmer, the Court noted:

"Whether a patentee may waive an

infringement of his patent by the government, and sue upon an implied contract, is a
question on which we do not express an opinion." Id. at 272.
ID 156 U.S. 552 (1895).
lo See also United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871) (discussing scope of
jurisdiction of Court of Claims).
"o Berdan Fire-Arms, 156 U.S. at 553-55.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/2

22

Lavenue: Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Cont

1995]

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

411

patentee, the inventor initiated suit in the Court of Claims under
a theory of breach of implied-in-fact contract."1
The Court of
Claims ruled that an implied-in-fact contract resulted where the
Government assuredly assumed the obligation of payment for the
use of the invention.1 1 2 The Supreme Court affirmed liability,
even though the inventor had never discussed the terms of
compensation with the Government.1 Nevertheless, absent the
requisite showing for an implied-in-fact contract,' 14 and absent
congressional reference, the Court of Claims possessed no jurisdiction over patent infringement actions before the statutory authorization of such jurisdiction." 5
3. PatentInfringementAgainst the United States by Statute. On
June 25, 1910, Congress created the first statutory action for patent
infringement by the United States." 6 The 1910 Act sought to
resolve the inconsistencies and inequities of patent infringement
claims by reference of Congress, as well as by common law
doctrines." 7 The primary rationale of the 1910 Act was resolution of the incongruity whereby the government could engage in
patent infringement without incurring liability to the patentee. 118
In Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft,"9 the Supreme
.. Id. at 562-64.

Id. at 563.
.Id. at 562. Before the Supreme Court, the United States cited authority that recovery
for use of a patent required more than mere patent infringement, namely an implied-in-fact
contract. Id. Rejecting the existence of any facts to support an implied-in-fact contract, the
Government disclaimed liability. Berdan Fire-Arms, 156 U.S. at 562-63. In contrast, the
inventor attempted to demonstrate the elements of an implied-in-fact contract claim. Id. at
563-64. The Supreme Court found the facts on all fours with the factual situation in United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888), and rendered judgement in favor of the inventor. Id.
at 569. The Court noted: "That no price was agreed upon, or that the officers of the
Government were not authorized to agree upon a price, is immaterial.... The question is
whether there was a contract for the use, and not whether all the conditions of the use were
provided for in such contract." Id.
114 E.g., United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884); United States v.
Alexander, 148 U.S. 186, 191 (1893).
112

11

Le Mieux, supra note 105, at 114.

6

Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 851 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (Supp. IV
1992)).
117 H.R. REP. No. 1288, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (May 7, 1910).
"8 Id. at 1. See also Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 857, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The original legislative premise was to assure a remedy to
patentees.").
"

11

224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912).
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Court first considered the new statute. A German corporation
sought an injunction in the Court of Claims to prevent patent
infringement by the Army's Chief of Ordnance. 120 Although
recognizing the applicability of the 1910 Act,121 the Supreme
Court
rejected the suit based on the nature of the relief request22
ed.

1

In William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v.
International Curtis Marine Turbine Co.," 3 the Supreme Court
revisited the issue and severely restricted the application of the
1910 Act.124 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff
argued that the 1910 Act extended a defense to government
contractors by an implied license to infringe patents in the course
of such a contract."2 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and found that the 1910 Act extended protection in the absence of
specific contractual indemnification of the Government.1 26 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court engaged in too limited an interpretation of the 1910 Act, allowing recovery under the Act only for the
acts of Government employees acting within the scope of their

"2 Id. The corporation sought to enjoin production of field guns and carriages made after
the "Model of 1902," a type of gun and carriage for which the German corporation

maintained a United States patent. Id.

121
Id. After noting the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over a controversy involving
the use or manufacture of a patent by the United States pursuant to an implied-in-fact
contract, the Court recognized the newly authorized jurisdiction over patent infringement
claims. Id. at 293.
The court recited:
In the recent act, approved June 25, 1910, the patentee is given still

further authority to sue the United States, and he may now file suit in
the Court of Claims to recover compensation where his patents have been
used without his consent, through there be no contract with the
Government, express or implied.
Crozier, 224 U.S. at 293.
246 U.S. 28 (1917).
12 International Curtis Turbine Company sued William Cramp & Sons for infringement
of a patent covering a turbine used in torpedo boat destroyers under a contract with the

Navy Department. Notably, the contract provided indemnity to the Government for patent
infringement occurring pursuant to the performance of the contract. The district court found
infringement and liability, and the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 42.
"5 Id. at 37.

' 2 Id. at 42. The Supreme Court rationalized this ruling by finding that the 1910 Act

only contemplated patent infringement jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for those claims

not suable under a contract theory. Id. at 41-42.
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authority.1 2 7
Following the William Cramp & Sons ruling, commentators
voiced great concern over delays incumbent in government
contracts if patentees could sue for injunctions during the performance of a government contract. 128 Because this ruling occurred
during World War I, the Department of War expressed much
concern over delays in the production of materials and the continuation of supplies during this critical period."2
4. PatentInfringementAgainst the United States Pursuantto 28
U.S.C. § 1498. In response to Crozier v. Crupp and its progeny,
particularly William Cramp & Sons, Congress amended the 1910
Act with the Naval Appropriations Act of 1918.130 The 1918 Act
resulted in 35 U.S.C. § 68, the precursor to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), and
131
substantially enlarged the protection afforded to patentees.
The 1918 Act eliminated many of the expansive defenses authorized
under the 1910 Act, including the authority defense recognized in
William Cramp & Sons. 3 2 Furthermore, the 1918 Act allowed
suit against the Government not only for use, sale, or other
disposition by the Government, but also for any use, sale, or other
disposition for the Government.'"
In Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States,1 34 the Supreme Court considered the 1918 Act, engaging in an extensive
analysis of the statutory right to a patent infringement action
against the United States. 13' The Court reviewed the history of
this statutory right, 13 including the legislative reversal of Wil-

William Cramp & Sons, 246 U.S. at 41-42.
L28 Karl Fenning, PatentInfringement by the Government, 37 YALE L.J. 773, 777 (1928).
ET AL., supra note 40, at 56-57.
3 Act of July 1, 1918, 40 Stat. 705 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1988)).
13 Fenning, supra note 128, at 777.
1 0 COWEN

'

Id.

133Id,
134 275

U.S. 331 (1928).

The Government had used cargo beams covered by a United

States patent owned by the Richmond Screw Anchor Company. The Government questioned
the validity of the patent, arguing that the beam in question was neither novel nor

nonobvious, and also challenged the patent's applicability under the statutory mandates
when prosecuted by an assignee of the patent.
1w RALPH C. NASH, JR. & LEONARD RAwIcz, PATENTS AND TECHNICAL DATA 284, 288

(1983).

" Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 339-46.
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liam Cramp & Sons v. International Curtis Marine Turbine
Co.."' Citing the new statutory mandate, the Court explained

the ramifications of the new amendment:
The intention and purpose of Congress in the Act of
1918 was to stimulate contractors to furnish what
was needed for the War, without fear of becoming
liable themselves for infringements to inventors or
the owners or assignees of patents. . . . To accomplish this governmental purpose, Congress exercised
the power to take away the right of the owner of the
patent to recover from the contractor for infringe-

ments. 138
The Court found, however, that if this amendment only applied to
original patentees, and not to assignees, such a result would pose
problems under the Fifth Amendment. 139 The Court ruled that
the amendment in the 1918 Act expanded
protection to all holders
140
patent.
a
in
rights
of
course
due
in
Other than the amendments of the 1918 Act, the 1910 Act
13
1

ld. at 342.
Id. at 345. The Court previously had explained:
The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the contractor entirely
from liability of every kind for the infringement of patents in manufacturing anything for the Government and to limit the owner of the patent
and his assigns and all claiming through or under him to suit against the
United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and manufacture. The word
.entire" emphasizes the exclusive and comprehensive character of the
remedy provided. As the Solicitor General states in his brief with
respect to the Act, it is more than a waiver of immunity and effects an
assumption of liability by the Government.
Id. at 343-44.
3 Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 345. The Court noted:
This is not a case of a mere declared immunity of the Government from
liability for its own torts. It is an attempt to take away from a private
citizen his lawful claim for damage to his property by another private
person which but for this Act he would have against the private
wrongdoer. This result.... would seem to raise a serious question as to
the constitutionality of the Act of 1918 under the Fifth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 345.
'40

Id. at 345-46.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/2

26

Lavenue: Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Cont

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

1995]

415

remained unchanged until the initiation of World War II, when
Congress wholly repealed these statutory provisions in favor of a
revised statutory structure and enacted the first version of 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a).141 Of most significance, the 1948 amendment
further broadened the protection of government contractors by
emphasizing protection not merely for the "use, sale, or other
disposition... for the Government" but for any performance "used

or manufactured... by or for the Government."42 One year later,
Congress amended section 1498(a), making the statute applicable
to agents
of the government as well as authorized representa43
tives.1

I.

ANATOMY OF THE STATUTE:

28 U.S.C. § 1498

Section 1498 of Title 28 provides statutory authority for an action
against the United States for the unauthorized use or manufacture
of United States patents by the government and by government
contractors. The purpose of § 1498 is to provide complete relief to
a contractor from liability for any kind of patent infringement in
manufacturing any item for the government. To fulfill this
purpose, the statute limits the owner of the patent, assigns, and all
claiming through or under the patentee, to suit against the United
States in the Court of Federal Claims for recovery of reasonable
and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.
As in any other claim against the government, a statute of

..Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 942 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
lId. (emphasis added).
14
Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 87, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). In 1951, Congress again revised 28 U.S.C. § 1498 by
incorporating a substantial part of the Royalty Adjustment Act into the statutory scheme.
Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 50(c), 65 Stat. 710, 727 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). To bring the statutory framework in conformity with the new
Patent Act of 1952, Congress enacted another substantial amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1498
with the Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 930, 66 Stat. 757 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Further amendments occurred in 1982, when Congress replaced the
name of the Court of Claims with the Claims Court, Act of Apr. 2, 1982, § 133(d), 96 Stat.
25, 40 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), and in 1992, when
Congress again replaced the name of the Claims Court with the Court of Federal Claims.
Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, § 902, 106
Stat. 4516 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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limitations limits recovery on any patent infringement claim to six
years from the date on which the use or manufacture occurred.1 "
For claims in the Court of Federal Claims, except for any period
during which an administrative claim is pending,1" 28 U.S.C. §
2501 requires the initiation of suit before the six-year statute of
limitations expires.'" In addition to the statute of limitations,
the government's liability for patent infringement depends on the
inclusion or exclusion of certain regulatory clauses anticipating this
source of liability. Part III of this Article describes the various
regulatory provisions and the required contractual provisions for
the allowance of suit against the government for patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
If the statute of limitations permits, and if the requisite contractual and regulatory clauses allow, a patentee may seek recovery for
'" The statute runs with the first use or manufacture of the patented item. Starobin v.
United States, 662 F.2d 747, 749 (1981). In Regent Jack Mfg. Co. v. United States, 337 F.2d
649, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136 (1964), a patentee sought recovery for the use of a hydraulic
jack after the expiration of the statute of limitations but within six years of an actual use
of the invention by the United States. The Court of Claims denied the patentee's attempt
to avoid the statute of limitations, describing first use as the time of first availability for use.
Regent Jack Mfg. Co., 337 F.2d at 650. As noted in De Graffenried v. United States, 25 Cl.
Ct. 209, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1594 (1992), however, two exceptions may apply. If a plaintiff
patentee demonstrates "that defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff
was unaware of their existence or [shows] that its injury was 'inherently unknowable' at the
accrual date.... the statute will not begin to run until plaintiff learns or reasonably should
have learned of his cause of action." 25 Cl. Ct. at 213 (quoting Japanese War Notes
Claimants Ass'n of the Philippines, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 359 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 971 (1967)).
1" Custer v. United States, 622 F.2d 554, 557, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 886 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1010 (1980):
Whereas 28 U.S.C. § 2501 requires suit to be brought within 6 years
after the claim 'first accrues,' 35 U.S.C. § 286 extends the time for
bringing suit for a period equal to the time an administrative claim was
pending before a department or agency of the Government prior to the
date of filing the petition.
Id. 35 U.S.C. § 286 excludes the time during which an patentee seeks redress from an
administrative agency. Id.
'4 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988). The statute of limitations provides, in part: "Every claim of
which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the
petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues." Id. See, e.g., De
Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. CI. 384, 390 (1993) (holding that statute runs when
plaintiff knew or should have known of unauthorized use); Messerschmidt v. United States,
29 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (1993) (holding that six-year limit not applicable to all defenses); De
Graffenried, 25 Cl. Ct. 209, 212 (1992) (holding that statute does not run until plaintiff
should have been aware of unauthorized use).
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patent infringement under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Yet recovery under
§ 1498(a) involves more than the mere assertion of a claim, because
§ 1498(a) contains four paragraphs of requirements for recovery,
including the base requirements for jurisdiction (at the first
paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)) as well as three specific limitations on jurisdiction (at the second through fourth paragraphs of 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a)). Moreover, § 1498 encompasses more than patent
infringement, including five subsections: (1) the patent infringement provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a); (2) the copyright infringement provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b); (3) the foreign country
infringement disclaimer of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c); (4) the plant variety
infringement provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(d); and (5) the mask
works infringement provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(e).
A. THE PATENT INFRINGEMENT PROVISION

In contrast to a typical patent infringement suit, where one
private party sues another in a United States district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338,147 a private party sues the government for the illegal use or manufacture of a patented device in the
14
Court of Federal Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
While a suit under § 1338 in a district court is an action in
tort,14 9 a suit under § 1498 in the United States Court of Federal
150
Claims is an action in eminent domain.
1. The Patent Infringement Provision: Jurisdictional Basis.
Paragraph one of § 1498(a)1 5 ' details the jurisdictional basis of
the Court of Federal Claims over patent infringement claims

147

148

1

28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1031, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
15"Airborne Data, Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1350, 1352, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297

(Fed. Cir. 1983).
"s

28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 1 1 (Supp. V 1993):
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against the United
States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of
his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.
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brought against the United States. This jurisdictional mandate
contains five elements: (a) "an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States"; (b) "used or manufactured by or
for the United States"; (c) "without license of the owner thereof or
lawful right to use or manufacture the same"; (d) with remedy by
"action against the United States in the United States Court of
Claims"; (e) "for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture." The following sections
examine these elements.
a. An Invention Described In and Covered By a Patent of the
United States. Although the first of a five-part analysis, this
element comprises the ultimate step in the judicial determination
of whether infringement has occurred. 5 2 Distinguishable from
claim interpretation, where a court considers a patent's application
and scope, a court determines infringement by claim construcTM
tion."s As explained in Messerschmidt v. United States,'
"[a]
court first interprets a claim, with the aid of the specification,
drawings, and prosecution history, to give meaning to the words
and symbols, and then a court constructs (or construes) a claim by
comparison to the accused device in order to ascertain the legal
operation."5 5 When a claimant considers the first of these five
analyses of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), only a subjective determination
may be made for purposes of establishing a claim of patent
infringement." And of course, any such determination remains
dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of each
case. 57 Furthermore, in addition to considering whether the
subject invention remains "described or covered by a patent," as set
forth above, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 extends protection to the owners of

15 Brunswick Corp. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 278, 281, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702

(1991).
153

4

ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 656 (1992).

29 Fed. Cl. 1, affd without op., 14 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.

1382 (1994).
15

Id. at 45 n.10.

See Marsh-McBirney, Inc. v. Jennings, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1624 (C.D. Cal.
1991) ("a subjective belief that he was not infringing is irrelevant if, under the undisputed
facts of the case, he should have realized that he was infringing").
1"

167Id.
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patents of the United States.158
b. Used or Manufactured By or For the United States.
Undefined by the statute, the use or manufacture of an invention
remains a matter of judicial determination.' 59 For purposes of
patent infringement determinations against the government, the
Court of Federal Claims has recognized that "use or manufacture"
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 parallels "make or use" under 35 U.S.C. §
271.'60

Although also undefined by the statute, "by or for the United
States" has a much more discernable meaning.16' Following the
amendment to the initial statutory allowance of patent infringement suits against the United States in 1948, Congress expanded
the statutory application to use or manufacture "by or for the
United States." 1 2 Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, liability
for patent infringement exists against the United States for any use
or manufacture by the government or by any person or entity for
the government, such as in a government contract.163
" United States v. Decca, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1070, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 296 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
16 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1974
(1993) ("The words 'manufacture' and 'use' in § 1498 (as well as the words 'make,' 'use' and
'sell' in Title 35) have never been defined by Congress and have become a matter ofjudicial
interpretation..).
160 29 Fed. Cl. at 218 n.21. See also Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics
Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 591 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering term "make" under
35 U.S.C. § 271).
161
See Larson v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 365, 368, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (1992):
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), the United States Claims Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the government for unauthorized use of patented inventions. Section 1498(a) provides two bases for
liability: (1) unauthorized use of a patented invention 'by' the government or (2) unauthorized use of a patented invention 'for' the government and with its 'authorization and consent'.
(footnote omitted).
16 See In re Valuation Proceedings Under Sections 303(c) and 306 of the Regional Rail
Reorganization Act of 1973, 445 F. Supp. 994, 1024 (Regional Rail Reorg. Ct. 1977) ("The
1918 amendment... made recovery available not only when the United States had 'used'
an invention covered by a patent, but whenever the invention had been 'used or manufactured by or for the United States.' ").
'" See Evans v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 270 F. Supp. 778, 780, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 338
(E.D. Mo. 1967) ('The purpose of this section is to relieve contractors working for the United
States Government from liability for infringement of patents in manufacturinganythingfor
the government and to limit patentee, and those claiming through him, to suit against the
United States Government in the Court of Claims.") (emphasis added).
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c. Without License of the Owner or Lawful Right to Use or
Manufacture the Same. This element requires consideration of
whether the government maintained a license to use or manufacture the subject invention or whether the government maintained
another right to do the same.'
Brunswick Corp. v. United
6
States' presents one of the most comprehensive analyses of the
type of license under which the Government is subject to liability
for patent infringement. The Claims Court recognized jurisdiction
over all claims submitted by the owner of an exclusive license,
regardless of the approval or participation of the patentee.' 61 In
effect, the third element of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) extends the cause
of action from owners of a United States patent to licensees of such
patents. 1 7 Additionally, the cause of action encompasses any
other "lawful right to use or manufacture the same." Accordingly,
in Heinemann v. United States,1 s the Court of Claims expressly
declined to restrict claims of patent infringement under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to the owner of the record title to the patent, recognizing
jurisdiction over a claim by the equitable owner of a patent.'6 9
Thus, the third element of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) contemplates a
broad variety of claimants under the statute, that is, the owner of

'" See, e.g., Leesona Corp. v. United States, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 4 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(observing that government's "license to use the improvement does not carry with it a license
to use the inventions covered by the infringed, unlicensed claims of the other Leesona
patents"), modified, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); Pitcairn v.
United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1115-16, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 612 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (discussing
whether government's use of patented article constituted license to continue such use); RollsRoyce, Ltd. v. United States, 364 F.2d 415, 417, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 460 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(characterizing issue of government license as "manifestly" relevant).
' 22 Cl. Ct. 278, 281, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702 (Cl. Ct. 1991).
' 22 Cl. Ct. at 282. In Brunswick Corp, the court also noted the allowability of such
claims where the licensor refuses to join the licensee in the suit. Id. (citing Independent
Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 269 U.S. 459, 469, reh. denied, 270 U.S. 84 (1926)).
However, citing E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 47, 60-61 (1917), the Claims Court
noted a circumstance where no jurisdiction may lie, distinguishing a "mere licensee" for
which no jurisdiction exists from an "exclusive licensee" for which jurisdiction exists. 22 Cl.
Ct. at 282-83.
167id.
15

620 F.2d 874, 877, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
In Heinemann, the Court of Claims considered the Government's argument that the

United States had waived sovereign immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 only with
respect to the holder of record title in a patent infringement suit against the United States.
620 F.2d at 877.
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170
the patent for purposes of the statute.
d. Remedy Shall Be By Action Against the United States in the
United States Court of Federal Claims. Although the statutory
language clearly states the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims, the courts have made strangely irregular rulings on this
issue.171 Since the enactment of the statute, the Court of Claims
has uniformly ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 constitutes the sole
remedy for patent infringement by the United States, 172 and both
the Claims Court and Court of Federal Claims have adhered to this
interpretation.173 However, in Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Arma
Engineering Co.,1 74 the Supreme Court rejected 28 U.S.C. § 1498
as a jurisdictional requirement.'7 5 Similarly, in Manville Sales

110See, e.g., LeFiell v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 865, 867-71, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 312
(1963) (allowing claim by company on patent held by officer); Wing Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, 151 F. Supp. 314, 315, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (finding exclusive right
to license "use" ownership for purposes of § 1498).
'7 Compare Lesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 991 (1979) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as jurisdictional statute establishing exclusivity
of jurisdiction of Court of Claims (Court of Federal Claims) over patent infringement suits
against United States) with Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as affirmative
defense).
17 See, e.g., Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d at 964 ("[28 U.S.C. § 1498] provides that the
exclusive remedy for patent infringement by the government is an action in the United States
Court of Claims, and in such an action, the owner of a valid claim is entitled to recover
'reasonable and entire' compensation for infringement.") (emphasis added). In Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, the court noted:
By its express terms, 29 U.S.C. § 1498(a) vests exclusive jurisdiction in
this court over patent infringement claims against the Government
arising upon either one or both of the following two grounds: (1)
unlicensed use or manufacture of a patented invention by the U.S.
directly; and/or (2) unlicensed use or manufacture of a patented invention
for the U.S. and with its authorizationor consent.
534 F.2d 889, 897, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 276 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (first emphasis added).
17.See Penda Corp. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 533, 573 (1993) (-The patentee's sole
remedy is a suit in this court for its 'reasonable and entire compensation' under section
1498."), appeal dismissed, 44 F.3d 967, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, (March 22, 1995) (No. 94-1563).
174 271 U.S. 232 (1926).
171 Sperry Gyroscope involved a private party infringement suit in which a district court
had dismissed a complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a). The Supreme Court held the statute went to the merits of the case, not the
jurisdiction of the court:
The true intent and meaning of the statute is not free from doubt; but
certainly there is nothing therein which shows any clear purpose to take
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Corp. v. ParamountSystems, Inc.,'7 6 the Federal Circuit affirmed
that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 provides an affirmative defense, not a
jurisdictional requirement. 177 Interestingly, however, the Federal
Circuit distinguished between the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
as jurisdictional in suits against the United States in the Court of
Federal Claims and as an affirmative defense in a district court
involving private litigants. 178
While the court specifically
declined to name the Court of Federal Claims as the exclusive
1 79
forum for claims of patent infringement by the United States,
it noted that, had the plaintiff in the case maintained a claim
against the Government under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the appropriate
resolution involved transfer to the Court of Federal Claims.'80
Therefore, despite the somewhat confusing status of the fourth
element of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, precedents uniformly hold that the
exclusive remedy for a patent infringement action against the
United States remains in the Court of Federal Claims.' 8 '

away the power to decide. It became the duty of the court below to
consider and determine whether, in the circumstances stated, appellee
was relieved of liability and permitted by the statute to do what
otherwise would have constituted a violation of appellant's rights. There
was jurisdiction.
271 U.S. at 235-36.
1'76917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
'7 917 F.2d at 555. "The Supreme Court has established that section 1498(a) is to be
applied, at least with respect to suits to which the United States is not a party, as a
codification of a defense and not as a jurisdictional statute." Id. at 554. But see Fulmer v.
United States, 83 F. Supp. 137, 143, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545 (N.D. Ala. 1949) (finding that
Sperry Gyroscope only permitted district court to ascertain its own jurisdiction).
178 Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 554-55.
Citing Sperry Gyroscope, the Federal Circuit
concluded:
Without deciding, we see no inconsistency between interpreting section
1498(a) as a jurisdictional statute (waiving sovereign immunity) in suits
against the United States and as merely codifying a defense that private
parties who are alleged infringers may raise on the merits. That two
different effects occur depending on the party raising section 1498(a) is
the clear implication of Sperry and the other cases, read together.
Id. at 555 n.6. In TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1058, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071
(Fed. Cir. 1986), the Federal Circuit had reasoned to the contrary, but the Manville Sales
panel dismissed the TVI Energy Corp. finding as dictum, contrary to Sperry Gyroscope.
Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 555 n.7.
7
' Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 555 n.6.
'go Id. at 555 n.8.
"l See, e.g., TVJ Energy Corp., 806 F.2d at 1061 (noting that "if TVI now has a cause of
action, its remedy is against the Government in the Claims Court").
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e. For the Recovery of Reasonableand Entire Compensationfor
Such Use and Manufacture. When determining reasonable and
entire compensation, the Court of Claims traditionally applied a
standard taking analysis under the Fifth Amendment. 8 2 In the
context of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, this analysis requires a determination
of the "reasonable royalty" and compensation for the delay in
making provision of the royalty. i 3
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court,' 4 the
Court of Claims recognized three methods to ascertain a "reasonable royalty," including: (1) the reasonable royalty of a license; (2)
lost profits; and (3) savings to the government."s Generally, the
Court of Claims preferred establishing the royalty by a comparative
determining the royalty using evidence 18of7
royalty technique,'
the royalty rate used by the patentee in commercial licensing.
When no such evidence was available, the Court of Claims made a
finding under the first of the three methods, determining an

182

Calhoun v. United States, 453 F.2d 1385, 1391, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 438 (Ct. CI. 1972).
In Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979), the Court of Claims explained the rationale of the statute: "The
theory for recovery against the government for patent infringement is not analogous to that
in litigation between private parties. When the government has infringed, it is deemed to
have "taken" the patent license under an eminent domain theory, and compensation is the
just compensation required by the fifth amendment."
" Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1168, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 52 (Ct. Cl.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
18 See Leslie Pickering Francis, Eminent Domain Compensation in Western States: A
Critique of the FairMarket Value Model, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 429, 431 ("The Supreme Court
never has precisely defined just compensation,' nor has it held that a single standard of
such as the fair market value standard is constitutionally mandated.").
compensation
185
Decca, 640 F.2d at 1167.
18
Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Ct. Cl.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
187 552 F.2d at 349. The Court noted, however, wide discretion in defining "reasonable
compensation":
Even an established royalty may be modified upward, or downward,
depending on the circumstances of the case. Where no established
royalty is found, one may be selected on the basis of royalty rates for
related patents. A settlement rate may be considered, or other contracts
between the parties may be used as a guide. Savings realized by the
defendant as a result of the infringement are sometimes used as a
measure of compensation, and lost profits have been awarded.
Id. at 347 n.5 (citations omitted).
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unlicensed royalty by consideration of a hypothetical license.'
Then the court compared this result with the findings under the
remaining two methods to determine the "reasonable royalty."18 9
For example, in Penda Corp v. United States,"9 upon finding no
evidence of a royalty rate under commercial licenses, the Court of
Federal Claims examined the considerations incumbent in defining
a "reasonable royalty" 9" and adopted the fourteen-part willing
buyer/willing seller hypothetical license
analysis of Georgia-Pacific
192
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.
In addition to a determination of the reasonable royalty, 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) contemplates compensation for the delay in
making a royalty remuneration to the claimant.1 93 As explained
in ITT Corp. v. United States,1 "4 when Congress amended the
statutory basis of patent infringement in 1918 from guaranteeing
"reasonable compensation" to provide for "reasonable and entire
compensation," Congress ensured the recovery not only of a
reasonable royalty but also of compensation for the delay in
As noted in IT Corp., this delay compensation
recovery. 19

188Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574-76, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d

(BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See, e.g., De Graffenried v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 209, 221,
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1594 (1992) (holding "hypothetical negotiation" appropriate to
determine unlicensed royalty); Amerace Esna Corp. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1377, 1380,
174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (describing use of "hypothetical negotiation" to
determine reasonable royalty).
189 Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1574-76.
10 29 Fed. Cl. 533 (1993).
19
' Id. at 570-87.
'9 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d
295 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). See also De Graffenried, 25 Cl. Ct. at 221
("[A] reasonable royalty analysis based on a hypothetical negotiation seems particularly
appropriate in Section 1498 cases.").
'9 See De Graffenried, 25 Cl. Ct. at 216 ("The first component is the value of the license
that, in effect, was taken by the government. The value is 'determined ordinarily as of the
time the Government takes the license.' The second component involves compensation for
the government's delay in paying for that license.") (citations omitted).
'94 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 233, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (Cl. Ct. 1989).
196 17 Cl. Ct. at 233. In ITT Corp., the Claims Court recognized a Supreme Court case

which distinguished the 1910 Act from the 1918 Act. Id. (citing Waite v. United States, 282
U.S. 508, 509 (1931)). The court noted that the Supreme Court intended a successful
claimant under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) to recover not only "reasonable" but "reasonable and
entire compensation." Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
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usually takes the form of prejudgment interest.' 96
2. The Patent Infringement Provision: Scope of Jurisdiction.
Whereas the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) describes the
jurisdictional prerequisites for a patent infringement action against
the United States, paragraphs two through four of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) establish the scope of such jurisdiction.'9 7
a. Jurisdictionfor Patent Infringement by Authorization and
Consent. Paragraph two of § 1498(a) establishes the scope of
jurisdiction when the government grants authorization and consent
for patent infringement in a government contract. It extends
liability not only to infringement by the government contractor, but
also to infringement by any subcontractor or any other person, firm,
or corporation within the authorization and consent of the United
States. 9 The provision does not require privity for the United
On the other
States to incur liability for patent infringement.'
hand, the absence of "authorization and consent" precludes liability.2"

9 Id. (citation omitted). In computing interest, the Court of Claims traditionally used
simple interest. Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812, 812 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Tektronix, 552
F.2d at 352; Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1051 (1978). The Claims Court has also generally computed awards by simple interest.
Henry v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 389, 393 (1985); Foster v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 738, 744
(1983); Jones v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 4, 7 (1983). However, for a Claims Court decision
computing awards with compound interest and an exhaustive analysis of the simple/compound interest issue, see ITT Corp. 17 Cl. Ct. at 234-37.
In addition to interest, "equivalents" of delay costs may even include certain costs related
to the patent infringement proceeding. Cf. Bendix Corp. v. United States, 209 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 778, 780 n.4 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (awarding expenses for complying with pretrial order).
However, attorney fees fall outside the ambit of "equivalents" in this determination. Id. at
787.
2-4 (1988).
'9 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
2 (1988):
196 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be
construed as use or manufacture for the United States.
5
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1277 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("In the event Garlock becomes a sub or sub sub contractor, a gracious
government has also taken care of that possibility in the second paragraph of § 1498(a).").
'0 Carrier Corp. v. United States, 534 F.2d 244, 249, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 55 (Ct. Cl.
1976) ("Since [slection 1498(a) expressly provides that any use of a patented invention for
the Government must be authorized or consented to, it is plain that the Government can
limit its authorization and consent as it did in this instance."); see generallyYassin v. United
States, 76 F. Supp. 509, 518, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (considering meaning and
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b. No Jurisdictionfor PatentInfringement Before July 1, 1918.
Paragraph three of § 1498(a) limits jurisdiction for patent infringement by the United States to claims occurring after July 1,
1918.20 ' Even though Congress enacted the first patent infringement provisions in 1910,202 § 1498 precludes application before
the effective date of the amended statute. 3 Perhaps because of
the incontrovertible language of the paragraph, neither the Court
to Federal Claims nor any other court has construed this third
paragraph. °4
c. No Jurisdiction Over Patent Infringement by Government
Employee. Paragraph four of § 1498(a) limits jurisdiction to claims
by nonemployees of the government or employees acting outside an
official capacity. 0 5 Section 1498(a) expressly proscribes patent
infringement suits by certain types of claimants,2 ° even if the
statute of limitations runs out on the claim while the claimant
remains in one of the prohibited categories of claimants." 7
Although this category originally included only government
employees, the present version of § 1498(a) extends the class of
prohibited claimants to include any person "in a position to order,
influence, or induce use of the copyrighted work by the Govern-

application of authorization and consent).
2o 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), T 3 (1988):
A Government employee shall have the right to bring suit against the
Government under this section except where he was in a position to
order, influence, or induce use of the invention by the Government. This
section shall not confer a right of action on any patentee with respect to
any invention discovered or invented by a person while in the employment or service of the United States, where the invention was related to
the official functions of the employee, in cases in which such functions
included research and development, or in the making of which Government time, materials or facilities were used.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
o 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 1 3 (1988).
o Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED file (March 1, 1994).
2w 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), 1 4 (1988) (The [Clourt [of Federal Claims] shall not award
compensation under this section if the claim is based on the use or manufacture by or for the
United States of any article owned, leased, used by, or in the possession of the United States
prior to July 1, 1918.").
5
Id.
Fletcher v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 279, 280, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 254 (Ct. Cl.
1956).
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ment."2° Thus, in contrast to earlier holdings on the right of
government employees to sue the United States for patent infringement,2° the present statutory structure allows suit by government employees, 21 provided the employee falls outside of the
statutorily precluded class of claimants.21'

m

The statutory prohibitions on suit by government employees has changed dramatically
since the 1918 Act which provided "'... the benefits of this act shall not enure to any
patentee who, when he makes such claim, is in the employment ... of the Government
.... ' " National Elec. Signaling Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 338, 340 (1925). Later,
when Congress reauthorized the patent infringement provision of 35 U.S.C. § 68 at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498, the Act provided that " ' [T]his section shall not confer a right of action on any
patentee who, when he makes such a claim, is in the employment ... of the United States
.... '" Kessenich v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 528,530, 133 Ct. Cl. 292, 296 (1955). While
the predecessors to the current statutory language focused entirely upon government
employment, the 1952 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) greatly reduced the prohibition:
"A Government employee shall have the right to bring suit against the Government under
this section, except where he was in a position to order, influence or induce use of the
invention by the Government." Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 930, 66 Stat. 757, 757 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
209 Le Mieux, supra note 105, at 121-23, 125-26. Under the original statutory
authorization-the 1910 and 1918 Acts-for patent infringement suits against the United
States, Congress did not provide for suit against the United States by government
employees. Id. at 121. Congress excluded government employees to prevent them from
suing for work done within the terms of government employment. Id. (citing H. Rep. No.
1228, 61st Cong., 2d Ses., May 7, 1910; H. Rep. No. 1726, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., April 7,
1952). Even if the government employee made the invention expressly outside of the scope
of employment, the Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that the statutes precluded suit by
a government employee. Moore v. United States, 249 U.S. 487, 489 (1919).
210 Government Acquisition of License to Employee's Invention, 60 Comp. Gen. 248, 251
(1981). In this advisory opinion, the Comptroller General considered the patent rights of an
employee of the United States Air Force. Id. at 248. The employee had invented a high
contrast light display lens. Id. In considering the employee's rights in the invention, the
Comptroller General recognized three tests:
First, Mr. Jeffers' invention must have been made without the use of
Government equipment, facilities, materials, time or information.
Second, the invention may not be related to the employee's official
functions if those functions include research and development responsibilities. Third, he cannot be in a position to order, influence, or induce
use of the invention by the Government.
Id. at 249-50. Finding no conflict with any of these considerations, and particularly finding
no influence of the employee over the Air Force procurement system, the Comptroller
General allowed the employee to retain patent rights in the invention. Id. at 250-51.
211 Stub v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 206, 207, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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B. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT PROVISION

Congress has only provided statutory authority for copyright
infringement suits against the United States since 1960.212 In
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 213 the Court of Claims
made the first and most cited consideration of a copyright infringement claim against the United States pursuant to § 1498(b).
Following Williams & Wilkins Co., the Court of Federal Claims and
its predecessors have disposed of several copyright infringement
214
claims by applying the law of private copyright infringement
in a manner similar to the interrelationship between 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) and 35 U.S.C. § 271.215 Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a),
which applies the same statute of limitations to all other claims in
the Court of Federal Claims, 21 6 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) has a threeyear statute of limitations.2 1 7 Except for this irregularity, the
Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors have applied the law
of copyright infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) and
patent infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) similarly.
C. THE FOREIGN COUNTRY INFRINGEMENT DISCLAIMER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c), 218 the patent infringement provisions of Title 28 do not apply outside of the United States.2 19
212

Steve Altman Photography v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 267, 279 (1989). Notably, the

Court of Federal Claims still maintains no jurisdiction over trademark infringement suits
against the United States. Lockridge v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 687, 688, 200 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 271 (Fed. Cl. 1978).
213 487 F.2d 1345, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 49 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
214
211

Sterner v. United States, 434 F.2d 656, 656 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
International Trade Management, Inc. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 402, 402-03 (Ct.

Cl. 1982).
216 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
2'7 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section also provides for tolling of
the three year statute of limitations for any period during which an administrative claim is
pending. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 260, 267-68 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
2'a 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) (1988) provides that "[t]he provisions of this section shall not apply
to any claim arising in a foreign country."
219 Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1072, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439 (Ct. Cl.
1976) ("United States patent laws are territorial in their application and by their own terms
are not infringed by acts in foreign countries that would be infringements at home."). Thus,
as noted in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, just as the Federal Tort Claims Act does
not apply to acts outside the United States, § 1498 does not apply to patent or copyright
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However, as recognized in Leesona Corp. v. United States,2 2 0 only
use or manufacture within the United States need occur for liability
to arise.2 2 ' Indeed, in Leesona Corp., the Court of Claims noted
that mere "availability" for use or manufacture within the United
States may satisfy § 1498(c). 22 2 Otherwise, § 1498(c) excludes
application of the patent and copyright infringement provisions of
Title 28 outside of the United States.
D. THE PLANT VARIETY INFRINGEMENT PROVISION
Because the Plant Patent Act of 1930 includes asexually
reproduced plants among subject matter suitable for a utility
patent, 2 - any claim of infringement of a patent on such plants
finds its basis in § 1498(a). Coextensive with the Plant Variety
Protection Act of 1970,224 28 U.S.C. § 1498(d) provides protection
for sexually-reproduced plant varieties in relationships between
private contractors and the United States. 225 However, as of
1994, neither the Court of Federal Claims nor its predecessors have
decided a case on the merits of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(d).226 If such a
dispute arises, however, the Court of Federal Claims will assuredly
turn to the existing case law in the United States District Courts
applying the Plant Variety Act of 1970.

infringement outside the United States. 29 Fed. Cl. 197, 230, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1974
(1993).
220 198 U.S.P.Q.
2 Id at 14. In

(BNA) 4, 6 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
Leesona Corp., the Court of Claims rejected any analogy to Deepsouth

PackingCo. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), where the Supreme Court held that the
making and selling of unpatented parts, shipped overseas and assembled into a patented

combination, precluded infringement under United States patent laws. Finding Deepsouth
distinguishable on the facts and law, the Court of Claims focused upon the circumstances of
the contract, noting that the United States had contracted domestically and the contractor
had manufactured domestically, although use occurred outside the United States. Leesona
Corp., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 22.
nId.
at 21.
35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988). Asexual plant reproduction occurs either from a physical
cutting or slip from the actual new plant variety. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 980, 201
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated on other grounds,Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444
U.S. 1028 (1980).
22 5 ERNEST. B. LIPSCOMB III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 17:4 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
WALKER ON PATENTS].

28 U.S.C. § 1498(d) (Supp. V 1993).
' Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED file (March 1, 1994).

22
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E. THE MASK WORKS INFRINGEMENT PROVISION

Although the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA)
provides protection for the intellectual property contained in the
structural facets of semiconductor design,227 28 U.S.C. § 1498(e)
provides similar protection against infringement by the United
States.22 While the Court of Federal Claims has found no
opportunity to rule on mask work infringement by the United
States, any claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(e) would 229
assuredly rely
on the limited case law developed under the SCPA.
III.

THE CONTRACTING OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER

28 U.S.C. § 1498
To provide the fruits of invention for the general welfare, § 1498
and other statutes and regulations authorize the utilization of all
forms of intellectual property for the benefit of the general
public.230 In the private arena, this authority only extends to the
lapsed intellectual properly rights, e.g., the copyright past term, the
expired patent, the generic trademark, the disclosed trade secret.
In the public arena, however, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 renders a caveat to
the general provisions of patent and copyright law and the terms
of protection. Section 1498(a) grants authority for the infringement
of patents under government contracts without regard to the source
of allowance or the nature of the application. In effect, § 1498(a)
induces patent infringement by the United States during government contracting-the "contracting of patent infringement." 1
The United States, of course, infrequently enters contracts
anticipating patent infringement. Nonetheless 28 U.S.C. § 1498
227

17 U.S.C. § 901-14 (1988).

28 U.S.C. § 1498(e) (1988).
See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (providing first appellate interpretation of Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act).
"o Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524
(1964).
23' While this Article describes the result of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) as the "contracting of
patent infringement," a more traditional description views the effect of the statute as the
granting of a "compulsory license." Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1360 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
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functions to contract patent infringement. To understand the
mechanism that allows this result, a regard for more than the
statute arises: while 28 U.S.C. § 1498 represents a statutory
animal, the nature of the beast becomes understood only by
reference to the regulatory framework. Therefore, this Part
considers both the statutory and regulatory nature of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498, whereby the government induces patent infringement.
A. STATUTORY INDUCEMENT OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT

As reviewed in Part II of this Article, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 entails
five main components in § 1498(a-e), with § 1498(a) containing the
heart of the statute regarding patent infringement. Also described
in Part II, these statutory provisions expressly detail the application and scope of protection for government contractors in the
performance of government contracts. What remains absent from
Part II is, however, an understanding of the broad application of
the statute. The following two cases demonstrate the expansive
nature of the protection afforded to government contractors by
§ 1498(a).
In TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane,2"2 Blane Enterprises, Inc.
submitted thermal targets for a weapons targeting demonstration
at Fort Knox, Kentucky in contemplation of selling the targets to
the United States. At the demonstration, TVI Energy Corp.
observed the Blane targets and believed that they infringed a TVI
patent. TVI subsequently sued Blane in a United States district
court for patent infringement. 33 On a motion for summary
judgment, Blane claimed immunity under 1498(a).2 TVI argued
against summary judgment because Blane had only participated in
the demonstration in order to qualify to bid on a government
contract. 283 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Blane and the Federal Circuit affirmed.'
The Federal
Circuit expressly noted that the government may expressly or
806 F.2d 1057, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled by Manville Sales
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
23 806 F.2d at 1059.
n 4 Id.
= Id.
Id. at 1059-61.
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impliedly authorize patent infringement under the terms of a
government contract, or237in this case, in preparation for bidding on
a government contract.
In W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,' the Federal
Circuit exercised similar latitude under § 1498, even though an
injunction was in effect. In W.L. Gore, the patentee had obtained
an injunction prohibiting Garlock's infringement of its patent.239
When Garlock attempted to respond to a government invitation for
bids on a product requiring application of the patent, the district
court refused to modify the injunction to allow Garlock's participation.240 Citing § 1498, the Federal Circuit emphasized that the
statute "automatically" authorizes the infringement of any patent
within the context of government procurement.24 1 Thus, even in
the face of an injunction, the interests embodied in § 1498 are
overriding.
Section 1498 generally, and § 1498(a) specifically, represent the
most recognized and expansive sources of statutory authority for
the acquisition and use of a patent "by or for" the government.
However, § 1498 is not the only source of statutory authority for
infringement of intellectual property rights. The Court of Federal
Claims has jurisdiction over other forms of statutory inducements
of patent infringement, including the War Secrecy (or Invention
Secrecy) Act, the Royalty Adjustment Act, the Atomic Energy Act,
and the Mutual Security Act. Additionally, administrative agencies
and departments also maintain specialized patent provisions,
generally used only in highly specialized circumstances.
1. The War Secrecy Act/The Invention Secrecy Act. The first
War Secrecy Act authorized compensation for any inventor who,
during World War I, found his or her patent placed under a secrecy
order by the Commissioner of Patents for reasons of national

TVI Energy Corp., 806 F.2d at 1060.
842 F.2d 1275, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
'Id.
at 1278.
240
23

Id.

2

" Id at 1282. Although the Federal Circuit failed to reverse the district court's refusal
to modify the injunction, the court noted that under § 1498, Garlock had every right to
participate in the Government procurement without any concern for the injunction. Id. at
1283. Indeed, the court found no modification necessary. W.L. Gore, 842 F.2d at 1283.
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security. 2 2 If the inventor adhered to the secrecy order and the
government used the invention, the Act provided for a remedy in
the Court of Claims.2 43 Congress enacted a second War Secrecy
Act arose during World War 11,244 and amended it by the Act of
1942.245 Under these Acts, however, the inventor gained standing
for such a claim only upon issuance of the patent.246 Upon the
Act's reauthorization in 1952 in the Invention Secrecy Act of
195 1,247 Congress dramatically expanded the scope of protection.248 Under this Act, an inventor could sue for either (1)
damages resulting from a secrecy order or for the government use
of the invention, upon notification of placement of the application
under a secrecy order, or (2) damages occurring after the rescission
of the secrecy order and the issuance of the patent.249 The Act
also creates an alternative jurisdictional basis, giving the inventor
a choice of fora between the Court of Federal Claims or the United
States district court for the district in which the inventor/applicant
resides.'
2. The Royalty Adjustment Act. During World War II, Congress
sought to constrain "excessive licenses" for patent rights and other
forms of intellectual property. 251 Accordingly, Congress enacted
the Royalty Adjustment Act which authorized the head of an
agency to establish a "fair royalty rate," which was a cap on license
royalties. 2 Challenges to the "fair royalty rate" were subject to
Tucker Act jurisdiction, with claims of less than $10,000 to be

242 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 95, 40 Stat. 394, 395 (repealed).

2" Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1988) (describing secrecy order whereby Commissioner of
Patents may place indefinite hold on patent application for reasons of national security).
'' Act of July 1, 1940, ch. 501, 54 Stat. 710 (repealed).
2' Act of June 16, 1942, ch. 415, 56 Stat. 370 (repealed).
2, Fulmer v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 137, 144, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 545 (N.D. Ala.
1949).
2A7Act of Feb. 1, 1952, ch. 4, 66 Stat. 3. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 183 (Supp.
V 1993)).
" As recognized in Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629, 632, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1727 (Ct. Cl.) affd, 884 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1002 (1989), recovery
under a secrecy order contrasts from recovery under § 1491.
"' Act of Feb. 1, 1952, ch. 4, § 3, 66 Stat. 3, 4-5 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 183
(Supp. V 1993)).
= Id.
251S. REP. No. 1640, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
' Act of Oct. 31, 1942, ch. 634, 56 Stat. 1013 (repealed 1952).
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brought in the district courts and claims of $10,000 or more in the
Court of Claims. 253 As most claimants sought more than $10,000,
the majority of claims arose in the Court of Claims. Although two
sections of the Royalty Adjustment Act applied during wartime and
expired upon the conclusion of World War 11,254 and although
Congress amended § 1498 to incorporate much of the Act,2 35
U.S.C. §§ 91-96 continues to apply to the establishment of royalty
rates by the United States. 6
3. The Atomic Energy Act. After the first use of the atomic bomb
in World War II, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act of
1946.25 7 The Act revoked all patents for inventions used in the
production of, or research concerning, fissionable material or in the
use of such material in a military weapon. 2 5 In exchange for this
condemnation of patent rights-in effect the nationalization of
atomic energy industry25 9-the Act promised "just compensation"
for this taking as established by the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC). 26° The Act further provided for jurisdiction over challenges to the compensation offered by the AEC in the Court of Claims
or in the district courts. 26 ' Few cases, however, arose under the
1946 Act.2 62
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Congress reorganized the

2 3

Id.

International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United States, 536 F.2d 1361, 1365, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 739 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
26 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
m See InternationalTel. & Tel. Corp., 536 F.2d at 1364 (declaring §§ 91 - 96 of Royalty
Adjustment Act of continuing legal effect).
27 Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, § 11, 60 Stat. 755, 768-69 (codified as
amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2181-90 (1988)).
Id.; see Gay v. United States, 356 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966)
(discussing Atomic Energy Act of 1946).
" See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 472
F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (S.D. Cal. 1979) ("Originally, the federal government retained exclusive
authority over the development and use of atomic energy.") (citation omitted), rev'd on other
grounds, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981).
2
Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. at 769.
2
Id.; see, e.g., Fletcher v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 192 F.2d 29, 32, 90
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 3 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 914 (1952) (stating that person
dissatisfied with compensation may sue in either Court of Claims or district court).
m See, eg., Fletcher v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 279, 108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 254 (Ct. Cl.
1956); Consolidated Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 558, 104 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 111
(Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 939 (1955).
'
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If an inventor
claims procedures for compensation claims.2"
challenged the AEC's decision on compensation, jurisdiction arose
only in the United States Court of Appeals. 2" 4 The jurisdictional
structure of the 1954 Act replaced that of the 1946 Act with one
exception: § 2223 of the 1954 Act authorized alternative claim
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims and in the district courts for the
disclosure "to any nation [of] any [r]estricted [d]ata based on a
patent application not belonging to the United States."2 ' Thus,
the Court of Federal Claims possesses limited jurisdiction over
claims under the present Atomic Energy Act.2
4. The Mutual Security Act. Enacted in 1951, and later expanded in 1954, the Mutual Security Act authorizes both the establishment of technical cooperation programs with any foreign government or foreign government agency and the entry into and
performance of contracts in connection with such technical
The Act further provides certain
cooperation programs. 26 7
protection for inventors and patentees by authorizing actions
against the United States for any infringement of patent rights by
federal agencies or departments under the terms of the Act.2 s
For any cause of action, the Act authorizes alternative jurisdiction
26 9
in either the Court of Federal Claims or in the district courts.
Notably, the Court of Claims has strictly construed application of
the Act, expressly requiring that any infringement of a compensaright arise under the authority of the
ble United States patent
27 0
Mutual Security Act.
5. Other Administrative Agency and Department Statutory
Provisions. Individual administrative agencies and departments
m Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, §§ 151-60, 68 Stat. 919, 943-48 (current version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181-90 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
Id. § 157, 68 Stat. at 947 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2187 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
Id. § 173, 68 Stat. at 953 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2223 (Supp. V 1993)).
2'Despite this special jurisdictional exception, LEXIS contains no references to any cases
in the Court of Federal Claims or its predecessors or in the district courts brought on this
basis. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED file (March 1, 1994).
Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, Title III, § 301-308, 68 Stat. 832, 841-43

(repealed 1961). See also Exec. Order No. 10,973, 3 C.F.R. 493 (1959-1963) (describing scope
of application of Mutual Security Act).
2 Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 497, Title V, § 517, 65 Stat. 373, 382-83 (repealed
1954); Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, Title V, § 506, 68 Stat. 832,852 (repealed 1961).
65 Stat. at 383 (repealed 1954); 68 Stat. at 852 (repealed 1961)..
20 Kaplan v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 787, 790 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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also maintain specialized statutory provisions relating to patent
rights and other rights in intellectual property. The Department
of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health
and Human Services, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration,
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Tennessee Valley

Authority, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission all
operate under specific statutory mandates pertaining to patent and
other intellectual property rights.2 7 ' Only when these more

'The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains a statutory mandate for the procurement
of patent rights and other intellectual properties. 10 U.S.C. § 2386 (1988). In such
situations, however, compensation for the acquisition or use of such property is required.
See 22 U.S.C. § 526 (1988) (providing that Army and Navy compensate patent owners for
rights utilized in government contracts regarding war material).
Patent rights related to the Department of Energy (DOE) cannot be granted for either
"special nuclear material" or "atomic energy in an atomic weapon." See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa)
(1988) (defining "special nuclear material"). If patents are granted for these categories, or
in the production or utilization thereof, such patents will be revoked. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181-82
(1988). Thus, all rights to inventions pertaining to "special nuclear material" or "atomic
energy in an atomic weapon" vest in the DOE. 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (1988). For other types of
inventions, although patents may be issued, the DOE maintains authority to utilize these
discoveries and grant licenses for such use. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183, 2186 (1988). These powers
cannot be prevented by injunction, but the DOE must compensate the patent owner for use
of the discovery. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2184, 2187 (1988). In the performance of a government
contract, any discoveries arising from research and development vest in the United States
instead of the inventor. 42 U.S.C. § 5908(a) (1988).
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) operates under the same statutory authority
as that of the DOE. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2223 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) maintains statutory authority to
limit rights in intellectual properties pursuant to research grants issued through the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). 30 U.S.C. § 937(b) (1988).
Thus, the NIOSH operates under the same statutory authority as the DHHS.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) maintains statutory authority to acquire property
rights, including patent rights. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 833a(d) (1988) (granting rights in
connection with project at Fort Peck, Montana). The DOI maintains further mandatory
obligations to require public availability of inventions discovered pursuant to research and
development in mining. 30 U.S.C. §§ 951, 1226(c), 1328(c) (1988).
The Department of State (DOS) maintains statutory authority to require public availability
of inventions discovered in the prosecution of contracts with its agencies. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.
§ 2572 (1988) (providing for contracts made with United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency).
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) operates under statutory
authority which provides for the vesting of all property rights in the United States that are
discovered in the performance of any contract with NASA. 42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (1988). A
patent may not issue for any invention that possesses "significant utility in the conduct of
aeronautical and space activities" without the authorization of the administrator of NASA.
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specific statutory inducements of patent infringement fail does 28
U.S.C. § 1498 apply, provided the regulatory framework for such an
infringement action against the United States exists.
B. REGULATORY INDUCEMENT OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT

Just as 28 U.S.C. § 1498 effectively allows patent infringement
through contracts, the regulatory framework for government
contracting of intellectual property further illustrates the means by
which the government may contract patent infringement. Part 27
of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), sets forth the varied regulatory provisions
regarding patents, copyrights, and technical data.2 72 The FAR
defines the competing policies that all federal agencies must
consider in government contracting with regard to all forms of
intellectual property and sets forth the means for implementing
these policies.2 73

Section 27.104 of the FAR sets forth eight policies of guidance for
implementing the "general contracting requirements" of FAR
27.274
These policies include seven points relevant to patents
specifically and intellectual property generally:

Id. § 2457(c). Moreover, NASA maintains statutory authority to compensate any "Scientific
or technical contribution' to NASA. 42 U.S.C. § 2458(a) (1988).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) operates under statutory authority to acquire
patent rights pertaining to fuels and vehicles, 42 U.S.C. § 7404(bX4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993),
and pertaining to solid waste disposal, 42 U.S.C. § 6981 (1988). Similarly, for environmental
concerns related to emissions standards, the EPA also maintains statutory authority for the
mandatory licensing of such patent rights if done with "reasonable terms and conditions."
42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1988).
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) operates under statutory authority which requires
the vesting in the TVA of all patent rights "made by virtue of and incidental to such service"
relating to the TVA. 16 U.S.C. § 831d(i) (1988).
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) operates under statutory authority
which protects the rights of the patent owner in the patent, but requires public disclosure
of information resulting from any "more than minimal' CPSC activity. 15 U.S.C. § 2054
(1988).
48 C.F.R. §§ 27.000-.601 (1994).
Id. "The policies, procedures, and clauses prescribed by this part 27 are applicable to
all agencies. Agencies are authorized to adopt alternate policies, procedures, and clauses,
but only to the extent determined necessary to meet the specific requirements of laws,
executive
orders, treaties, or international agreements. Id. § 27.101.
27
4 Id. § 27.104.
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(a) The Government encourages the maximum
practical commercial use of inventions made while
performing Government contracts.
(b) Generally, the Government will not refuse to
award a contract on the grounds that the prospective
contractor may infringe a patent.
(c) Generally, the Government encourages the use of
inventions in performing contracts and, by appropriate contract clauses, authorizes and consents to such
use, even though the inventions may be covered by
U.S. patents and indemnification against infringement may be appropriate.
(d) Generally, the Government should be indemnified against infringement of U.S. patents resulting
from performing contracts when the supplies or
services acquired under the contracts normally are or
have been sold or offered for sale by any supplier to
the public in the commercial open market or are the
same as such supplies or services with relatively
minor modifications.
(e) The Government acquires supplies or services on
a competitive basis in accordance with part 6, but it
is important that the efforts directed toward full and
open competition not improperly demand or use data
relating to private developments.
(f) The Government honors the rights in data
resulting from private developments and limits its
demands for such rights to those essential for Government purposes.
(g) The Government honors rights in patents, data,
and copyrights, and complies with the stipulations of
law in using or acquiring such rights.27 5
Although these points appear inconsistent on first impression,
careful review of the syntax reveals each point's limited nature.
Subsection (a) only "encourages" maximum commercial use; (b-d)
contains only "general" prescriptions; (e) proscribes only "improper"
' Id. § 27.104(a-g).
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demand or use of data; and (f-g) merely "honor" rights in such
data.2 7
As evidenced by the limited nature of these points of
general guidance, regulatory inducement of patent infringement
lies in the clauses recited by the FAR.
1. Distinguishingthe Regulations. The subparts of part 27 of the
FAR pertaining to patents and patent rights under government
contracts contain four clauses for the acceptance (or disclaimer) of
government liability for patent infringement occurring in the
performance of government contracts.2 77 These four clauses form
the bedrock of the regulatory inducement of patent infringement by
the United States in government contracts.2 78 These clauses are,
respectively, the authorization and consent clause, the notice and
assistance clause, the patent indemnification clause, and the waiver
of indemnity clause.
a. Authorization and Consent Clause.2 79 The most common

27

6

278

Id.
48 C.F.R. § 27.201-.203, 27.203-6 (1994).
See generally Richard J. McGrath, The Unauthorized Use of Patents by the United

States Government or its Contractors, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 349, 352-54 (1991) (examining
authorization and consent clause, patent indemnity clause, waiver of indemnity clause, and
notice and assistance clause).
s 7 The authorization and consent clause provides:
(a) The Government authorizes and consents to all use and manufacture,
in performing this contract or any subcontract at any tier, of any
invention described in and covered by a United States patent (1)
embodied in the structure or composition of any article the delivery of
which is accepted by the Government under this contract or (2) used in
machinery, tools, or methods whose use necessarily results from
compliance by the Contractor or a subcontractor with (i) specifications or
written provisions forming a part of this contract or (ii) specific written
instructions given by the Contracting Officer directing the manner of
performance. The entire liability to the Government for infringement of
a patent of the United States shall be determined solely by the provisions of the indemnity clause, if any, included in this contract or any
subcontract hereunder (including any lower-tier subcontract), and the
Government assumes liability for all other infringement to the extent of
the authorization and consent hereinabove granted.
(b) The Contractor agrees to include, and require inclusion of, this
clause, suitably modified to identify the parties, in all subcontracts at
any tier for supplies or services (including construction, architect
engineer services, and materials, supplies, models, samples, and design
or testing services expected to exceed $25,000 (however, omission of this
clause from any subcontract, under or over $25,000, does not affect this
authorization and consent.)
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means by which government contracts constitute patent infringement is by entering contracts containing an "authorization and
consent clause."'
This clause appears in almost all government
contracts, except for small purchases, that encompass complete
performance and delivery within the United States."1
The
authorization and consent clause entitles a contractor to use any
invention disclosed in a patent of the United States necessary for
the performance of a government contract, and simultaneously, to
avoid liability for patent infringement. 2
b. Notice and Assistance Clause.'
Government contracts

48 C.F.R. § 27.201-2(a) (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-1 (1994). Under the express instructions
of § 27.201-2, the authorization and consent clause from § 52.227-1 is to be utilized.
However, FAR § 27.201-2 requires a separate authorization and consent clause for research
and development contracts. 48 C.F.R. § 27.201-2(b) (1994). Further, for obscure cases of
contracts for communication services with a common carrier, § 27.201-2 requires a third type
of clause. Id. § 27.201-2(c).
2o 48 C.F.R. § 27.201 (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-1 (1994). FAR § 52.227-1 illustrates the
most common authorization and consent clause, or the clause which applies to all
construction and supply contracts. 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-1(a) (1994). Notably, this clause
contains several restrictions on application. In contrast, FAR § 27.201-2 requires a separate
authorization and consent clause for research and development contracts. Id. § 27.201-2(b).
Further, for the obscure cases of contracts for communication services with a common carrier,
FAR § 27.201-2 requires but a third clause. Id. § 52.227.1 (Alternate II).
281 48 C.F.R. § 27.201-1(bX2) (1994).
2m Id. § 27.201-1(a).

288 The notice and assistance clause requires that:

(a) The Contractor shall report to the Contracting Officer, promptly and
in reasonable written detail, each notice or claim of patent... infringement based on the performance of this contract of which the Contractor
has knowledge.
(b) In the event of any claim or suit against the Government on account
of any alleged patent... infringement arising out of the performance of
this contract or out of the use of any supplies furnished or work or
services performed under this contract, the Contractor shall furnish to
the Government, when requested by the Contracting Officer, all evidence
and information in possession of the Contractor pertaining to such suit
or claim. Such evidence and information shall be furnished at the
expense of the Government except where the Contractor has agreed to
indemnify the Government.
(c) The Contractor agrees to include, and require inclusion of, this clause
in all subcontracts at any tier or supplies or services (including construction and architect engineer subcontracts and those for material, supplies,
models, samples, or design or testing services) expected to exceed the
dollar amount set forth in 13,000 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR).
48 C.F.R. § 27.202 (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-2 (1994).
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that contain the authorization and consent clause generally include
the "notice and assistance" clause.2 ' This clause requires the
contractor who infringes a patent during performance of the
contract to assist in the defense of any action under 28 U.S.C. §
1498. 2m The clause requires that the contractor provide notice of
any claim of infringement relating to a government contract and,
when requested, that the contractor provide assistance in connection with any such suit. 2 "
c. Patent Indemnity Clause.2
In contrast to both the
authorization and consent clause and the coordinate notice and
assistance clause, the "patent indemnity clause" absolves the
government of liability for patent infringement.'
While a
2 4

Id.

48 C.F.R. § 27.202-1 (1994).
48 C.F.R. § 52.277-2(b) (1994).
2 The patent indemnity clause provides that:
(a) The Contractor shall indemnify the Government and its officers,
'

agents, and employees against liability, including costs, for infringement
of any United States patent (except a patent issued upon an application
that is now or may hereafter be withheld from issue pursuant to a
Secrecy Order under 35 U.S.C. 181) arising out of the manufacture or
delivery of supplies, the performance of services, or the construction,
alteration, modification, or repair of real property (hereinafter referred
to as "construction work") under this contract, or out of the use of
disposal by or for the account of the Government of such supplies or
construction work.
(b) This indemnity shall not apply unless the Contractor shall have been
informed as soon as practicable by the Government of the suit or action
alleging such infringement and shall have been given such opportunity
as is afforded by applicable laws, rules, or regulations to participate in
its defense. Further, this indemnity shall not apply to (1) an infringement resulting from compliance with specific written instructions of the
Contracting Officer directing a change in the supplies to be delivered or
in the materials or equipment to be used, or directing a manner of
performance of the contract not normally used by the Contractor, (2) an
infringement resulting from addition to or change in supplies or
components furnished or construction work performed that was made
subsequent to delivery or performance, or (3) a claimed infringement that
is unreasonably settled without the consent of the Contractor, unless
required by final decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
48 C.F.R. § 27.203 (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52,227-3 (1994).
2 FAR § 52.227-3 illustrates the most common patent indemnity clause, or the clause
which applies to all sealed bid contracts for supplies or services, except for sealed bid
construction contracts or sealed bid contracts for the dismantling, demolition, or removal of
improvements, provided the goods or services are normally for sale on the open market. 48
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patentee may sue the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498
under a contract with a patent indemnity clause, the clause
requires the contractor to reimburse the government for damages
paid under a finding of liability. 9 The FAR mandates the
inclusion of a patent indemnity clause in government contracts for
any form of performance that normally appears for sale on the open
market. 29° The FAR otherwise precludes the inclusion of the
clause in government contracts in all other situations, 291 except
for sealed bid contracts for "specific components, spare parts, or
services" or for contractors who so agree.2 92 The FAR prohibits
the inclusion of the patent indemnification clause in government
contracts for architect-engineer work,293 for small purchases,29 4
for performance outside the United States,2 9 5 or for contracts that
contain the authorization and consent clause.2 9
In addition, the inclusion or exclusion of the patent indemnity
clause within a government contract depends upon whether the
government sought the contract by sealed bids or by negotiation. 29 7 Although the FAR requires the inclusion of a patent
indemnity clause in all sealed bid contracts for goods or services
normally for sale on the open market, 298 except construction

C.F.R. §27.203-2(a) (1994). In situations where the foregoing types of sealed bid contracts
require specific components or services normally for sale on the open market or otherwise,
the FAR provides for an addendum clause to the general clause either including or excluding
the respective good or service. Id. § 27.203-2(b); 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-3 (1994) (Alternate I);
Id. (Alternate III). Whether the inclusionary or exclusionary clause applies depends entirely
upon simplicity and convenience. Id. § 27.203-2(b). As contracts with communication
services with a common carrier require a specific authorization and consent clause, similarly
the FAR requires a specific patent indemnity clause for these obscure contracts. Id. § 52.2273 (Alternate III).
2 Id. § 27.203-1.
2' Id. § 27.203-1(a).
291Id. § 27.203-1(bX2).

m 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-1(bX2) (1994).

Id. § 27.203-1(bX5).
Id. § 27.203-1(bX4).
2' ld. § 27.203-1(bX3).
2
Id. § 27.203-1(bX1).
2"

' Compare 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-2 (1994) (describing use of patent indemnity clause with
sealed bids) with 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-3 (1994) (describing use of patent indemnity clause with
negotiated contracts).

2"

Id. § 27.203-2.
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contracts,2 the FAR mandates no inclusion of this clause for
similarly situated negotiated contracts. 3° Instead, the decision
to include a patent indemnity clause in negotiated contracts
initially depends upon price considerations. 30 1 The inclusion of
a patent indemnity clause in negotiated contracts also depends
upon certain defined exceptions to the general practice of exclusion,
although in contrast to the sealed bid requirements, these exceptions entail only discretionary mandates of inclusion.3 2 Specifically, the FAR provides discretionary authority to include a patent
indemnity clause in negotiated contracts where the goods or
services are normally for sale on the open market,30 3 where the
prospective contractor expresses willingness to indemnity the
Government,'
where "specific components, spare parts, or
services" are normally for sale on the open market, 3 5 or where
the contract entails communication services by a common carri3
er.

0

d.

Waiver of Indemnity Clause."7

Even though the FAR

2
Any contract for construction or for dismantling, demolition, and removal of
improvements requires a separate analysis under the FAR. Id. §§ 27.203-2, 27.203-3. As
set forth at FAR § 27.203-5, unless otherwise prohibited, these contracts require the
inclusion of the specific construction patent indemnity clause. See supra note 288 (describing
FAR § 27.203-1(b)). Id. FAR § 52.227-4 sets forth this particular clause. Nevertheless,
"nonstandard, noncommercial, or special" techniques or other construction or demolition
requirements may gain an express exclusion to patent indemnity if the contracting officer
anticipates the requirement. Id. § 27.203-5. As with the construction patent indemnity
clause, FAR § 52.227-4 also contains a clause for such an exclusion. Id. § 52.227-4 (Alternate
I).

Id. § 27.203-3.
s Id.
w2 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-4 (1994).
3o1

' Id. § 27.2034(a2).
'Id. § 27.203-4(aXl). This exception includes the same provision as that of FAR 27.2031(bX2Xii). See supra note 288.
m Id. § 27.203-4(b).
3' Id. § 27.203-4(c).
'o The waiver of indemnity clause mandates that:
Any provision or clause of this contract to the contrary notwithstanding,
the Government hereby authorizes and consents to the use and manufacture, solely in performing this contract, or any invention covered by the
United States patents identified below and waives indemnification by the
Contractor with respect to such patents: [The Contracting Officer must
identify the patents by number or by other means if more appropriate].
48 C.F.R. § 27.203-6 (1994); 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-5 (1994).
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provisions regarding patent indemnity require the clause's inclusion
in particular situations, the government may grant a waiver of such
indemnity for specific United States patents.s s An unusual
occurrence in the regulatory setting, such a waiver requires
approval from the head of the respective contracting agency.
2. Distinguishingthe Regulations: A Reprise. In applying these
regulations, a contracting organ of the government may ascertain
the need for any indemnity provisions from the outset and thereby
attempt to induce the submission of the lowest overall price.
However, as the government bears the burden of applying these
regulations, the patentee or the government contractor may dispute
the choice taken by the Government official, almost always a
In order to aid parties in applying the
contracting officer. s°
regulations, this Article offers a flow diagram analysis of the
regulatory decision-making process:

MId.
See generallyTo the Chairman, United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 46 Comp. Gen.
227 (1966) (describing obligation of contracting officer to apply regulations regarding patent
infringement).
'o
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This Article also provides two hypotheticals to illustrate the
above application of the diagram. 1 °
Hypothetical #1
The United States Marine Corps issues a solicitation for
offers (SFO) for a standard type of helicopter with delivery
within the United States. The SFO contains no express
indemnity provision.
As the diagram illustrates, a contracting officer begins the
regulatory analysis with two initial considerations: (1) whether the
contract's performance and delivery occurs outside the United
States and (2) whether the contract expressly indemnifies the
contractor.3 ' If the contracting officer can answer either of these
questions in the affirmative, no authorization and consent extends
to the contract." 2 Otherwise, if the contracting officer can answer the question in the negative, the contacting officer next
considers the contract type.3" 3 In the hypothetical, the contracting officer must consider the contract type.
Hypothetical #1(A)
The SFO calls for a research and development contract
not to exceed $100,000,000.
If the contract is for a supply or service, then the contracting
officer must insert the authorization and consent clause.3 14 If the
contract involves research and development, then the contracting
officer must insert an authorization and consent clause (Alternate
I). 31' Finally, if the contract is a common carrier contract, then
the contracting officer must insert an authorization and consent
clause (Alternate II).316 Further, if the dollar value of the con-

310

The hypotheticals are derived from Messerschmidt v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 1, affd

without op., 14 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1382 (1994).
311 48 C.F.R. § 27.201-1(b) (1994).

312 Id.
31 Id.

48 C.F.R. § 52.227.1 (1994).
315 Id. § 52.227.1 (Alternate I).
3 16
ld. § 52.227.1 (Alternate II).
314

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1995

59

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

448

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 2:389

tract exceeds the limits of FAR 13.000, then the contracting officer
must also incorporate a notice and assistance clause within the
research and development contract.3 1 7
After these determinations, regardless of the type of authorization and consent clause applied, the contracting officer considers
whether to include the patent indemnity clause.3 18 In the hypothetical, because the solicitation for offers calls for a research and
development contract, the contracting officer should include an
Alternate I authorization and consent clause. Further, because the
contract amount most likely will exceed $25,000, the contracting
officer should also include
a notice and authorization clause
319
pursuant to FAR 13.000.
Hypothetical #1(B)
The SFO requires not only engineering requirements for
production of the helicopter but manufacturing of the
helicopter as well.
Even if the contracting officer includes an authorization or
consent clause and a notice and assistance clause within a contract,
these clauses alone do not preclude the introduction of a patent
indemnity clause.3 2 ° Indeed, the FAR specifically recognizes the
likelihood of both an authorization and consent clause and a patent
indemnity clause within the same contract.32 ' In five specific
circumstances, however, the contracting officer shall not include a
patent indemnity clause within a contract: 322 (1) a research and
development contract with authorization and consent clause
(Alternate I);323 (2) a contract for supplies or services that clearly

1748 C.F.R. § 27.202-2 (1994).
38s Id. § 27.201-1. The contracting officer also considers the inclusion or exclusion of the

patent indemnity clause from a contract because "both a patent indemnity clause and an
authorization and consent clause may be included in the same contract." Id.

48 C.F.R. § 13.000 (1994).
m048 C.F.R. § 27.201-1(a) (1994).

319

21 id.
n Id. § 27.203-1(b).

sn Id. § 27.203-1(bXl). However, if the research and development contract includes
supplies normally sold to the public on the open market, the contracting officer may allow
a patent indemnity clause solely for those supplies. Id.
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have not been sold to the public on the open market; 324 (3) a

contract requiring both performance and delivery outside the
United States;325 (4) a contract involving small purchase procedures;3 2 or (5) a contract involving only architect-engineer
services.3 27 If the contracting officer finds any of these five
circumstances present, and a patent indemnity clause improper, the
analysis ends; otherwise, the contracting officer continues the
analysis depending on the type of procurement. 3" In the hypothetical, as the solicitation for offers satisfies none of the five conditions, the regulations allow no provision for patent infringement to
the government contractor. Thus, the contracting officer would
continue the analysis and consider the type of procurement to
ascertain whether a patent indemnity clause is appropriate.
Hypothetical #1(C)
The SFO calls for the negotiated procurement of the
helicopters. Further, in response to the SFO, Eugene
Luegemaker submits a letter to the contracting officer
alleging that any helicopter produced under the anticipated
contract would infringe his patent. Luegemaker owns a
patent to a four-axis helicopter controller similar to the
controller required under the SFO. None of the government
contractors agree to indemnity the government with regard
to Luegemaker's assertions of patent infringement.
If the specification calls for a negotiated procurement, the
contracting officer generally has discretion to avoid the inclusion of
a patent indemnity clause in order to secure the most advantageous
pricing. 329 This discretion is the general rule, absent one of five
exceptions: (1) if a patentee alleges patent infringement, and the
Id. § 27.203-1(bX2).
48 C.F.R. § 27.203-1(bX3) (1994). Note that this exception only applies if no supplies
or services are ultimately shipped to the United States, despite the performance and delivery
3
32

means. Id. Note that the United States also includes its possessions and Puerto Rico. Id.
m Id. § 27.203-1(bX4).

Id. § 27.203-1(bX5).
m Id. §§ 27.203-2, 27.203-3.
3
Compare 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-1 (applying strict requirements in application of
regulation) with 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-4 (applying more lenient requirement in application of
regulation).
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contractor agrees to indemnify the United States without an
increase in price or otherwise, the contracting officer may insert a
patent indemnity clause;330 (2) if the supply or service contract
requires goods normally sold on an open market; 331 (3) if the
contract requires the provision of specific components, spare parts,
or services normally sold to the public on an open market, the
contracting officer may insert either patent indemnity clause
(Alternative I) or patent indemnity clause (Alternate II);33 2 (4) if
the contract involves communication services by an unregulated
common carrier, then the contracting officer shall insert a patent
indemnity clause (Alternate III); or (5) if the contract involves
a construction contract for dismantling, demolition, and removal of
improvements, if standard, 3 4 the contracting officer must insert
a patent indemnity clause (construction contracts).335 Yet, even
if the contracting officer determines whether the inclusion of a
patent indemnity clause under this system is proper, upon approval
of the head of the agency, the contracting officer may waive such
indemnity.33
Whatever the outcome, this final determination
ends the analysis. In the hypothetical, even though a patentee
asserts patent infringement, no government contractor agrees to
indemnify the government. Therefore, the contracting officer may
not insert a patent indemnity clause.
Hypothetical #2
The invitation for bids (IFB) calls for sealed bids for the
helicopters. In response to the IFB, Eugene Luegemaker
submits a letter to the contracting officer alleging that any
helicopter produced under the anticipated contract would
infringe his patent. Luegemaker owns a patent to a fouraxis helicopter controller similar to the controller required

o 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-4(aX)

(1994) (citing FAR 27.203-1(bX2Xii)).

331Id. § 27.203-4(aX2).
n

Id. § 27.203-4(b).

3" Id.

§ 27.203-4(c).

3N Id. § 27.203-5. If nonstandard structures, products, materials, equipment, processes,
or methods, then the contracting officer may specifically exclude such matters from the
patent indemnity clause. Id.
3" 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-5 (1994).

sw Id. § 27.203-6.
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under the IFB. None of the government contractors agree
to indemnity the government with regard to Luegemaker's
assertions of patent infringement.
In sealed-bid procurement, the contracting officer possesses no
discretion to determine whether to include a patent indemnity
clause. 7 Thus, in the following five circumstances the contracting officer must insert a patent indemnity clause in a sealed bid
contract: (1) if a patentee contends that the contractor would
infringe a United States patent, and the contractor agrees to
indemnify the government without an increase in price or otherwise;m (2) if the contract includes goods or services normally sold
to the public on the open market; 9 (3) if the contract involves
communication services by an unregulated common carrier;3 ° (4)
if the contract requires the provision of specific components, spare
parts, or services normally sold to the public on the open market;341 or (5) if the contract requires the provision of specific
components, spare parts, or services normally sold to the public on
the open market, or such with relatively minor modifications.342
Again, as with the patent indemnity clause in negotiated procurement, the head of the agency may authorize the insertion of a
patent indemnity clause, even if the contracting officer had found
otherwise.m In the hypothetical, the contracting officer reaches
the same outcome as in the negotiated procurement, providing no
patent indemnity clause absent agreement of the government
contractor to indemnify the government.
By application of the diagram, the contracting officer maintains
specific requirements for establishing which clauses to include and
exclude within any particular contract.344 Despite whatever
finding the contracting officer may deem appropriate under this
I& § 27.203-2(a).
Id, § 27.203-1(bX2Xii).

'
"

mId. § 27.203-2(a).

30 48 C.F.R. § 27.203-2(b) (1994). Notably, in this situation, the contracting officer has
discretion to insert either a patent indemnity clause Alternate I or patent indemnity clause

Alternate II.
1

'~

1d.
I
§ 27.203-2(a) (citing 27.203-1(b)2)i)).

I4
Id. § 27.203-2(c).
Id. § 27.203-6.

s" See supra notes 277-308 and accompanying text.
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system, pursuant to FAR 27.203-6, the head of the agency maintains wide discretion to prevent the insertion of the patent
indemnity clause in any contract.3 5 In so doing, the head of the
agency maintains full authority over indemnification of the United
States for the infringement of any United States patent by the
United States directly or for the United States via a government
contractor.
IV. THE LITIGATION OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1498
Section 271 of Title 35 provides the statutory definition of patent
infringement," 7 yet the jurisdictional basis for patent infringement cases before the Court of Federal Claims lies not in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271, but in 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).348 In contrast to 35 U.S.C. §
271, where a patentee frequently maintains a choice of suits, 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides a single source of recovery against the
United States and only for the type of direct infringement contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 271. 349 Yet, technically, a suit under 28
U.S.C. § 1498 constitutes neither an infringement nor a damage
claim but a claim for reasonable and entire compensation in
eminent domain. 3

48 C.F.R. § 27.203-6 (1994).
'~Id.

35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988 & Supp. I 1994).
See generally Barry L. Springer, Patent Practice in the United States Court of Claims
3-4, 31-32 (1968) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, George Washington University) (on file with
author) (making observations on patent infringement suits in Court of Federal Claims).
" See Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1169-70, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 52 (Ct.
Cl. 1980) ("Section 1498 expressly waives the Government's sovereign immunity only with
respect to governmental direct infringement of a patent. Nowhere in the section is active
37
3"

inducement of infringement or contributory infringement mentioned, either directly or by
cross-reference to 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c).").
o See Kornylak Corp. v. United States, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 161 (Ct. Cl. 1980):
The instant suit, however, is neither an action for 'infringement' in the
sense in which that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (compare language
of 35 U.S.C. § 271 with that of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)), nor an action for
'damages' in the sense in which that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 284 (also
compare language of 35 U.S.C. § 284 with that of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)).
It is a suit for 'reasonable and entire compensation' for 'Use or manufacture by or for the United States' of the invention described in and
covered by the patent in suit 'without license or lawful right.' It is not
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In an action against the government for the use or manufacture
of a patent, although § 1498(a) refers to "reasonable and entire
compensation," and not infringement as such,35 ' the legal
standards for ascertaining a § 1498 action mirror the standards of
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271.352 For claims of "direct
infringement," or more properly for a compulsory, nonexclusive
license in eminent domain, only the standards of infringement and
standards for § 1498 violations are synonymous. Within this realm,
still, the Court of Federal Claims 353 applies the common infringement analysis of Title 35 in adjudicating a patent dispute under 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a). 3 4
In contrast to patent infringement under Title 35, a patent
infringement claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) generally takes place
in two fora, first as a contingency in administrative proceedings,
and second as a patent infringement claim in a judicial proceeding.
In the contingency stage, a patentee may anticipate patent
infringement will occur during the course of a government contract
and may challenge the contract, either in a bid protest or though
other administrative action. If patent infringement occurs, the
patentee retains the sole remedy of a suit in the Court of Federal
Claims.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Distinguishable from judicial claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498, patentees may seek administrative redress for the unauthorized use of a patent by the government or government contractors

an action sounding in tort, but an action for just compensation for an
eminent domain taking of a nonexclusive license.
(emphasis in original).
3" Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 287 has no application in eminent domain taking).
2 Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1548, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that burden of proving mode or structure of "accused device" differs under §
1498 and Title 35). See also Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 454, 459 n.3, 11
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (1989) ("Accordingly, [the Court of Federal Claims] uses 'infringement' as a familiar term accurately describing the central and relevant requirements of §
1498.").
Motorola, 729 F.2d at 768.
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 980 (1992).
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before initiating a claim for patent infringement in the Court of
Federal Claims. 3"
In most areas of government contracting,
whether in the formation or administration of contracts, administrative proceedings usually constitute a condition precedent to
judicial redress for a claim. For patent infringement claims,
jurisdiction before exhaustion of administrative remedies is
discretionary,' but if a patentee pursues administrative remedies prior to judicial resolution, specific statutory authority
excludes the period of administrative redress from the six-year
statute of limitations.3 5 7
1. Anticipated Patent Infringement in Bid Protests. If a government contractor considers a government practice in the formation
of a government contract to be improper or illegal under the laws
or regulations of the federal procurement system, the contractor
may assert a "bid protest."358 Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 1498, where
jurisdiction exists solely in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, a protestor maintains a choice of venue for these proceedings, except for automatic data processing equipment contracts for
which protests occur only at the General Services Administration
Board of Contract Appeals.3 5 9 In addition to a protest before the
Comptroller General of the Department of the Treasury,36 ° preaward protests for contracts other than data processing equipment
contracts must be filed with the United States Court of Federal

m Halas v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 354, 360-61 (1993). Notably, each agency and
department maintains its own procedures for the initiation of administrative redress. Id.
"Omni Moving & Storage, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 224, 230 (1990). "If no
statute exists, or if the relevant statute does not mandate exhaustion of remedies, however,
then the reviewing court has jurisdiction over claims filed by plaintiffs who failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies." Halas, 28 Fed. Cl. at 361. In such circumstances,
application of the exhaustion doctrine is discretionary, not mandatory. Id. See also
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1361, 1361 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (finding no
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Invention Secrecy Act).
"3 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1988).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988) (providing six year statute
of limitations) with 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (1988) (providing three year statute of limitations for
copyright infringement claims against United States).
' Timothy J. Rollins, A Contract Lawyer's Guide to the Requirement for Meaningful
Discussions in Negotiated Procurements,122 MIL. L. REV. 221, 221 (1988).
3"SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 8589-P, 8863-C, 87-1 BCA (CCH)
19,637.
30See
RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
353 (2d ed. 1986) (noting examples of exceptions to solicitations).
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Claims,"' or if a post-award protest, the local United States
District Court. 62 In the most common scenario, a government
contractor protests the requirements of the solicitation, often on the
grounds that the contract would lead to patent infringement.3m
One other common scenario occurs when the ground for protest
involves a dispute over whether the government properly awarded
a contract to the lowest bidder irrespective of the patent's ownership.'
The Comptroller General, however, has uniformly rejected protests based on anticipated patent infringement since 28
U.S.C. § 1498 provides an adequate remedy at law.3
A recent Comptroller General decision illustrates the typical
course of events in a protest based on anticipated patent infringement.3
In Lab Products, Inc.,& the National Institute of
Health (NIH) advertised an anticipated sole source contract for
laboratory cages in the Commerce Business Daily. After two
businesses expressed an interest in competing for the contract, NIH
amended the contract to an invitation for bids. When the incumbent contractor discovered the change in the procurement mechanism, based on assertions of patent infringement by the other
businesses, the incumbent contractor protested the change to the

" Id. For perhaps the most comprehensive consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court
of Federal Claims over pre-award bid protests, see generally AeroleaseLong Beach v. United
States, 31 Fed. Cl. 342, 353-54 (1994).
NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 360, at 353.
See Aircraft Porous Media, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-241665.2, B-241665.3, Apr. 8, 1991, 91-1
CPD 356 at 11 ("A potential for patent infringement does not provide a basis for objection
to award. As we have recognized, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1988) gives patent holders an adequate
and effective remedy for patent infringement, while saving the government from having its
procurements delayed pending litigation of patent disputes.").
' See David Fromson, 40 Comp. Gen. 294, 299 (1960) ("[I]t is our opinion that alleged
infringement of patent rights is not a sufficient justification for departing from the general
rule that procurements are to be made after formal advertising with award to the lowest
responsible bidder....").
See Cryo-Technologies Mktg. Group, Comp. Gen. B-207138, Oct. 27, 1982, 82-2 CPD
1 372, at 2 ("Section 1498, Title 28, United States Code, was designed for the purpose of
furnishing patentees adequate compensation for the use of their patents by or on behalf of
the Government, and at the same time preventing the obstruction of Government activities
by disputes or litigation between private parties respecting such patents.*).
'"Anticipated
patent infringement" arises in federal procurement when no infringement
has occurred but the patentee "anticipates" such by the execution of a government contract.
NASH & CBINIC, supra note 360, at 353.
' Comp. Gen. B-252452, Mar. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD T 250.
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Comptroller General. In the interest of "full and open competition,"
however, the Comptroller General rejected the protest.
As the Comptroller has ruled, "[a] potential for patent infringement does not provide a basis for objecting to a contract
award."3
This prohibition extends to issues relating to anticipated patent infringement, including the payment of patent
royalties,369 patent rights created under government contracts,370 patent rights pursuant to subcontracts with the government,371 delay compensation,372 use of patented drawings in a
solicitation,373 use of technical data rights,374 the infringement
of foreign patents, 37' and the infringement of United States

patents by foreign concerns. 76
2. Patent Infringement DuringContractAdministration. As 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) contains no statutory requirement for the exhaustion of administrative remedies before the initiation of suit in the
Court of Federal Claims, a patentee has the choice of suit in an
administrative agency or in the Court of Federal Claims.377 In
Odetics, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-246008, Feb. 13, 1992, 92-1 CPD 1 185 at 3.
Aircraft Porous Media, Inc., B-241665.2, B-241665.3, Apr. 8, 1991, 91-1 CPD

356,
at 11.
' Thomas-Morse Aircraft Corp., 4 Comp. Gen. 224, 228-29 (1924).
37 AWC, Inc., Comp. Gen. B-237405, Feb. 9, 1990, 90-1 CPD
173.
' RCA Corp., Comp. Gen. B-184053, Apr. 14, 1980, 80-2 CPD 80.
' Diversified Technologies, Comp. Gen. B-236035, Nov. 6, 1989, 89-2 CPD 427.
'4 Hughes Aircraft Co., Comp. Gen. B-226955, July 15, 1987 87-2 CPD
48.
'~' Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Comp. Gen. B-177115, May 14, 1973, 1973 CPD
39.
...
Charles Pfizer & Co., Comp. Gen. B-141459, May 10, 1960, 1960 CPD 1 37.
3" SAUL ELBAUM, InformationPaper,The Role of PrivatelyOwned Patentsin Government
Procurement (Feb. 5, 1992), in 3 WORKING GRoUP FIVE WORKING PAPERS § 17 (1993) (on file

with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC).
A patentee maintains two choices, either the filing of an administrative claim with the
agency responsible for the contract in which the infringement resulted or suit in the Court.
While the filing of an administrative claim involves great expense, a suit in the Court of
Federal Claims faces a funding anomaly disadvantageous to the resolution of a patent
infringement by administrative redress. Id. Elbaum explains the funding anomaly as
follows:
The funding anomaly is that when an agency voluntarily settles a patent
claim, it must pay that claim out of its appropriated funds. On the other
hand, if the agency declines to settle and the claimant files suit, the
claim is ultimately paid out of the Permanent Judgment Appropriation.
Since there is no requirement for agencies to reimburse the Judgement
Appropriation in patent cases, the agency escapes fiscal responsibility.
The funding anomaly contributes to agency reluctance to settle administrative claims for patent infringement.
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the most common situation, however, if the contractor seeks
guidance from one of the Boards of Contract Appeals (BCAs), the
BCA refers the patent issues to the terms of the contract. 7 s
Because almost all patent issues arise in the context of patent
infringement, the BCAs (just as with the bid protest fora) defer
these matters to the Court of Federal Claims.379
Other matters related to, but not resulting from, patent infringement may nevertheless arise within the jurisdiction of the BCAs.
The most common matter involves the construction of a contract
specification to include a proprietary good or its "equal."380
Another common issue before the BCAs relates to the allowability
of various costs (particularly legal costs) related to patents under
the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). 381' As a well recognized
general rule, the BCAs consider costs incurred in connection with
patent infringement litigation as unallowable unless otherwise
provided for under a government contract.382
Other patent issues considered by the BCAs include the government's obligation to retain patent notices on drawings delivered to

Id.
' Kings Point Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 27201,85-2 BCA (CCH) 1 18,043, at 90,571, 90,574.
'r James B. Nolan Investigative & Protective Co., GSBAC Nos. 5905, 5985, 82-2 BCA

(CCH) 1 15,943, at 79,024. Nevertheless, even should a BCA decide a patent infringement
issue in the express absence of jurisdiction, the Court of Claims has adopted the findings of
fact of such a proceeding. Whittaker Corp., ASBCA No. 18,422, 81-1 BCA (CCH) 1 15,055,
at 74,478. If, however, the alleged patent infringement regards actions occurring after the

performance of a Government contract, then the Court of Federal Claims maintains no
jurisdiction over the matter. See, e.g., Rhodes-Lewis Co., ASBCA No. 5150, July 17, 1959,
59-2 BCA, 1 2274, 1959 A.S.B.C.A. LEXIS 1339, at *11-14 (noting jurisdiction does not exist
for post-performance claim brought on behalf of assignee).
'i" Meredith Constr. Co., DOTCAB No. 1549, 85-1 BCA (CCH) 1 17896, at 89,618
(rejecting claimant's request for reimbursement of expenditures incurred to procure "brand
name welding shop exhaust hood" where equivalent hoods available); Arnold M. Diamond,
Inc., ASBCA No. 22,733, 78-2 BCA (CCH) 1 13447, at 65,720 (rejecting claimant's argument
that government violated procurement regulation through failure to disclose existence of
patent for specified oil collection pans); MB Assocs., ASBCA Nos. 19,924, 20,476, 77-2 BCA
(CCH) 1 12,797, at 62,272 (requiring claimant to develop satisfactory preproduction test in
absence of clearly delineated government specifications).
s Bos'n Towing & Salvage Co., ASBCA No. 41,357, 92-2 BCA (CCH) T 24,864.
Blue Cross Ass'n & Blue Shield Ass'n, ASBCA No. 25,778, 89-2 BCA (CCH) 1 21,840,
at 109, 885-86.
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determining respective entitlement to patent rights pursu-

ant to the Patents Rights clause,'

establishing the validity of

reservations of rights relating to contractor liability under the

various clauses,'

and calculating royalties under licensing

agreements for patent rights.8 6 Whatever the dispute, however,
if the patent question involves infringement, the BCAs have
uniformly rejected jurisdiction in favor of the Court of Federal
Claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
B. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

A proceeding in the Court of Federal Claims for the "unauthorized use or manufacture" of a patent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498
mirrors a similar proceeding in a United States District Court. 38 7
For the infringement determination, the Court of Federal Claims
applies the same standards as the district courts. 388 Like the
district courts, the Court of Federal Claims maintains explicit
authority to affirm or reject the validity of a patent.3 89 Outside
of these two determinations, however, the similarities between the
two judicial fora generally end. For example, whereas the district
courts maintain injunctive authority regarding patents in private

' See, e.g., Teledyne Continental Motors, ASBCA No. 16,516, 76-1 BCA (CCH) 11,852,
at 56,783 (concluding that contract at issue permitting only those "legends" on submitted
drawings that are 'specifically authorized by the contract or are otherwise approved by the
Government").
3 General Dynamics Corp., ASBCA No. 14,466, 73-2 BCA (CCH) 10,260. If reduction
to practice occurs before execution of a contract that includes a Patents Rights clause, the
contractor maintains the patent rights, but if reduction to practice occurs after execution of
the contract, the government maintains the patent rights. Id.
Wallace 0. Leonard, Inc., ASBCA No. 11,273, 66-2 BCA (CCH) 5983, at 27,667.
Raytheon Co., ASBCA No. 6616, 1963 BCA (CCH) 3446.
3_ Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1548, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
' Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768-69, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
3
0 See id. at 768:
Although concepts, phrases and words commonly used in the patent field
may connote or denote a panoply of rights and remedies under Title 35,
the same concepts, phrases and words do not and cannot always connote
or denote the same meaning under section 1498. Although a section
1498 action may be similar to a Title 35 action, it is nonetheless only
parallel and not identical.
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suits, the Court of Federal Claims maintains no injunctive
authority for patent infringement suits against the United
States. 39°
For infringement questions, the Court of Federal Claims follows
the precedent of the Court of Claims and of the United States
Infringement
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.3 9'
analyses almost always trace to Autogiro Co. v. United States,392
in which the Court of Claims defined the classic infringement
analysis: "[T]he determination of patent infringement is a two-step
process. First, the meaning of the claims in issue must be determined by a study of all relevant patent documents. Secondly, the
claims must be read on the accused structures." 93 In the first
step of the infringement analysis, claim interpretation, a court
determines what is patented. In the second step of the analysis,
claim construction, the court ascertains whether the accused device
embodies every element of the claim. Even if the accused device
fails to embody every literal detail of a claimed invention, however,
it may infringe the patent if it constitutes a substantially equivalent embodiment of the patented invention.3 94
Although the Court of Federal Claims applies the same standards
for validity as the Court of Claims, it has distinguished the need to
consider validity if noninfringement exists.39 While the Court of

390 d.
"5 South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1369, 215 U.S.PQ. (BNA) 657 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
384 F.2d 391, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
Id. at 401. See also Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 454, 11 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1481 (1989) (expanding upon traditional approach).
' Deuterium Corp., 16 Cl. Ct. at 461. The classic "doctrine of equivalents* asks whether
the accused process "performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way
to obtain the same result" as the patent claim. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods.
Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
' Compare Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1367, 1369 (1992) (stating "[T]his
court need consider the [patent] validity arguments only if infringement is found" and citing
Morton Intl, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 959 F.2d 948, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1231 (Fed. Cir.
1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 1967 (1993), affd without op. in part, and vacated without op. in
part, 6 F.3d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) with Pacific Technica Corp. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 393,
405, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168 (1986) (observing that "[p]atentdisputes in the United States
Claims Court require the court to make determinations on both validity and infringement,
regardless of the conclusion reached on either validity or infringement") (citing Simmons
Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tools Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1576, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 744
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Claims allowed the trial commissioners to avoid lengthy validity
analyses upon a finding of noninfringement,3 9 the Supreme
Court considers validity, not infringement, as the matter of greatest
importance. 39 7 Following the Court of Claims' rationale, however,
the Federal Circuit developed the practice of vacating validity
findings upon an affirmance of noninfringement, citing the
rationale that a court need not consider validity if no infringement
exists.3 98 District courts, as well as the Court of Federal Claims,
have adopted this practice on the trial level as well. 399 In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc.,4°° the Supreme
Court overturned the Federal Circuit practice of vacating validity
findings following rulings of noninfringement.4 °1 Antithetically,
the Court also stressed the ruling's limited nature, reviewing the
appellate practice but not any trial-level conventions of finding a
validity determination moot upon finding noninfringement.4 ' 2

(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985)).
' See Barrett v. United States, 405 F.2d 502, 510, 160 U.S.P.Q.2 (BNA) 224 (Ct. Cl.
1968) ("Since there is no infringement, it is unnecessary to decide validity."); Autogiro Co.
v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 415 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Only on claims found infringed is it
necessary to reach a decision on validity.").
3' Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). See also
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943) (commenting that "[t]hough the decision of
non-infringement disposes of the bill and answer, it does not dispose of the counterclaim
which raises the question of validity").
' 6 See, e.g., Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (dismissing cross-appeal on invalidity as moot); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel
Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1571, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (criticizing
custom of proving validity prior to deciding infringement).
' See Gargoyles, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1369 (rendering validity issue extraneous upon finding of
noninfringement); Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. 715, 717 (D.N.J. 1985)
(rendering validity issue moot upon finding of noninfringement), affd, 785 F.2d 1026, 228
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 933 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In contrast to making the validity of a patent moot
following a finding of noninfringement, the sole issue at the trial level is whether a court
should review validity at the trial level upon a finding of noninfringement. See Howard T.
Markey, On Simplifying Patent Trials, 116 F.R.D. 369, 370-71, 380-81 (1987) (considering
role of trial courts as fora for validity determinations in absence of infringement).
4m 113 S. Ct. 1967, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (1993).
" The Supreme Court also reiterated the public interest in resolving questions of patent
validity. Id. at 1977.
40 See id. at 1974 (pointing out that "the issue before us, therefore[,] concerns the
jurisdiction of an intermediate appellate court-not the jurisdiction of either a trial court or
this Court"). Additionally, the decision also suggests that the holding applies only to
appellate consideration of declaratory judgment decisions. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro
Mechanical Sys., 3 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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With regard to validity, however, the Court of Federal Claims has
recognized somewhat of a distinction between the district courts'
consideration of validity pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271 and the
validity determinations in patent infringement suits against the
United States. Whereas the district courts recognize no precedent
regarding validity determinations after a finding of noninfringement,4 °3 the Court of Federal Claims has strictly followed the
precedent of the Court of Claims by considering validity only after
upon a showing of "plainly evident"
finding noninfringement
°
invalidity.'

1. Distinguishingthe Cases. The Court of Federal Claims and
its immediate predecessor, the Claims Court, have adjudicated
approximately fifty-two reported cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
Before that, beginning as early as 1917 with the inception of
statutory authority for patent infringement suits against the
United States, the Court of Claims adjudicated approximately 190
reported cases. As precedent and persuasive authority for suits
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the practitioner must maintain close
familiarity with these cases. An analytical overview leads to three
classifications of suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1498: (1) the type of
proceeding, (2) the type of patent, and (3) the type of contract.
a. Type of Proceeding.
i. Summary Judgement. In the Court of Federal Claims,
disposition of a patent infringement claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
usually involves disposition by summary judgment rather than
trial. 4 5 Although an appropriate procedure of judicial dispute

'" But see Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 715, 717 (D.N.J. Mar. 8,
1985) (rendering validity issue moot upon finding of noninfringement), affd, 785 F.2d 1026
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
'0' See Messerschmidt, 29 Fed. Cl. at 17 ("The crucible of deciding validity at the trial
level, therefore, appears to hinge on whether the defendant presents sufficient evidence to
render as 'plainly evident' the invalidity of the patent-in-suit.") (emphasis added) (quoting
Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
'4o The Court of Claims has long ruled that even patent cases remain amenable to
summary judgment. See, e.g., Ace Fastener Corp. v. United States, 276 F.2d 391, 392, 125
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) (Cl. Ct. 1960) (stating that design patents are particularly susceptible to
summary judgment disposition).
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resolution, 4° summary judgment in patent cases requires a
higher level of analysis than summary judgment in other types of
cases.0 7 Nevertheless, if no genuine issue of material fact is
present and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter of law,
a court may render summary judgement even though patent
infringement constitutes a question of fact.
ii.
Trial. Per the national,'
even international, 4 0
jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims, trials generally take
place in the venue where the majority of the witnesses and parties
to the dispute are found.41 ° A trial in the Court of Federal
Claims mirrors a trial in a district court, with the major exception
that the Court of Federal Claims maintains no authority to
empanel a jury for the adjudication of claims against the government.41 1
08

See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 795, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that [als in other cases, the grant of summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate in a patent case where no genuine issue of material
fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law") (footnote omitted);
Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d 831,835, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (commenting that "[slummary judgment is as appropriate in a
patent case as in any other").
' See D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1573, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) ("[A] motion for summary judgment of infringement or noninfringement should
be approached with a care proportioned to the likelihood of its being inappropriate.").
" See, e.g., Branning v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 777, 782 (1985) (refusing to limit
payment of attorney's fees to local rates because of national jurisdiction of Court of Claims),
affd, 784 F.2d 361 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Charlson Realty Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 434, 446
(Cl. Ct. 1967) (pointing out importance of procedural rule due to national jurisdiction of
Court of Claims).
4 In the Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 906, 106 Stat. 4516, 4517-18 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 798 (Supp. V
1993)) Congress authorized the Court of Federal Claims to conduct proceedings outside of
the District of Columbia, including foreign countries "whose laws do not prohibit such
proceedings." 106 Stat. 4518.
410 Precision Specialty Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 1, 11 (1988).
411 From the inception of the waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the United
States, the government has allowed no provision for jury trials. COWEN ET AL., supra note
40, at 17. While the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires jury trials in criminal
matters and the Seventh Amendment provides for jury trials in civil matters over $20,
neither the Court of Federal Claims nor any of its predecessors have provided for jury trials
in suits against the United States. Id. See generally Practitioner's Handbook for the Court
of Federal Claims (Court of Federal Claims Bar Association 1994).
Following the creation of the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court considered the validity
of the court absent jury trials in McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). In
McElrath, the petitioner claimed that the legal authority for the Court of Claims violated the
'
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b. Type of Patent.
i. Utility Patent. The Court of Federal Claims has applied
the standard infringement analysis to utility patents, the most
prevalent type of patent.4 12
In Messerschmidt v. United
States, 413 the Court of Federal Claims provided an exhaustive
description of the patent infringement analysis for utility patents.41 4 Although relying on a separate statutory basis for
jurisdiction, the court recognized the same dual literal infringement/doctrine of equivalents analysis used by the district courts
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271. 41
As recognized in Messerschmidt,416 the precedent for this approach originates with Autogiro
Co. v. United States. 417 Although affirmed in an unpublished
opinion of the Federal Circuit, Messerschmidt v. United States
represents perhaps the best starting point for any suit of patent
infringement against the United States.
ii. Design Patent. The analysis of infringement of a design
patent differs from that of a utility patent.4 18 Similar to trade
dress of trademark law, a design patent encompasses the pattern
or style of an invention. 419 Although design patents require

Seventh Amendment, but the Court rejected the claim, noting the status of the Court of
Claims as a special court with special jurisdiction. Id. at 440. Neither the Court of Claims
nor any of its predecessors have questioned the absence of jury trials since McElrath. See,
e.g., Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 774, 775 (1990) (refusing to dismiss
counterclaim on grounds of jury unavailability in forum chosen by plaintiff); Seaboard
Lumber Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 366, 374 (1988) (holding that jury trial not required
where suit did not involve public rights or exercise of Article III power), affd, 903 F.2d 1560
(Fed. Cir. 1990); Frantz Equip. Co. v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 490, 494 (Ct. Cl. 1952)
(holding that plaintiffconsented to adjudication of government's counterclaim by filing action
in Court of Claims).
412

RAPHAEL V. LUPO & DONNA

M. TANGUAY,

WHAT CORPORATE AND GENERAL

PRACTITIONERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION 8 (1991). "Utility
patents" or "mechanical patents" comprise any invention claimed under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or
any "machine, process, manufacture, or composition of matter." Id.
4" 29 Fed. Cl. 1, affd without op., 14 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1382 (1994).
414 Id. at 45-66.
5
41 Id. at 43-45.
16
4 Id. at 44-45.
417 384 F.2d 391 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
41s Regent Jack Mfg. Co., v. United States, 292 F.2d 868, 870, 130 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235
(Ct.4Cl.
1 9 1961).
JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw 142 (1991).
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essentially the same validity determination as utility patents,42 °
the infringement of a design patent likewise involves matters
separate from those considered under the dual literal infringement/doctrine of equivalents analyses for utility patents.4 2 1 In
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. United States,42 2 the Court of Claims
recognized the differing standards,4 2 citing the Supreme Court
decision of Gorham Co. v. White42 4 as the applicable standard for
design patent infringement. Thus:
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such
attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs
are substantially the same, if the resemblance is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first
one patented is infringed by the other.4 25
Although the Court of Claims, the Claims Court, and the Court of
Federal Claims maintain little precedent for this, Blumcraft of
Pittsburgh presents the most likely starting point for any design
patent infringement claim against the United States pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).

" Principle Business Enters., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 433, 438-40, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 180 (1985).
421See also Ace Fastener Corp. v. United States, 276 F.2d 391, 392, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

143 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (noting that "[d]esign patents are particularly susceptible to disposition
on summary judgment") (citation omitted).
4m 372 F.2d 1014, 1016, 153 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 298 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
4
' In Blumcraft of Pittsburgh,the patentee owned a design patent to a unique hand rail.
Applying the substantial identity of appearance test of Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 511 (1871), the court found infringement. Blumcraft of Pittsburgh,372 F.2d at 1018.
Upon a finding of design patent infringement, the court then considered the patent's validity.
A review of the prior art resulted in the court's finding of nonobviousness: "[It is equally
clear that every such possible combination would not have the pleasing aesthetic effect,
appeal of beauty, and compatibility with modern architecture achieved by the design taught
by plaintiff's design patent." Id. at 1017.18. Accordingly, the Court of Claims found the
United States liable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
4 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872).
426 Id. at 528. In Gargoyles, Inc., the Court of Federal Claims further noted that design
infringement required that "the accused device must appropriate the novelty in the patented
device which distinguishes it from the prior art." Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct.
1367, 1370 (1992), affd in part and vacated in part, 6 F.3d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
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iii. PlantPatent. Since Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 1498(d),
no claims have arisen against the United States for the infringement of a plant patent. With the enactment of the Plant Patent
Act of 1930426 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,427
Congress has authorized and extended the subject matter protected
The 1930 Plant Patent Act afforded
under the patent law.4
patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants and the
1970 Plant Variety Protection Act authorized protection for certain
sexually reproduced plants. Although the Supreme Court has
provided instructive analysis of plant patent protection in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty,429 no case has arisen under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(d)
relating to plant patent infringement. If such a case ever arises in
the context of patent infringement by the United States, Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, as well as the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals decisions, will prove instructive in the application of 28
U.S.C. § 1498(d).
c. Type of Contract.
i. Supply and Service Contracts. A service or supply
contract involves the most elementary of patent infringement
disputes. 3 0 If the contract at issue includes the authorization
and consent clause (as required by the FAR and described by the
flow diagram earlier in this Article), but no patent indemnity
clause, liability arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 once the

426 The Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, § 2, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1988)), provides in relevant part: "Whoever invents or discovers and
asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports,
mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings ... may obtain a patent therefor...." See
generally WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 224, at ch. IX.
42 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1988). The Plant Patent Act of 1930 provided patent protection
to "novel varieties of non-sexually reproduced plants." Public Varieties v. Sun Valley Seed
Co., 734 F. Supp. 250, 251, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 20355 (N.D. Miss. 1990). By 1970, however,
Congress recognized that true-to-type reproduction was possible for sexually reproduced
plants and passed the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 to provide patent-like protection
for sexually reproduced plants. Id.
41In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,978,201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
vacated sub nom., Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S. 1028, affd 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
42 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4w 1 RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAw 412 (1977).
Whereas research and development contracts and construction contracts must separate
patent rights disputes from patent infringement disputes, the issue of infringement
constitutes the sole issue in patent disputes involving supply and service contracts. Id.
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government accepts the good or service.4 3 '
ii. Construction Contract. In the construction of machines
and similar technology, government contractors frequently develop
or discover better methods or machines to fulfill the government
contract, raising the question of ownership or license rights to these
new discoveries. In these circumstances, pursuant to the Patent

Rights clause,

32

the answer to ownership questions of the discov-

eries almost always depends on when the contractor developed the
invention. 41 3 If the contractor developed the invention during the
performance of a government contract and reduction to practice
occurred,'
the government generally retains an exclusive,
royalty-free license to use and manufacture the teachings of such
a discovery.43 5 Otherwise, the contractor retains all patent rights
and no license results.4 36 Although prevalent in research and
development contracts, these issues also arise in construction
contracts. 37 As a general rule, absent discovery of an invention
during a construction contract, the mere use of a patented intention
during performance does not constitute infringement without proof

" 1Stelma, Inc. v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 300 F.2d 761, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665 (3d Cir. 1962);
General Elec. Co. v. United States, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 260 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
42 Carl L. Vacketta & Oliver L. Holmes, Patent Rights under Government Contracts,
BRIEFING PAPERS, Dec. 1983, 1, 2. The Patent Rights clause defines the requirements for a
patent to an invention developed during the performance of a government contract. Id. The
clause requires that, in the event a contractor develops an invention during the performance
of a government contract, the government may retain certain patent rights if: (1) the
invention was conceived or actually reduced to practice during the performance of the
contract, (2) performance of the contract included matters closely related to the invention,
and (3) the United States patent law, or foreign patent law, provides patentability for the
invention. Id.
" Soundscriber Corp. v. United States, 360 F.2d 954, 961 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
'See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156, 161, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
857 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("Reduction to practice occurs when it is established that the invention will
perform its intended function beyond a probability of failure.'). The filing of a patent
application constitutes a constructive reduction to practice. In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454,
215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 14 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Pacific Technica Corp. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct.
393, 428, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1168, affd in partand vacated in part, 835 F.2d 871 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
" Hazeltine Corp. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1190, 1197-98, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1744
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
' Technical Dev. Corp. v. United States, 597 F.2d 733, 746 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
4
Zonolite Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 953, 113 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 223 (1957).
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of a nexus between the construction and the infringement. 438

iii. Research and Development Contract. Patent infringement may occur in one of two ways during a research and development contract; either the contractor may develop an invention
during the research and development and later claim infringement
of its patent or the contractor may use an invention during the
research and development and a third-party patentee may claim
infringement of its patent. In the former case, the patent rights
clause of the contract applies, creating "an irrevocable, nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free license in all inventions (whether
patentable or not) 'conceived or first actually reduced to practice' in
the performance of research and development work under the
contract." 9 In the latter case, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 applies. 440
Under the Patent Rights clause, no infringement results from the
development of an invention during the performance of a research
and development contract, unless the contractor is a nonprofit or
small business concern."' Moreover, the contractor may not
assert a patent infringement claim against the government for use
or manufacture of an invention developed during the performance
of a contract by that contractor. 442 Under the license vel non, the
government has long recognized that any discovery arising under
the "close and umbilical relationship" of work it funded gives rise
to a license." 3 As a result, for a development made independently of the ongoing program, 4 the contractor may make a claim
' The best example of this general rule for construction contracts appears in Carrier
Corp. v. United States, 534 F.2d 244, 248, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 55 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (holding
incidental use not equivalent to "use" contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
, General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 985,988, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 215
(Ct. CI. 1977) (quoting Patent Rights Clause in contract at issue).
4' Teledyne McCormick Selph v. United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1000, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
261 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
"' FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 982 F.2d 1546, 1547-50, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283
(Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 85 (1993).
' AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 454, 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968).
'Technical Dev. Corp. v. United States, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 329 (Ct. Cl. 1978),
affd as modified, 597 F.2d 733 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
'Id.
In Technical Development Corp., the Court of Claims best describes the rationale
supporting government rights in intellectual property discovered during the stages of a
government contract. The court explains: 'If the Government and the patentee entered into
several continuing research and development contracts and the invention was not separate
from or independent of the ongoing program, the Government is entitled to a license." Id.
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but only upon proof of such development.
2. Distinguishing the Cases: A Reprise. The notion of the
"prerogatives of the Sovereign" originated concurrently with the
idea of the "patent" in England.'
Edward III bestowed the first
known patent, then named a commission, for the "philosopher's
stone," a metaphysical invention based solely on superstition.'8
Later, Elizabeth utilized the patent as a source of revenue,
granting monopolies in exchange for capital.44 7 After granting a
patent to everything from ashes to iron, Parliament modified and
contained the law of English patents in the "Act concerning
Monopolies."'
Even under this new statute, however, the patent
in England remained not a right but a favor and, as such, subject
to exclusion by the Crown." 9 Therefore, under English law as
early as the 1800's, the Crown maintained free access to any
invention° under the prerogative of the Sovereign, whether patented
45

or not.

In McKeever v. United States,4 5 ' the Court of Claims considered

at 329-30. Thus,
[i]n research and development contracts, the Government normally is
contracting for more than the final product. It is also contracting for
design, development, improvements and advancements in technologies.
Thus it is entitled to at least a "shop right" in or license to use the
crystallized ideas, improvements and inventions emerging from the
process of ongoing study, inquiry and creation.
Id.
"4 CORYTON'S LAW OF PATENTS 4 (1903). The sovereign's royal prerogative is "the power
of the king to do things which no one else could do, and his power to do them in a way in
which no one else could do them.' ADAmS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 78 (1921).
" 6 Id. (citing Case of Monopolies (Moore, p. 6 75)).
"7

Id.

' Id. (citing An Act concerning Monopolies, and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the
Forfeitures Thereof, 21 Jac., ch. 3 (1623-24)). Parliament eventually decided to act out of
fear that the Crown would grant a patent to bread. Id.
' See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 23
n.66 (1987) (discussing sovereign's grant of patent).
"o See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Originsof State Power in America,
45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1085-87 (1994) (discussing scope of royal prerogative). See, also,
Dixon v. London Small Arms Co., (1876] 1 App. Cas. 632 (appeal taken from Q.B.) (refusing
to extend rule ofFeatherv. The Queen to private contractor manufacturing weapons for War
Office); Feather v. The Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1204 (Q.B. 1865) (applying rules of
construction to conclude that Crown has right to use patent without remuneration to
inventor).
"5 14 Ct. Cl. 396 (1878).
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the English lineage of the American patent as well as the prerogatives of the Sovereign. 452 The court recognized: "[A] patent in
England was nothing more than a grant dependent in contemplation of law upon royal favor, and subject to the general implication
of all grants wherein the contrary was not expressed, that they
shall not exclude a user by the Crown."45 3 In contrast, as specified by the Constitution, the Court of Claims noted that the
Founding Fathers had intended a vastly different system for the
protection of inventions in the United States.'
Under this
system, the Constitution guaranteed not a privilege or favor but a
legal property right to a patent. Thus, to appropriate that right,
the government must exercise its powers of eminent domain
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution and pay for
the taking of the property in question.455
Review of all cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Court of
Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Claims
Court, and the Court of Federal Claims reveals the most striking
commonality. All view the interpretation of patent infringement
456
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) as suits in eminent domain.
These assertions of the exercise of this power include:
It is settled that recovery of reasonable compensation
under § 1498 is premised on a theory of an eminent
domain taking under the Fifth Amendment.4 5 7
52

Id. at 420.

4

MId.

4

Id. at 420-21 (noting patent grant as creation of right).
' John E. Kidd, Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Suits Against the Federal
Government, 33 FED. B.J. 125, 126 (1959).
' Judge Rich of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit describes this
status as follows:
A patent is a grant of the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention claimed. Taken at face value, this would seem to
be a right to prevent a manufacturer from selling its product to the
United States; but it is not because § 1498 says it is not. The patentee
takes his patent from the United States subject to the government's
eminent domain rights to obtain what it needs from manufacturers and
to use the same.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
* Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 346, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Ct. Cl.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
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When the government has infringed, it is deemed to
have "taken" the patent license under an eminent
domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required by the fifth amendment. 4'
The Court of Claims, as well as its predecessors, continued to
consider patent infringement claims against the government as the
exercise of eminent domain, frequently reciting claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) as compulsory licenses compensable under
eminent domain. 4" Technically an action for "inverse condemnation,"4 " 28 U.S.C. § 1498 has been widely used as an eminent
domain statute in courts which have construed the jurisdictional
statute.
In De Graffenried v. United States,461' however, the Court of
Federal Claims recently made an independent review of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) as an eminent domain statute.4 62 The Court of Federal
Claims specifically considered whether an action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) constituted an eminent domain proceeding in determining
a claimant's qualification for the recovery of attorneys' fees and
expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).4 "
The court first reviewed the holdings of the Court of Claims,
reciting the many cases that refer to suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
as eminent domain actions. Then, the court recited the holding of
Leesona Corp v. United States:'

a Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 424 (Ct. Cl.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
' Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1082, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439 (1976), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
4m 4 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1254, at 246-49 (Supp. 1995).
In eminent domain proceedings, the government must adhere to certain requirements of due
process; at a minimum, providing notice of the subject property's intended use. In inverse
condemnation proceedings, however, a private party seeks remuneration from the
government where no formal eminent domain procedure had taken place. Id. As § 1498(a)
creates a remedy subsequent, and not a remedy precedent, to the unauthorized use of a
patent, the most apt legal analogy lies in the realm of inverse condemnation.
46' 29 Fed. Cl. 384 (1993).
4

Id. at 386.

at 385-86. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting forth Equal
Access to Justice Act).
'Id. (citing Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 991 (1979)).
40Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/2

82

Lavenue: Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Cont

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

19951

28 U.S.C. § 1498... is essentially an Act to authorize the eminent domain taking of a patent license,
and to provide just compensation for the patentee

Despite this affirmation of the Court of Claims's decision, the Court
of Federal Claims not only refused to apply the "eminent domain"
status, but expressly rejected the Leesona finding. 465 The Court
of Federal Claims made what it considered 411 the first judicial
interpretation
of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) as an eminent domain
proceeding. 4" 7
In addressing the issue, the court rejected suits under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 as eminent domain proceedings because: (1) "in a technical
sense, the United States has not 'taken' any property," (2) a patent
infringement suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and a request under
the EAJA find dissimilar statutory sources, and (3) the EAJA
maintains no suggestion for the inclusion of suits under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a).'
Of these three rationales, the first presents the most
specific refutation of the long precedent for regarding 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a) as an eminent domain proceeding.
In the first rationale, the court rejects the characterization of §
1498(a) as a "taking" because the statute authorizes that which the
Fifth Amendment prohibits. As § 1498(a) grants authorization and
consent for the infringement of patent rights "by or for the United
States" upon payment of reasonable and entire compensation, the
court concludes that no taking occurs. In rationales two and three,
the court makes no direct refutation of the long historical understanding of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) as an eminent domain action,
instead distinguishing a case for the recovery of attorneys' fees and
expenses under EAJA from prior judicial rulings.
Although the Court of Federal Claims makes persuasive arguments in De Graffenried,this author considers the ultimate finding

Id. at 386-87 ("These statements, however, are not controlling in the instant action
because they constitute dicta, and, in any event, do not address the precise issue raised
herein.").
' De Graffenreid v. United States, 29 Fed. CI. 384, 386-87 (1993).
"

7

Id. at 387.

' Id. at 387-89.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1995

83

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 2

472

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 2:389

in error. In Leesona Corp. v. United States,469 the Court of
Claims considered the issue of awarding attorneys' fees in a
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 470 Responding to the trial
commissioner's decision to grant a motion for attorneys' fees, the
Court of Claims ruled:
The fundamental error of the trial judge is that he
has taken 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which is essentially an
Act to authorize the eminent domain taking of a
patent license, and to provide just compensation for
the patentee, and he has converted it to a consent to
suit on a tort theory, and the treatment of the
United States as a tort-feasor.4 7 1
Thus, the Court of Claims infers that a § 1498(a) action may
constitute either a tort claim or a contract claim and decides that
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) has basis in contract, and specifically, in
eminent domain. Consequently, the Court of Claims not only ruled
on the issue of the recovery of attorneys' fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a), but also ruled on the issue of the status of an action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an action in eminent domain. In Crozier
v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft47 2 and in Waite v. United
States,47 3 the Supreme Court has made similar affirmative
references to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an eminent domain statute.47 4
V. PATENT INFRINGEMENT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN
CONTEXT: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1498

Since Cyrus McCormick initiated the first claim of patent
infringement against the United States in the Court of Claims by

599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979).
Id. at 963. In the trial commissioner's decision, the court had awarded the plaintiff
$100,000 in attorneys' fees. Id.
471 Id. at 970.
47 224 U.S. 290, 305-08 (1912).
473 282 U.S. 508, 508 (1931).
74
4 In analysis of this issue, Kidd contends that the Supreme Court has expressly adopted
the eminent domain structure for suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See Kidd, supra note 455,
at 126 (citing Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508 (1931)).
"m
0

41

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/2

84

Lavenue: Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Cont

1995]

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

473

reference of Congress,4 75 the body of law encompassing patent
infringement against the United States has experienced dramatic
development.4 7 6 The most significant development involves the
creation of a statutory remedy for patent infringement pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1498. 477 To understand the application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to claims of patent infringement against the government,
this Article has provided a review of the history of this section as
well as the exercise thereof by the courts. In this Part, the Article
turns to the policy considerations of such suits in the Court of
Federal Claims.
A. 28 U.s.c. § 1498: A RETROSPECTIE
Upon viewing the history and development of 28 U.S.C. § 1498,
a dichotomy emerges between a patentee's rights and the government's obligations in federal procurement. The struggle between
the interests of the patentee and the government divides into two
periods resulting from differing application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498. In
the first period, from 1910 to 1958, application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
coexisted with an implicit preference for the patentee because
contracting officers considered the presence of patent infringement
in the evaluation process. In the second period, from 1958 to
present, the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 extended no preference
to the patentee, as contracting officers simply assumed the
indemnification of competitors without regarding the patent rights
of a specific patentee. During the first period, the government
assumedly paid more because only the patentee, or licensees
thereof, maintained authorization to compete; during the second
period, the government assumedly paid a lesser amount, even
factoring in costs associated with the defense of patent infringement suits. Under this latter system, contracting officers assumed
that the competitors had factored out the costs of patent infringement. Now, as then, the question remains whether the government
calculated accurately and whether this system results in fairness

4' McCormick v. United States, 1 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 11 (1856).
476John Shea, Statutory Jurisdictionof the Court of Claims: Past, Present,and Future,

B.J. 157, 163 (1987).
29 FED.
4
7 Id.
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to all parties.
1. Preference for the Patentee. In the first period, from 1910 to
1958, the procurement system displayed an overt preference for the
patentee.4 78
Contracting officers considered the likelihood of
patent infringement in the procurement process and even factored
such considerations into the price of the contract.4 79 Accordingly,
patentees maintained a preferential position in any procurement
because only the patentee possessed the ability to price a product
absent the anticipated costs of patent infringement. The government either negotiated directly with patentees and their licensees,
or if the solicitation took place by formal advertising, the government adjusted the bids of offerors without patent rights by a factor
relative to the anticipated patent infringement costs.
2. Preference for Competition. In the beginning of the second
period, the preference for the patentee began to obstruct the timely
procurement of necessary goods and services.4
If the patentee,
or its licensee, submitted a responsible offer, then the government
most likely favored these offers over those by bidders without rights
to the patent at issue. If not, the allowance of patent infringement
claims against a contractor during the course of performance of a
government contract frequently impeded the delivery of the good or
service. Accordingly, after Congress authorized the statutory right
to bring a patent infringement action against the United States, the
Comptroller General reconsidered the historical preference for the
patentee.
In an advisory opinion of the GAO, To the Administrator,
NASA, 4s the Comptroller General considered the varieties of the
statutory right to a patent infringement claim against the United
States. 4 2 According to this opinion, the interest in timely and

478NASH

& RAWICZ, supra note 135, at 319-20.
Springer, supra note 348, at 7-25 (discussing what is "reasonable and entire
compensation' under 1910 Act).
4 0
8 NASH & RAWICZ, supra note 135, at 319-20.
4' B-136916, 46 Comp. Gen. 205 (1966).
' While the Comptroller General opinion concerns 28 U.S.C. § 1498 specifically, the
findings thereof demonstrate not only the present understanding of the rationale of the
statutory right but also shows the evolution of thinking since Crozier v. Fried Krupp
Aktiengesellschaft. Compare Crozier v. Fried Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 307
(1912) (finding equity as basis for 1910 Act) with Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United
States, 275 U.S. 331, 342 (1928) (reciting government contract performance issues as basis
47
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orderly procurement takes precedence over the patentee's concerns. 4 m The Comptroller General explained this conclusion as
follows:
Considering the act and its purposes, this Office has
concluded that Government contracts should not be
restricted to patent holders and their licensees where
patents are held, but rather all potential sources
should be permitted to compete for Government
contracts regardless of possible patent infringement. 4 4
The courts have followed the same reasoning throughout the
application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.485 However, the preference for
patentees died in the Herbert Cooper416 case, another opinion of
the Comptroller General.
The scholarship regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498 acknowledges the
pivotal role of Herbert Cooper.48 7 Subsequent to Herbert Cooper,
the Comptroller General has required that the government award
the contract to the lowest bidder pursuant to full and open
competition. As such, the contracting officer has apparently lost
the discretion to consider other factors in the evaluation of award.
Most recently, American Sealcut' replayed the Herbert Cooper
scenario. In the case, the Comptroller General recommended the
cancellation of a sole source procurement to the patentee based on
an inadequate basis for avoiding competition. When American
Sealcut sought redress, the District Court dismissed the case, citing
for 1910 Act).
* See To the Administrator,NASA, B-1369116, 46 Comp. Gen. 205 (1966) (describing
rationale as "[tihe legislative intent of section 1498 is to assure that the Government will
have available to it the resources of private industry unfettered by private patent rights.").

Id. (citations omitted).
See TVI Energy Corp. v. Blane, 806 F.2d 1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that
government maintains no obligations to accept or reject bid or offer based on presence of
patent infringement).
Comp. Gen. B-136916, Aug. 25, 1958 (unpublished).
NASH & RAWICZ, supra note 135, at 317-19. As the first opinion to question the old
practice of preference to the patentee, by allowing the government to compute the costs of
patent infringement in the bid or solicitation, Herbert Cooperindeed constitutes an essential
point of understanding regarding the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
4m Com. Gen. B-201573, 81-1 CPD 327 (1981).
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28 U.S.C. § 1498.49 The court recognized that: "[t]he purpose of
this statute was to remove impediments to the government's
procurement of patented articles; in other words, Congress sought
to permit resolution of patent disputes after the contract
award."4 ' Therefore, absent a sole bidder or offeror to a solicitation, American Sealcut
represents the state of the law of 28 U.S.C.
49 1
§ 1498(a) today.
B. 28 u.S.C. § 1498: A PERSPECTWE
The dichotomy between the period of preference to the patentee
and the period of preference to competition resulted from different
understandings regarding the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.492
While the first period virtually ignored the statute, the second
period affirmed 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and reemphasized its requirements. Since the transformation of the patent infringement statute
subsequent to HerbertCooper, patentees have nevertheless rebelled
against stringent application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Perhaps because
of equity considerations, patentees have sought reconsideration of
Herbert Cooper and its progeny. In one of the most recognized
attempts to do just that, a recent panel of experts in government
procurement has recommended amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to
more adequately protect the rights of patentees. This section
considers these recommendations to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and
to change the effect of § 1498 on federal procurement.

Principle Business Enters., Inc. v. Weinberger, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 87 (D.D.C. 1982).
ao Id. at 88 (emphasis in original).
491See, e.g., In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F.
4

Supp. 1354, 1393, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Bath Iron Works Corp. v.
Parmatic Filter Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1175, 1176, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1807 (D. Me. 1990)
(noting policy of § 1498 "is to relieve private government contractors from expensive
litigation with patentees, possible injunctions, payment of royalties, and punitive damages").

Notably, the Comptroller General recognized an exception to the Herbert Cooper doctrine
in Capital Industries,Inc., 53 Comp. Gen. 270 (1973). Therein, only one bidder responded
to an advertisement for bids, but the agency anticipated a patent problem by inclusion of the
patent infringement clause. The Comptroller General allowed the agency to contract only
with the patentee or licensee pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2304(aXO).
'" See NASH & RAWICZ, supra note 135, at 284-88 (noting divergence between reliance
on contract jurisdiction from Tucker Act and specific statutory remedies under 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a)).
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493
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (NDAA)
authorized the establishment of the Department of Defense
Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law

(Advisory Panel). 49 4 The NDAA charged the Advisory Panel with

continuing the financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement and protecting the best interests of the Department of
Defense. 495 To address these goals, the NDAA further charged
the panel with recommending either the repeal or amendment of
acquisition laws unnecessary for the government-government
contractor relationship. 49 To accomplish these tasks, the Advisory Panel created six working groups to study specific areas of the
acquisition laws.497 Working Group Five (WG5) reviewed the
laws dealing with intellectual property, specifically 28 U.S.C. §
1498,498 and developed recommendations in a draft proposal.49
WG5 distributed two sets of recommendations, one recommending
amendment of 10 U.S.C. § 2403 and another recommending
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and 35 U.S.C. § 283.
3

49 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (NDAA), Public L. No. 101-

510, 4§ 800, 104 Stat. 1485, 1587 (1990).
' As section 800 of the NDAA authorized the establishment of the Advisory Panel, many
publications refer to the panel as the 'section 800 panel." Because the panel refers to itself
as the Advisory Panel, however, this Article adopts that nomenclature.
49 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1988).
NId.

§ 800, 104 Stat. at 1587.
'" Memorandum from Allan Burman & Ralph Nash, Chairmen, Advisory Panel on
Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law, Department of Defense, to Distribution (Sept.
29, 1992), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § A (1993) (on file with the
Government Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC)
[hereinafter Advisory Panel Memorandum (Sept.)]. WG5 membership consisted of experts
from both the private and public sector, including Chairman Allan Burman, Administrator,
Office of Procurement Policy; Chairman Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Professor of Law, George
Washington University; Pete Bryan, Director, Contract Policy & Administration, Office of the
Secretary of Defense; Anthony Gamboa, Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Army;
Jack Harding, Vice President, Contracts, Raytheon Corp.; LeRoy Haugh, Vice President,
Procurement & Finance, Aerospace Industries Association; Thomas J. Madden, Partner,
Venable, Baetjer, Howard, & Civiletti; F. Whitten Peters, Partner, Williams and Connolly;
Gary Quigley, Deputy General Counsel, Defense Logistics Agency; Major General John D.
Slinkard, USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Contracting, Headquarters, Air Force Material
Command; Rear Admiral W. L. Vincent, USN, Commandant, Defense Systems Management
College; Robert D. Wallick, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson; and Harvey Wilcox, Deputy General
Counsel, Department of Navy. Id.
49 DEPT. DEF. ADVISORY PANEL ON STREAMLINING AND CODIFYING AcQUIITION LAW,
DRAFT PROPOSAL (1992).
47
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On June 25, 1992, WG5 called for comments on the draft
proposal for the amendment of 10 U.S.C. § 2403(d). 500 The
recommendation proposed a statutory amendment permitting the
head of an agency to approve a procurement covering a United
States patent by sole source." 1 Limited to Department of Defense procurements, the recommendation suggested the addition of
the following language to 10 U.S.C. § 2403(d):
(C) In the case of a contract for property or services
covered by patent or copyright, the property or
services may be considered to be available from only
one source if(i) the source is the patent or copyright
owner and/or his licensee, and
(ii) the source is responsible.
In order to increase the availability of sources for
copyrighted or patented property or services, the
head of an agency may
(i) take a license from the patent or copyright owner or his license prior to award, and
(ii) procure the property or services from
an unlicensed source and consider as a bid
evaluation factor the reasonable cost of a
license
from the patent or copyright hold2
er.60
In effect, the proposed changes to 10 U.S.C. § 2403 sought to return
the law addressing government use or manufacture of United
States patents to that existing before Herbert Cooper. 3 WG5
"o Memorandum from Allan Burman, Chairman of Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law to Distribution (June 25, 1992), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE,
WORKUNG PAPERS § 7 (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George
Washington University, Washington, DC).

501Id.
21d.

' Minutes of WG5 (undated) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George
Washington University, Washington, DC). During a discussion of the members of WG5,
Thomas J. Madden best recited the rationale for the recommendations: "[T]he intent here
was to reinstate the pre-CICA option that was taken out, that shouldn't have been done
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sought to empower the head of an agency with the authority to
force government contractors to factor the costs of a license (or of
patent royalties) into the overall costs of a government contract.'
In response to the request for comments, four government agencies, as well as the American Bar Association's Section
on Public Contract Law responded. The government agencies were

unanimously in the negative,'5° while the ABA reacted positively,
albeit with major revisions.m
On September 29, 1992, WG5 also called for comments on the

away with." Id. at 3.
' Id. In addition to the recommendation of the draft proposal regarding 10 U.S.C. §
2403(d), WG5 also stated the intention of reviewing the Technology Transfer Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 3201 et seq. (1988). See Memorandum from Allan Burman, supra note 500, at 1 ("Working
Group 5 is also presently reviewing the provisions for the transfer of technology established
under 15 U.S.C. § 3701 et. seq. Of particular interest is whether there are any procedural
problems with the statute."). WG5 never returned to the Technology Transfer Act in
subsequent recommendations.
0 6
' See, e.g., Letter from Joseph R. Varady, Jr., Director for Procurement Policy, Office of
the Assistant Secretary, Department of the Army, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law (July 27, 1992) ("1 do not agree with the proposal to amend 10
U.S.C. § 2403(d)"), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § 11 (1993) (on file with the
Government Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC); Letter
from Anthony J. Perfilio, Principle Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Force
Material Command, Wright-Patterson AFB OH, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law (July 24, 1992) (noting "[tihis office does not support the changes
to 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)"), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § 10 (1993) (on file
with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC);
Letter from Anthony T. Lane, Intellectual Property Counsel to the Army, Office of the Judge
Advocate General, Department of the Army, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law (July 10, 1992) ('strongly objects to this [§ 2304(a)] proposal"), in
1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § 12 (1993) (on file with the Government
Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC); Letter from Gregory
H. Petkoff, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Air Force, to Advisory Panel
on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (July 10, 1992) (describing proposed
amendment as "not justified and not necessary"), in 2 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING
PAPERS § 8 (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington
University, Washington, DC).
5
Letter from Karen Hastie Williams, Chair, Section of Public Contract Law, ABA, to
Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (Sept. 30, 1992) [hereinafter
Public Contract Law Section Comments]. The ABA Response incorporated the comments of
the Section of Public Contract Law as well as the Section of Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Law. Id. at 2. On the whole, these sections supported the proposed amendment
of 10 U.S.C. § 2304 "subject to proposed changes". Id. Specifically, the response noted that
the proposed amendment would have too broad of an application. In fact, the response noted
that the memorandum encompassed both patents and copyrights but that patents and
copyrights should receive different treatment. Id.
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draft proposal to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to allow regulatory
rejection of the authorization and consent clause by the contracting
officer.5" 7 WG5 proposed the following addition to the second
paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a):
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention described in and covered by
a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for
the Government and with the authorization or
consent of the Government, shall be construed as use
or manufacture for the United States. The Secretary
of Defense is authorized to issue regulationsprescribing when a contractingofficer may withhold authorization and consent.5°8
Although the proposed amendment only enabled the Secretary of
Defense to promulgate regulations concerning when a contracting
officer may withhold authorization and consent, it extended to
situations when the Secretary could allow withholding of authorization and consent.5 °9 Again limited to Department of Defense
procurements, the WG5 recommendation also specified two
circumstances for automatic rejection: (1) if the patentee claims
patent infringement would result from the contract award and (2)
if the subject matter of the procurement involves a commercial
product.5 1
If rejection occurred, the alleged infringer would
become directly liable for the patent infringement and, according to
WG5, would factor the costs of defending a patent infringement suit

5' Advisory Panel Memorandum (Sept.), supra note 498, at 1.
WORKING GROUP FIvE, DRAFr PROPOSAL 5 (Sept. 1992) (emphasis in original).

Id. The cover letter to the draft proposal recited the following recommendation:
Iu
The attached draft proposal recommends that section 1498 be amended
to provide the Secretary of Defense with the flexibility to vary this policy
by issuing regulations prescribing when a contracting officer may
withhold authorization or consent. The purpose of this recommendation
is to ensure that the patent owner has the ability to effectively compete
in the Government market.
Advisory Panel Memorandum (Sept.), supra note 498, at 1.
0
Id. For a recitation of the final recommendation of the Advisory Panel on these two
points of regulation, see infra notes 522-524 and accompanying text.
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into the contract price.511 In addition to the recommendations in
the draft proposal specifically regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498, WG5 also
recommended amending 35 U.S.C. § 283 to preclude issuance of an
injunction against patent infringement in a government contract.512 WG5 considered this amendment an essential component of the changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, needed to restrict the
patentee's ability to impede government procurement.1 3 In
response to the request for comments, eleven individuals representing both private and public interests replied.514 One favored the
recommendations, 51551another favored different changes,"' eight
opposed the recommendations, 1 7 and one expressed neither

511Id.

512 DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 508, at 3. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1988) (defining standards

for issuance of injunction).
6' DRAFT PROPOSAL, supra note 508, at 3.
'"" Responses to the Recommendations of WG5, in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING
PAPERS § 9 (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington
University, Washington, DC).
""The three sentence response of Data General Corporation was the only one to express
unreserved support for the recommendations of WG5. Letter from Arthur S. Dandeneau,
Contracts Manager, Data General Corp., to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying
Acquisition Law (Oct. 6, 1992), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § H (1993) (on
file with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington University, Washington,
DC). Even this brief notice of support, however, noted the contingent status of any proposed
change to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the possibility of further commentary. Id. Accordingly, the
affirmation provided no analytical support for the recommendation.
5'6 Letter from Gregory B. Barthold, Director, Government Marketing, Alcoa, to Advisory
Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (Oct. 20, 1992), in 1-3 WORKING
GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § C (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program,
George Washington University, Washington, DC). His response, however, objected to the
specific recommendation ofWG5. Id. at 1-2. Indeed, the Alcoa response noted that the WG5
recommendations created no unique authority for the contracting officer, as the contracting
officer already had discretion to waive the authorization and consent clause under existing
regulatory authority. Id. at 2. The Alcoa recommendation suggested "court-determined"
royalties and other judicially-mandated remedies. Id. Further, this recommendation
suggested that patentees should receive a distinct advantage in the provision of technology
to the government. See id. at 3 ("In summary, we believe that the effort to amend 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to provide the patent owner with deserved advantage is appropriate.").
"" The eight responses in opposition to the WG5 recommendations included three
government responses, three attorney/trade association responses, and one corporate
response. Memorandum from Anthony J. Perfilio, Principal Deputy Staff Judge Advocate,
Headquarters Air Force Material Command, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and
Codifying Acquisition Law (Oct. 26, 1992) (rejecting recommendations on similar grounds but
suggesting that any changes should occur through Part 27 of FAR), in 1 WORKING GROUP
FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § J (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George
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objection nor support.1 8
Despite the opposition voiced in response to the WG5 recommen-

dations, the Final Report of the Advisory Panel adopted WG5's
recommendations regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498.519 As acknowledged by the eleven responses, the WG5 recommendations resulted

Washington University, Washington, DC); Memorandum from Anthony T. Lane, Intellectual
Property Counsel of the Army, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition
Law (Oct. 16, 1992) (objecting to recommendations on grounds of potential for delay,
development of infringement issues after solicitation, and substantiality of time and
resources required to conduct patent validity studies), in 1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING
PAPERS § G (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington
University, Washington, DC); Memorandum from Gregory H. Petkoff, Office of the General
Counsel, Department of the Air Force, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying
Acquisition Law (Oct. 14, 1992) (stating WG5 recommendations provided unnecessary
changes to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 in view of existing law and regulations), in 1 WORKING GROUP
FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § 1 (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George
Washington University, Washington, DC).
Of all the responses submitted against the WG5 recommendations, the Corps of Engineers
response provides the most thorough analysis and persuasive policy grounds for rejection.
Memorandum from Lester Edelman, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to
Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (Oct. 21, 1992), in 1
WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § B (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts
Program, George Washington University, Washington, DC). The Edelman response focused
primarily on the requirement that the government maintains access to intellectual property
for the public welfare. Id. at 1. In addition, the response also questioned the need for
further protection of patentees during the solicitation phase of the procurement process,
especially in view of the current system recited at Part 27 of the FAR. Id. Furthermore, this
response strictly rejected the proposition that WG5 recommendations would improve a
system that currently provides compensation to patentees and ensures uninterrupted access
for the operation of government contracts. Id.
18
In view of two other responses from the Department of the Air Force, a third response
presents an interesting question. Memorandum from Robert H. Shipman, Assistant Deputy
Assistant Secretary (Contracting) & Assistant Secretary (Acquisition), Department of the Air
Force, to Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (Oct. 27, 1992), in
1 WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS § K (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts
Program, George Washington University, Washington DC). The Shipman-Air Force response
expresses no objections to the WG5 recommendations. See id. at 1 ("[W]e have reviewed the
package on Patent Infringement (28 U.S.C. § 1498) and believe the overall concept is
reasonable."). In view of the contrary recommendations of the other Air Force responses,
however, this two sentence response probably represents a statement of noncommittal rather
than one of support or opposition.
51 FINAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ADVISORY PANEL ON STREAMLINING

AND CODIFYING ACQUISITION LAW § 5.4.1.6 [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. See generally Yoav
M. Griver et al., Patent Protection Against Government Contractors Proposed, 4 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS., Dec. 1992, at 29 (discussing Advisory Panel's Final Report and reaction
of small business).
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from the desire to better protect the rights of patentees.520 By
allowing direct suits against contractors for patent infringement,
however, the majority of the opposition explained that diminished
competition and delay would result from implementation of the
recommendations.521 In addition, some responses suggested that
the recommendations would endanger participation by small
business in government procurement. The following sections
consider the conflicting interests that arise from such a change to
the present statutory framework.
1. Problem: Adequacy of Protectionfor the Patentee. As the
primary basis for the impetus to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Final
Report of the Advisory Panel focuses almost entirely upon greater
protection for intellectual property owners,522 specifically patentees.5' 2 In fact, the minutes of Working Group Five demonstrate
a preference for patentees to the disadvantage of other interested
parties in the procurement of patented inventions.524 The minutes also include criticism of the judicial process under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498.
For the most part, the primary complaints with the current
application of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 involved the lengthy judicial
proceedings required to secure a patentee's compensation for the
infringement of a patent,5 a disingenuous criticism by anyone

' Acquisition Policy, Section 800 PanelReporton StreamliningDefenseAcquisition Laws
Sent to Congress, 59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 2 (Jan. 18, 1993) [hereinafter Panel Report Sent
to Congress].
621 Committee Report on StreamliningDefense Acquisition Sent to Congress, 1993 Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) 10 (Jan. 15, 1993).
m FINAL REPORT, supra note 519, § 5.4.1.4, at 5-95.
5
= Id.
Minutes of Meeting (undated), in WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS (on file with
the Government Contracts program, George Washington University, Washington, DC).
Indeed, the recommendations of WG5 explained this bias: "The infringer also has a
competitive advantage over the patent owner or licensee because the infringer can offer a
price which does not include recovery of the costs of making the invention." FINAL REPORT,
supra note 519, § 5.4.1.3, at 5-99.
'' In the minutes of one WG5 meeting, Robert D. Wallick of Steptoe & Johnson
commented: "Current suing of Government in Claims Court for patent violation and getting
paid 10 years later is not a viable answer." Minutes of Meeting, supra note 524, at 4. What
Mr. Wallick misses, as does WG5, is that any patent litigation takes years to complete-such
is the nature of the American judicial system, a problem Congress never intended WG5 to
address. See also Public Contract Law Section Comments, supra note 506, at 2 ("[Tlhe costs
and time involved in litigation, as well as the potential damage to the patent owner's
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who understands the method by which an agency pays claims.526
Yet, while the Advisory Panel recommends changes to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 to protect the patentee, others support the changes as a way
to inhibit the loss of American technology and American technological know-how.527 Some government contractors even consider the
present
system a threat to national economic and military securi528
ty.

2. Solution: Provisionfor Direct Suits for Patent Infringement.
On January 15, 1993, the Advisory Panel submitted the Advisory
Panel Report, including the recommendations of WG5 regarding 28
U.S.C. § 1498, to the Secretary of Defense for final transmission to

protected business damage, impose an inappropriate burden on successful inventors.").
2

The judicial system maintains only partial blame for the delay in suits before the

Court of Federal Claims because the very nature of the system of suing the United States
requires lengthy proceedings before an agency and in court. 4 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 29-30 (1972), in WORKING GROUP FIVE, WORKING PAPERS

§ 16 (1993) (on file with the Government Contracts Program, George Washington University,
Washington, DC). The Commission on Government Procurement explained the problem:
At present, payment on judgments of $100,000 or less in the Court of
Claims [now, the Court of Federal Claims] is made from funds provided
for by the Permanent and Definite Appropriations Act on approval by the
General Accounting Office. For judgments over $100,000, the Department of Justice must report to the Department of Treasury which in turn
must obtain the funds from Congress.
This practice has two drawbacks. First, there may be an incentive in
certain cases on the part of the procuring agency to avoid settlements
and prolong litigation in order to have the final judgment against the
agency occur in court, thus avoiding payment out of agency funds.
Second, the practice may tend to hide from Congress the true economic
costs of some procurements by not requiring the agencies to seek
additional appropriations to pay the judgment.
Id. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). To solve this problem, the Commission recommended the
payment of all judgments from the agency's appropriation. Id. at 30. Although Congress
adopted many of the recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement,
Congress rejected the foregoing suggestion. See Elbaum, supra note 377 (noting that agency
may deny valid patent infringement claim in favor of judicial resolution for benefit of
payment by means other than agency appropriations).
"2See White House Advisory Panel Issues Report on 22 CriticalTechnologies, 55 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) 559, 559 (Apr. 29, 1991) (discussing comparable recommendations of
National Critical Technologies Panel).
m See Stephen M. Elliott, PatentsPolicy, CONT. MGMT., May 1992, at 42, 62 (noting that
many potential government contractors refuse to participate in collaborative arrangements
because of "a real or perceived fear of losing, revealing or forsaking proprietary or patented
technology").
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the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.529 The
Advisory Panel submitted two specific recommendations for the
statutory amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.530 The WG5 recom5

Panel Report Sent to Congress, supra note 520, at 2.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 519, § 5.4.1.4, at 5-99:

Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to provide the Secretary of Defense with the
authority to issue regulations prescribing when a contracting officer may

withhold authorization or consent.
Amend 35 U.S.C. § 283 to prohibit a claimant from obtaining injunctive
relief where the infringement has occurred in the performance of a
Government contract.
This proposal provides the Secretary of Defense with the flexibility to
vary this [current] policy by issuing regulations prescribing when a
contracting officer may withhold authorization or consent. The purpose
of this recommendation is to ensure that the patent owner has the ability
to effectively compete in the Government market. Two possible
circumstances where withholding authorization and consent would be
appropriate are: (1) where the patent owner comes forward claiming
that award would infringe his patent; and (2) where the procurement is
for a commercial product.
In the first instance, if a patent owner came forward asserting the
patent, then the contracting officer could elect not to insert the "authorization and consent" clause in the solicitation. Since the infringer would
no longer be protected from suit, the infringing offeror would have to
factor the costs of an infringement suit into his offer. This price factor
would bring the infringer's offer more in line with the patent owner's
offer. Presently, an infringing offeror can sell an infringing product to
the Government at a lower price than the inventor, thereby excluding the
inventor from the Government market. Although a patent indemnification clause is often contained in a Government contract, this may not
induce infringers to include a meaningful factor into their offer to
compensate for the potential liability. Making infringing offerors
quantify the risk of suit will assist the patent owner to effectively
compete in the Government market. Small businesses expressed concern
over this proposal stating that they would not be able to compete against
large defense contractors or critical aircraft spare parts if this proposal
were adopted. This issue will have to be addressed more fully addressed
as will the possible unintentional consequences of the Panel's recommendations.
The second instance where a contracting officer may want to withhold
authorization or consent is where the procurement is for a commercial
product. Generally, contractors do not infringe on commercial products
because of the protection provided in section 2-312 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Under this provision, the seller warrants that:
(1) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful;
and
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mendations originated primarily from a perception of unfairness to
patentees. Other than generalized allegations of unfairness to the
patentee, however, neither the Advisory Panel nor WG5 provided
any specific reasons for the recommended changes. 1 Indeed,
neither the Final Report of the Advisory Panel nor the digest of the
Working Papers of WG5 contain a single specific reference to a
particular example of unfairness to a patentee. 32
Following the submission of the Final Report to the Secretary of
Defense, the government procurement community expressed great
reservations, describing the recommendations as dramatic and
"sweeping."= Although this author finds general favor with the
goals of the Advisory Panel, he disagrees with the specific recommendations regarding the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
This author disapproves of the recommendation to amend 28
U.S.C. § 1498 to provide authority for the Secretary of Defense to
withhold authorization and consent because the present statutory
framework already provides the "head of an agency" with adequate
5 34
discretion in regard to allegations of patent infringement.

(2) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest
or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of
the contracting has no knowledge.
Patent owners should be provided the same protection for commercial
products sold to the Government as that given in section 2-312 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. This proposal would improve the Government's commercial buying practices. Buying commercial products allows
the Government to "take advantage of the broad based competition that
occurs in the commercial market place." Some of the benefits in the
commercial market include "lower costs resulting from price competition
and scale economies, short lead-times provided by deliveries from
existing production lines, and increased surge capacity available from a
broadened industrial base." Only by assimilating commercial practices
when buying commercial products can the Government take full
advantage of the commercial marketplace.
'1 Petkoff Memorandum, supra note 517, at 3.
Id. The Army-Lane responses noted that the "fundamental flaw* with the WG5
recommendation involved the complete absence of any positive evidence of a problem with
the present system. Lane Memorandum, supra note 517, at 1. Even assuming arguendo
such evidence, the Air Force-Petkoff response noted that a more appropriate remedy would
appear in a regulatory, not a statutory, form. Petkoff Memorandum, supra note 517, at 2.
'"John F. Morton, Panel Calls for Sweeping Changes in Defense-AcquisitionRules, FED.
TECH. REP., Mar. 18, 1993, at 6.
534 10 U.S.C. § 2304(bXl) (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
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Indeed, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 presently empowers the head of an agency
with broad discretion as to the types of contracts in which the
Department of Defense may participate, including sole source
contracts. In Capital Industries, Inc., 5 for example, the Comptroller General allowed a solicitation under 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(10)
despite complications involving patent infringement. Although 10
U.S.C. § 2304 provides no authority to withhold authorization and
consent, the statutory provision enables the head of an agency to
make special provisions for contracts in which allegations of patent
infringement may create unique contracting requirements.
Aside from the statutory recommendation, this author disagrees
with the recommendations concerning the withholding of authorization and consent made by the Advisory Panel. Where a patentee
asserts patent infringement, the Final Report contends that the
patentee would always offer a higher price (to include the cost of
the royalty) and thus lose the contract. This conclusion makes
several questionable assumptions: (1) the solicitation requires the
invention disclosed in the patentee's patent; (2) the patentee
maintains a valid patent; and (3) the patentee fails to sue in the
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of reasonable and entire
compensation for the alleged patent infringement. Where the
contract calls for a commercial product, the Final Report also
recommends the adoption of the requirements of UCC section
2-312. This recommendation wholly ignores the present regulatory
framework, which specifically provides for situations where a
patentee alleges patent infringement or for contracts involving
"supplies or services normally sold on an open market."53 6 For
these reasons, this author concludes that the recommendations of
the Advisory Panel with regard to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would burden
procurement law, not only with regard to the government, but also
with regard to the rights of patentees and government contractors
in general.
3. ProblemsAnew. Except for the recommendation made in the
conclusion of this Article, this author recommends maintaining the
status quo with regard to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The patent policy
proposed by the Advisory Panel contemplates a system favoring the
53 Comp. Gen. 270 (1973).
See supra notes 309-346 and accompanying text (depicting the flow diagram).
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owners of patent rights, while the present system maintains a
preference for competition. Neither the Advisory Panel nor WG5
have given sufficient evidence of unfairness to patentees to justify
a change. Indeed, while the present system places a burden on the
patentee, such as suit in the Court of Federal Claims, the adoption
of the recommendations of the Advisory Panel would disproportionally affect the government. If Congress adopts the recommendation
of the Advisory Panel with regard to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, some results
seem inevitable: (1) a heightened level of unfairness to small
business; (2) diminution of competition; (3) higher costs; (4) an
increase in delay; and (5) loss of the best technology.
a. Fairness. Although the Final Report of the Advisory Panel
suggests improvements for small business, adoption of the recommendations of the Advisory Panel would negatively impact small
business contractors.5 3 7
While most small businesses have
opposed the recommendations of the Advisory Panel based on the
increase of the small business acquisition threshold from $25,000
to $100,000 as well as changes in technical data provisions, the
recommendations of the Advisory Panel, and specifically those of
WG5 regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498, would disparately affect small
business.'
Indeed, the Final Report of the Advisory Panel
recognized the threat to small businesses posed by implementation
of its recommendations. 9
b. Competition. Adoption of the recommendations of the

"' Acquisition Policy: Small Businesses Oppose Simplified Threshold, Other Section 800
Recommendations, 59 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 25, 25 (June 28, 1993). Small businesses
criticized the recommendations of the Advisory Panel as giving little consideration to the
interests of small business: "The witnesses asserted that, although the report says the
recommendations will benefit small businesses, they will in fact work to their detriment,"
and that "the Section 800 Panel apparently devoted little attention to factors that impede
small businesses from participating in the government procurement process." Id.
". Id.
Small businesses have roundly criticized the fact that neither the Advisory Panel
nor WG5 had a single representative of small business. Id. Further, even when WG5 and
other working groups submitted draft recommendations for comment, small businesses noted
that their interest groups received such information well toward the end of the drafting

stages. Id.
' See FINAL REPORT, supra note 519, § 5.4.1.4, at 5-100 ("Small businesses expressed
concern over this proposal stating that they would not be able to compete against large
defense contractors or critical aircraft spare parts if this proposal were adopted. This issue
will have to be addressed more fully, as will the possible unintentional consequences of the
Panel's recommendations.") (footnotes omitted).
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Advisory Panel would diminish competition for government
Currently, if a contract contemplates patent
procurement.'
infringement, a small business may rely on the authorization and
consent clause in a government contract, but if the agency withholds authorization and consent as proposed by the Advisory Panel,
only large concerns or concerns with extensive patent holdings
would take the risk of engaging in patent infringement during the
course of a government contract. 4 1 Although some provision
already exists for securing competition among nonprofit organizations and small businesses, such benefits only extend to a minority
of agencies and departments. 2
c. Cost. Adoption of the recommendations of the Advisory

Perfilio Memorandum, supra note 517, at 1.
"'1 d. at 2.
62 The Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980 allowed the retention of title of
""

inventions discovered by nonprofit groups operating government-owned contractor operated
(GOCO) laboratories, cite. See also Exec. Order No. 12,591,3 C.F.R. 220 (1988) (authorizing
agency heads to "waive rights to intellectual property developed by [government-owned,
government operated] laborator[ies] under ... cooperative research or development
agreements"). For other efforts to protect the intellectual property of companies, both large
and small, who contract with the United States, see Elliott, supra note 528, at 44
(referencing Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Patents in Space Bill, and Patent
Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990).
In 1980, Congress also enacted the Government Patent Policy Act of 1980 which permitted
nonprofit and small business contractors to retain title to inventions developed during
research and development contracts. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3020 (1980)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 202 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6461 (characterizing Act as
.establish[ing] presumption that ownership of all patent rights in government funded
research will vest in any contractor who is a non-profit research institution or a small
business"). Although implementation of the law remained within agency discretion, in 1983,
President Reagan issued a "Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy," which
directed the heads of executive agencies and departments to adopt similar policies as Pub.
L. No. 96-517. Id. See also Federal Acquisition Circular 84-1 (Mar. 26, 1984) (reiterating
objectives of Presidential Memorandum on Government Patent Policy). By 1992, however,
only the Department of Defense had adopted the recommendation. See FAR 27.302, 48
C.F.R. § 27.302 (1992) (setting forth recommendation as adopted); see also 55 Fed. Reg. §
25524-25 (1990) (codified at 48 C.F.R. § 27.302 (1992)) (noting final adoption). Despite other
efforts to ensure protection for small business, no proposal or recommendation to date would
offset the loss of business incumbent in the recommendation of the Advisory Panel. For the
importance of small business to the American economy, see Lionel M. Lavenue, The
Corporationas a Criminal Defendant and Restitution as a Criminal Remedy: Application
of the Victim and Witness Protection Act by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Corporations,18 J. CoRP. L. 441, 514-19 (1993).
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Panel would increase cost to the government.' 4 Less competition
inevitably means greater costs.'
Furthermore, since the
Advisory Panel favors the approval of sole source contracts for
technology in which the patentee maintains the only patents, its
recommendations entail substantially greater costs to the government." 5
d. Delay. Adoption of the recommendations of the Advisory
Panel would delay the procurement of goods and services by the
United States.5" While alternative licensing procedures already
empower some agency officials to secure licenses before patent
infringement occurs under a government contract, time limitations
frequently minimize the added delay inherent in securing a license
for the use of a patent." 7 Additionally, some agencies and departments make no provision for such licensing procedures, relying
on the regulatory protections afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1498.548
e. Best Technology for the Government. The recommendations
of the Advisory Panel may also inhibit the submission of the best

s Perfilio Memorandum, supra note 517, at 1.
5 Id.

'"Id.
Lane Memorandum, supra note 517, at 1.
57 See NASA 9.101-2(f(2), 48 C.F.R. § 9.101-2 (1992). The concept of"preprocurement
licensing" began at NASA, when the agency initiated a policy of securing licenses in lieu of
patent infringement. See, e.g., To the AdministratorINASA], 46 Comp. Gen. 205, 208 (1966)
(describing NASA plan as "theoretically sound* and approving on 'trial basis"); To the
Administrator INASA), 49 Comp. Gen. 806, 808 (1970) (approving proposed revision that
incorporated "reasonableness" standard for licensing costs). Such a preprocurement licensing
program renders infringement costs ascertainable:
[There] seems to be the feeling that potential patent infringement
liability is too speculative a matter to become a factor in evaluating bids
or proposals. But where the Government is a licensee under the patent
in question, obligated to pay a predetermined royalty for procurement
from an unlicensed source, the cost of such procurements could be readily
and precisely determined.
Gerald J. Mossinghoff& Robert F. Allnutt, Patent Infringement in Government Procurement:
A Remedy Without a Right?, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5, 22 (1966).
' In contrast to NASA, because of the delay incumbent in securing preprocurement
licenses, the Department of Defense rejected the adoption of such an "instant licensing"
policy. See S. Joseph Rotondi, Jr. & James A. Dobkin, Government CompetitiveProcurement
and Patent Infringement: Substance and Solution, 27 FED. B.J. 325 (1967) (examining
Department of Defense reliance on procurement regulations).
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technology available for a particular government contract. 9
Under the recommendations of the Advisory Panel, only the
patentee could offer the "best technology" for a particular type of
product; all other producers and providers could only offer that for
which no patent infringement would occur.5" Under this system,
if the patentee chooses not to offer the subject technology, then the
government may not have access to the best technology within a
certain field, a particularly undesirable situation in the aerospace
and military arenas.55'
c. 28 u.s.c. § 1498: A PROSPECTIVE
As discussed in the preceding section, the recommendations of
the Final Report of the Advisory Panel call for the amendment of
28 U.S.C. § 1498 to allow the government to withhold authorization
and consent in order to allow patentees more latitude in suing for
patent infringement arising during the course of government
contracts. Although the Advisory Panel submitted these recommendations to Congress on January 15, 1993 (at least with regard to
the recommendations regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498), Congress has
fortunately not attempted to adopt the recommendations.5 5 2
Indeed, the most recent legislative proposal regarding federal
procurement, introduced by Senator Glenn in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1993, chose not to recommend amendment
of 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 5' In view of these legislative developments,
and particularly in the absence of any mention of 28 U.S.C. § 1498
in the Gore Report,'
the law regarding 28 U.S.C. § 1498 remains unchanged. Although the proposed Federal Acquisition

' Comments of Judge Frederick J. Lees (Ret.), NASA Board of Contract Appeals, now
Professor of Law at George Washington University, on the Recommendations of WG5.
65 Id.

MIld.
iMPanelReport Sent to Congress, supra note 520, at 2.
' Id.
Government Contracts: Draft of Gore Report Calls for Sweeping Changes Concerning
Federal Procurement, 1993 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) (Sept. 1, 1993). However, the
Gore Report contains numerous recommendations for changing the way that government
currently procures goods and services, with some recommendations regarding intellectual
property rights. Id. Predominately, however, the recommendations involving intellectual
property rights engage technical data rights. Id.
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Streamlining Act of 1993 adopted the recommendations of the
Advisory Panel,' including the recommendations of WG5 regarding the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)," the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act of 1994, as enacted, made no change to 28
557
1498.
§
U.S.C.
Accordingly, as 28 U.S.C. § 1498 apparently will remain the law
for at least a few years longer, this section attempts to provide
some realistic assistance for the patentee or the government
contractor facing an impending suit in the Court of Federal Claims
under the statute. Reviewing the 279 reported cases resolved by
the Court of Federal Claims or its predecessors, the following
analysis enables a patentee, government contractor, or government
agent to make certain conclusions with regard to the application of
the statute.5"
As described in Part I of this Article, the Court of Claims only
gained statutory authority to adjudicate patent infringement claims
against the United States in 1910 with the enactment of the 1910
Act, as later amended in 1918 and codified at 35 U.S.C. § 68. The
following graph depicts the number of published claims resolved by
the Court of Claims during this period: 59

5m39 CONG. REC. S14384 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Glenn introducing
S. 1587). Section 5011 of S. 1587 recommended the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) in
conformity with the recommendations of WG5 of the Advisory Panel. Id. at S14414.
'See Ron R. Hutchinson, A Practical Guide to the New Commercial Item Provisions
Containedin S-1587, the FederalAcquisition StreamliningAct of 1994,62 Federal Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 13, 13-14 (Oct. 10, 1994).
"5 Exec. Order No. 12,931, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,387 (Oct. 13, 1994). On October 13, 1994,
President Clinton signed the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.
'Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994). In the following review, the
reader should note that the figures represent only approximations of the actual figures for
each year. While the number reflects the number of cases as contained within the LEXIS
database, duplicity of issues as well as other factors may corrupt the exactness of any totals.
For this reason, these computations should be considered only for general policy analysis and
not an accurate accounting or for any other particularized purposes.
"'Graph 1 portrays the number of reported cases on the LEXIS database as appeared
in the Court of Claims Reporter. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994).
The computation includes all dispositions with case references to the 1910 Act, the 1918 Act,
or 35 U.S.C. § 68. Id.
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During the period from 1910 to 1948, the Court of Claims adjudicated World War I claims and the initial claims from World War
II.50 As the graph illustrates, the majority of the claims occurred
during the 1930's while relatively few claims arose during the early
1940's."
The graph may represent a somewhat imprecise portrayal of the total number of patent infringement claims during
this period, as neither congressional reference cases nor implied-infact contract claims for patent infringement appear in the graph.
Nevertheless, as for the number of claims initiated under the
statutory authority to sue the United States for patent infringement, the Court of Claims Reporter contains only 37 such cases.
In contrast, after Congress replaced 35 U.S.C. § 68 with 28
U.S.C. § 1498 in 1948, the Court of Claims experienced a virtual
explosion of the number of reported cases. The following graph
depicts the published claims resolved by the Court of Claims, the
Claims Court, and the Court of Federal Claims during this
period: 2

COWEN ET AL., supra note 40, at 54-57.
Search of LExIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994).
Graph 2 portrays the number of reported cases on the LEXIS database as appeared
in the Court of Claims Reporter, the Claims Court Reporter, and the Court of Federal Claims
Reporter. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994). The computation
61

includes all dispositions with case references to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Id.
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Since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the Court of Federal
Claims and its predecessor courts have decided an average of five
and one-half cases a year.m In contrast to the period prior to 28
U.S.C. § 1498, which included years without a single patent
infringement case, the present statutory framework has induced at
least one patent infringement suit against the United States every
year since the enactment of the statute, with the largest number of
reported cases (nineteen) occurring in 1980.
In the last ten years, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has looked increasingly favorably on the disposition of patent
infringement claims by summary judgment. Because of this trend,
some claimants believe that the presence of such decisions on the
record provides less than an ample encouragement for a claim of
patent infringement.56 4 Accordingly, claimants frequently prefer
to attain disposition by trial in lieu of summary judgement.56 In
the Court of Federal Claims, however, the United States submits
a motion for summary judgment in essentially every claim proffered
for resolution, whether for patent infringement or not.6" In
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 this practice is more pronounced,
with the United States seeking not only a favorable decision by
summary judgment, but also a declaration of invalidity as well.567
To illustrate this trend, the following graph depicts the published
cases from the inception of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 to present, differentiat5
ing between resolutions by summary judgment and by trial:

N3Id. Thus, of the 240 reported cases since 1949, the Court of Claims, Claims Court, and
Court of Federal Claims have resolved an average of 5.45 cases a year. Id.
' Bruce Wieder, Significant Patent Decisions from the Court ofAppeals for the Federal
Circuit - 1988, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 1303, 1309 (1989).
6" Id.
- Id.
'

Id.

Graph 3 portrays the number of reported cases on the LEXIS database as appeared
in the Court of Claims Reporter, the Claims Court Reporter, and the Court of Federal Claims
Reporter. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994). It also includes
separate declination of these cases, whether by summary judgment or by trial. Id.
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As the graph shows, despite the prevalence of summary judgment
motions, the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors have
historically rendered patent infringement decisions more often by
trial than by summary judgment. Indeed, even after the rulings by
the Federal Circuit allowing a more expansive application of
summary judgement dispositions, the Court of Federal Claims has
nevertheless continued to resolve patent infringement claims more
often by trial. For example, the following graph refines the
preceding graph encompassing the years 1982-1993:69

' Graph 4 portrays the number of reported cases on the LEXIS database as appeared
in the Claims Court Reporter and the Court of Federal Claims Reporter. Search of LEXIS,
Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994).
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Except for 1988, the Claims Court and the Court of Federal Claims
have rendered patent infringement decisions more often by trial
than by summary judgment. 570 Thus, patentees receive more
favorable outcomes in the Court of Federal Claims than in District
Court because of the number of cases which the former decides by
trial (as opposed to summary judgement).571 Of the 1,248 patent
infringement cases filed in the district courts in 1989, for example,
only eight percent found resolution by trial.572 In the Court of
Federal Claims, however, fifty-six percent of all patent infringement cases found resolution by trial as opposed to summary
judgement since 1982. 673
Regardless of the number of cases or the form of decision,
however, if a patentee cannot succeed in a suit under 28 U.S.C. §
1498 against the United States, then the statute provides no
benefit. The following graph depicts the published decisions since
1982:574

670 Id.
'""

Anne L. Spangler, Note, Intellectual PropertyProtection and Import Trade: Making

Section 337 Consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
217, 260 n.286 (1991).
's See id. (comparing number of cases in district courts from June 1988 to June 1989)

(citation omitted).
'"' Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994).
Of the fifty-two cases
decided since 1982, twenty-nine were resolved at trial and twenty-three were disposed of by

summary judgment. Id.
5 Graph 5 portrays the number of reported cases on the LEXIS database as appeared
in the Claims Court Reporter and the Court of Federal Claims Reporter. Search of LEXIS,
Genfed library, FED File (Apr. 1, 1994).
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As this win/loss record demonstrates, excluding dispositions other
than a win or loss, a plaintiff/patentee maintains a little better
than one-third chance of success in a suit under 28 U.S.C. §
1498." 7' However, if the computation includes other dispositions
(such as nonjusticiability), then the win ratio becomes even more
disheartening for the potential patentee-plaintiff. In these cases,
the plaintiff-patentee
maintains less than a one-fourth chance of
576
success.

CONCLUSION

The task of law is to maintain an ever-readjusted
balance between the needful restraint on the powers
of government and the needful exercise of the powers
of government.5 77
As required by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution,
the patent system encourages invention by rewarding the inventor
with a bundle of exclusionary rights for a finite term. This same
system also requires the disclosure of the invention to enable public
access to the technology. This dichotomy becomes even more
pronounced when the government intervenes, especially through
the infringement of a patent, because patent infringement by the
United States involves yet another competing interest. While a
patentee seeks the broadest possible protection for intellectual
property rights, the government considers only the level and cost
of the available technology and maintains little concern for the
rights of patentees. To resolve these competing interests, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498 provides the means to achieve such competition by providing
authorization and consent for patent infringement while allowing
the patentee to secure the benefits of inventorship.

576 Id. During the period from 1982 to 1993, the Claims Court and the Court of Federal
Claims have reported dispositions in fifty-two cases. Id. Of these fifty-two, seventeen case
dispositions occurred by remedies other than a merit adjudication in favor of or against the
plaintiff. Id. Thus, of the remaining thirty-five cases, the plaintiff prevailed in twelve, or

34%, of the cases. Id.
578
Id. Of the fifty-two cases, the plaintiff prevailed in twelve, or 23%, of the cases. Id.
57 THE QUOTABLE LAWYER § 61.44, at 124-25 (David S. Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds.
1986) (quoting Leon Jaworski).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol2/iss2/2

114

Lavenue: Patent Infringement Against the United States and Government Cont

1995]

PATENT INFRINGEMENT

503

Not surprisingly, the resolution of these conflicting interests
places a heavy burden upon a patentee when seeking to enforce
patent rights in the Court of Federal Claims. As with most matters
regarding patent enforcement, the issues all revolve around cost.
In 1991, a typical patent infringement suit cost $396,000, while in
1993, the same suit cost $518,000.578 A patentee cannot always
expect to recoup these costs. For example, Hughes Aircraft recently
obtained a $114 million judgment against the United States for
patent infringement after twenty-eight years of litigation, but had
sought more than $1.5 billion in royalties. 579 In 1993, the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform (ACPLR) addressed the cost
of patent enforcement:
Thus, there is an essential relationship between the
value of patent rights, and the cost of patent litigation. Where the market value of a patented invention is less than the cost of its enforcement, the
patent has essentially no economic value to its
holder. If the patent owner does not have a strong
financial posture, threatened litigation can be used
as a bargaining tool to decrease or even eliminate
the potential value of a patented invention to the
patent owner. Even where parties are equally
situated, excessive "transaction" costs in enforcing
patent rights serve only to lessen the value of patents to their holders, and thus, weaken the incentive
they are designed to provide.'
In response to the "excessive" cost of patent enforcement, the
Report noted that public comments had produced a variety of
recommendations ranging from the practical, such as the appoint-

578 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASS'N (1993); AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY LAW ASS'N (1991). Note that 1991 figures include the median cost of litigating
only "utility"patents, whereas the 1993 figures indicate the median cost for the litigation of
all patent infringement suits in general.
', Bruce Rubenstein, $114 Million Not Enough: Hughes Aircraft Appeals Latest
Judgment in 28-year-long Saga, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 1.
uo ADVISORY COMMN ON PATENT LAw REFORM, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

76 (1992) (on file with author).
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ment of special expert magistrates to assist in patent trials, to the
radical, such as the creation of specialized patent trial courts and
the creation of special "small" claims proceedings for patent
infringement claims."' The Report, however, made no recommendations regarding patent infringement pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498.
Indeed, the only recommendations involving 28 U.S.C. § 1498
involve those of the Department of Defense Advisory Panel on
Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law (Advisory Panel). The
Report of the Advisory Panel proposed a solution to the problem of
patent enforcement costs by seeking the statutoryamendment of28
U.S.C. § 1498. The recommended amendment would allow broad
authority for a contracting officer to require competitors to compute
the costs of patent infringement within the government procurement. Such a recommendation thus seeks a statutory reversal of
Herbert Cooper, the Comptroller General case which first recognized that the government may engage in government contracts
without consideration of possible patent infringement. If this result
seemed the sole answer, not only to the question of patent enforcement costs, but also to the issue of fairness to the patentee, then
transferring these costs from the patentee to the government would
seem justified. However, as the fundamental basis of inequity to
the patentee lies in the exclusivity of the remedy of suit in the
Court of Federal Claims, and not merely in the requirement of suit
per se, this author finds an alternative remedy more compelling.
In De Graffenried v. United States,"2 the Court of Federal
Claims rejected the status of a suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 as an
eminent domain proceeding and found the claimant qualified for
the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to the EAJA.
The claimant had sought the recoupment of attorneys' fees and
expenses for a successful suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1498.r 3
In
takings suits under a theory of eminent domain, authority exists
for the recoupment of attorneys' fees and expenses independent of
the EAJA, but the claimant did not meet the statutory require-

at 81-84.
29 Fed. C1. 384, 388 (1993).
Id. at 387-88.

5'1d.
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ments.5 ' 4 However, the Court of Federal Claims concluded that
an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 was not a suit in eminent
domain.5 The court explained:
As a general legal matter, absent some statutory
prohibition, an individual who lawfully becomes
aware of another individual's invention is free to
produce and use that invention. Therefore, the
metes and bounds of an inventor's property interest
in an invention is defined by the statutory framework that restricts other individuals from using the
invention. Herein, plaintiffs patent was granted in
1965, and at that time, the existing statutory framework included not only 35 U.S.C. § 154, which
generally grants a patent owner the right to exclude,
but also Section 1498(a), which grants the government the absolute right, whether or not licensed, to
use any patented invention. In view of Section
1498(a), a patent owner can have no expectation of
excluding the government from using his or her
invention, and the sole remedy available for the
government's unlicensed use of the patent is the
right to secure "reasonable and entire compensation."
Because a patent owner's property rights under the
applicable statutory scheme do not include the right
to exclude the government from using his or her
patented invention, when the government uses a
patented invention, it does not "take" any property
interest that belongs to the patent owner. Stated in
another way, the government does not have to resort
to exercising its sovereign power of eminent domain
to utilize a patent owner's patented invention because the statutory framework that defines a patent
owner's property rights gives the government the

's

Id. Although the Court of Federal Claims found the claimant qualified for attorneys'

fees and expenses under the EAJA, the court found that the claimant had not satisfied either
requirement for recovery under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Id. at 392.
''

Id.
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authority to use all patented inventions. Thus, the
government cannot "take" what it already possesses.

5"

Thus, the Court of Federal Claims ruled that a patentee maintains
no patent rights as against the United States for patent infringement. In a historical and jurisprudential context, this cannot be
the law.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution secures discernable rights to inventors for their discoveries. This mandate
contains no exceptions for the federal government. Thus, while 28
U.S.C. § 1498 exempts the actions of the United States from
liability, the exemption only applies provided the United States
compensate the patentee with "reasonableand entire compensation."
As discussed in the preceding section, such action constitutes a
taking. The Constitution establishes the right to a patent, 28
U.S.C. § 1498 carves out the statutory remedy for the use by the
United States, and the Fifth Amendment requires compensation.
After this conclusion, however, the problem remains how to
compensate a patentee for attorneys' fees and expenses when the
patentee prevails in a patent infringement suit against the United
States. The solution, implied in De Graffenried, is the statutory
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1498 providing for the recoupment of
attorneys' fees and expenses.
A statutory right for the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses
constitutes a more appropriate remedy than restructuring the
present system as suggested by the Advisory Panel. The recommendations of the Advisory Panel would result in less fairness and
competition, more delay, the loss of best technology, and greater
costs to the government. Conversely, a statutory amendment to
allow the recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses would only
subject the United States to greater liability. If correctly implemented, the allowance of attorneys' fees and expenses would benefit
both the patentee and the government-the patentee would stand
to gain full compensation for an infringed patent and the government would incur additional liability only if patent infringement
actually occurred.
'" Id. at 387-88.
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Like the EAJA, the statute should mandate recovery by the
prevailing party, the successful patentee. However, authorization
of fees and expenses should not depend upon the financial condition
of the patentee, the number of employees engaged by the patentee,
or the net worth of the patentee, as under the EAJA. Most
importantly, the authorization should absolutely not make recovery
dependent upon disproving substantial justification (or a similar
standard) or proving special circumstances. In short, the authorization should expressly preempt the "American Rule" if a patentee
prevails in a patent infringement suit against the United States in
the Court of Federal Claims.
Upon the adoption of a statutory amendment for the recoupment
of attorneys' fees and expenses, the United States may continue to
seek the best overall price by full and open competition and the
patentee may expect reasonable and entire compensation for any
patent rights utilized by the United States in a government
contract. In light of the costs of patent enforcement, this recommendation ensures the only fair result for all the parties in
government contracting. The Fifth Amendment requires reasonable and entire compensation for property taken for government
use; without the provision of attorneys' fees and expenses in patent
infringement suits, a patentee could never achieve full compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. 5s

' As of the publication of this Article, the 103d Congress had allocated funds for the
consideration of this recommendation during its second session:
Attorneys Fees in Cases Involving the Infringement of a Patent by
Government Contractors.The Subcommittee [on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations] may consider legislation to permit owners of
patents which are infringed by Government contractors to recover their
reasonable litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, as part of their
compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which provides specific authority
for the award of damages in such cases through suit against the
Government.
H.R. REP. No. 433, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1994). Upon convening the 104th Congress in

1995, this author wishes this Subcommittee the best of luck in arriving at a bill that will
ensure that the government allows patentees the same rights as private parties, as required
by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
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